

# Assignment #7 – Solutions

# Problem 1a

- Migrating secrets between platform configurations on a single machine.

- TPM command to seal  $S$ :

$$C = \text{Seal}(K_{EPUB,A}, S, PCR_0, PCR_1, PCR_2, PCR_3, PCR_4, PCR_5)$$

- TPM command to unseal  $C$  and retrieve  $S$ :

$$\text{Unseal}(K_{EPRIV,A}, C, PCR_0, PCR_1, PCR_2, PCR_3, PCR_4, PCR_5)$$

# Problem 1b

- Patching part of the measured OS
- Before applying the patch, the OS needs to seal  $S$  to the set of *new* PCR values that match the patched OS and save this sealed value away
  - Then, after patching, the PCR values of the patched OS will update and allow this sealed value to be unsealed.

$Seal(K_{EPUB,A}, S, PCR_0, PCR_1, PCR_2, PCR_3, PCR'_4, PCR'_5)$

# Problem 2

- Migrating secrets between machines with TPMs
- Basic idea: use *Seal* (without any PCR values) to encrypt  $S$  to  $B$ 's TPM.
- $A$  needs a copy of  $B$ 's public encryption key for *Seal*, so
  - $A$  queries the PKI (or perhaps  $B$  itself) for a copy of the PKI's certificate issued to  $K_{EPUB,B}$ .  $A$  verifies that the cert chains properly to the PKI's trusted root, then extracts  $K_{EPUB,B}$  from the certificate
  - With  $K_{EPUB,B}$ ,  $A$  computes
$$C = Seal(K_{EPUB,B}, S)$$
  - $A$  then sends  $C$  to  $B$
  - $B$  computes  $Unseal(K_{KPRIV,B}, C) = S$ .

# Problem 3

- Migrating secrets between machines with TPMs with assurance of equivalent software stacks
  - a) Before sending  $S$  to  $B$  (in any form),  $A$  should receive from  $B$  some proof that  $B$ 's OS boot sequence (measured by PCRs 0-5) is the same as  $A$ 's.
  - b) When  $S$  is transmitted to  $B$ ,  $A$  should ensure that  $S$  will only be accessible on  $B$  if the same software stack is running on  $B$  as on  $A$  at the time the migration begins.

# Problem 3a

- “Before sending  $S$  to  $B$  (in any form),  $A$  should receive from  $B$  some proof that  $B$ 's OS boot sequence (measured by PCRs 0-5) is the same as  $A$ 's.”
- $A$  can request an attestation from  $B$  to something that includes PCRs 0-5.
  - To make sure the attestation is “fresh”,  $A$  should send a random challenge value to  $B$  and ask  $B$  to *Quote* that.
- $A \rightarrow B$ : random value  $R$  (say 128 bits of random)
- $B \rightarrow A$ :  $Q = \text{Quote}(K_{SSIG,B}, R, PCR_0, PCR_1, \dots, PCR_5)$
- $A$  verifies the signature on  $Q$ , checks  $R$  hasn't changed, checks  $PCR_0, \dots, PCR_5$ .

# Problem 3b

- “When  $S$  is transmitted to  $B$ ,  $A$  should ensure that  $S$  will only be accessible on  $B$  if the same software stack is running on  $B$  as on  $A$  at the time the migration begins.”
- $A$  uses  $Seal$  to encrypt  $S$  to  $B$  and the values of PCRs 0-5
  - We assume  $A$  has a copy of  $B$ 's public encryption key  $K_{EPUB,B}$
- Using  $K_{EPUB,B}$ ,  $A$  computes
$$C = Seal(K_{EPUB,B}, S, PCR_0, PCR_1, \dots, PCR_5)$$
- $A$  then sends  $C$  to  $B$
- $B$  computes  $Unseal(K_{KPRIV,B}, C, PCR_0, PCR_1, \dots, PCR_5) = S$ .