

# CSE P564: Computer Security and Privacy

Usability, Physical Security, Exceptional Access

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# Final Project reminders


- Please submit as a group 1x if you are working as a pair
- Much of this lab is about identifying the root cause of a problem, not all potential problems.
  - Because of this, we tend to answer questions less directly.
  - You should always ask: How does the vulnerability relate to XYZ if I'm thinking about changing XYZ.
- There is no length limit to patches. 20-30ish lines changed is a useful estimate for a small-but-effective patch size.
  - If you want to write a 50 line change and refactor 5 functions, that may be changing more than is related to the vulnerability.

# Final Project guidance

- Always ask:
  - Does the component/feature/etc I'm consider changing relate to the vulnerability in question? Is it part of either the exploit, or a similar exploit?
    - Similar being pretty close in behavior here, needs to abuse the same problem.
  - If I change this thing, does that affect the exploit?
    - If no, then it is likely not relevant.
- Minimize changes
  - Your patch is easier to grade
  - You are less likely to *add* any bugs
- CWEs: aim for more generic CWEs, rather than some of the weird niche ones


Finishing up Usability

# The Lock Icon




- Goal: identify secure connection
  - SSL/TLS is being used between client and server to protect against active network attacker
- Lock icon should only be shown when the page is secure against **network attacker**
  - Semantics subtle and not widely understood by users
  - Whose certificate is it??
  - Problem in user interface design

# Will You Notice?





# Newer Versions of Chrome


c. 2017



2022



2023/2024



# Today's warnings (2022)



# Deprecated encryption schemes



## This site can't provide a secure connection

**rc4.badssl.com** uses an unsupported protocol.

ERR\_SSL\_VERSION\_OR\_CIPHER\_MISMATCH

Details



12/10/2024

## Secure Connection Failed

An error occurred during a connection to rc4.badssl.com. Cannot communicate securely with peer: no common encryption algorithm(s).

Error code: SSL\_ERROR\_NO\_CIPHER\_OVERLAP

- The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
- Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem.

[Learn more...](#)

Try Again



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# Expired certificates



## Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **expired.badssl.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR\_CERT\_DATE\_INVALID

💡 To get Chrome's highest level of security, [turn on enhanced protection](#)

Advanced

Back to safety



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## Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead

Firefox detected an issue and did not continue to expired.badssl.com. The website is either misconfigured or your computer clock is set to the wrong time.

It's likely the website's certificate is expired, which prevents Firefox from connecting securely. If you visit this site, attackers could try to steal information like your passwords, emails, or credit card details.

### What can you do about it?

Your computer clock is set to 12/7/2022. Make sure your computer is set to the correct date, time, and time zone in your system settings, and then refresh expired.badssl.com.

If your clock is already set to the right time, the website is likely misconfigured, and there is nothing you can do to resolve the issue. You can notify the website's administrator about the problem.

[Learn more...](#)

Go Back (Recommended)

Advanced...



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# Self-signed certificates



## Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **self-signed.badssl.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR\_CERT\_AUTHORITY\_INVALID

💡 To get Chrome's highest level of security, [turn on enhanced protection](#)

Advanced

Back to safety



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## Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead

Firefox detected a potential security threat and did not continue to self-signed.badssl.com. If you visit this site, attackers could try to steal information like your passwords, emails, or credit card details.

[Learn more...](#)

Go Back (Recommended)

Advanced...



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# Untrusted Root certificate



## Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **untrusted-root.badssl.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR\_CERT\_AUTHORITY\_INVALID

💡 To get Chrome's highest level of security, [turn on enhanced protection](#)

Advanced

Back to safety



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## Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead

Firefox detected a potential security threat and did not continue to untrusted-root.badssl.com. If you visit this site, attackers could try to steal information like your passwords, emails, or credit card details.

### What can you do about it?

The issue is most likely with the website, and there is nothing you can do to resolve it.

If you are on a corporate network or using anti-virus software, you can reach out to the support teams for assistance. You can also notify the website's administrator about the problem.

[Learn more...](#)

Go Back (Recommended)

Advanced...



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# Does anything stand out?

- Gradescope:
- Q1: What are some things that make warnings hard to be effective?
- Q2: Why would Firefox and Chrome choose different warning designs?




# Case Study #2: Phishing

- **Design question:** How do you help users avoid falling for phishing sites?

# A Typical Phishing Page


The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "PayPal - Welcome". The address bar contains the URL `http://www.ipaypal.szm.sk/login.html`, where the `http` part is circled in red. A red box with the text "Weird URL http instead of https" points to this URL. The page features the PayPal logo, navigation tabs for "Welcome", "Send", and "Auction Tools", and a "Member Log-In" section with input fields for "Email Address" and "Password". Other elements include a "Join PayPal Today" button, a "Shop Without Sharing" banner, and various promotional tiles for "Buyers", "eBay Sellers", and "Merchants".

# Safe to Type Your Password?







# Safe to Type Your Password?



# Safe to Type Your Password?




# Safe to Type Your Password?



**“Picture-in-picture attacks”**  
Trained users are more likely to fall victim to this!


# Phishing Warnings (2008)



Passive (IE)




Active (Firefox)



Active (IE)

# Active vs. Passive Warnings

- Active warnings significantly more effective
  - **Passive (IE): 100% clicked, 90% phished**
  - **Active (IE): 95% clicked, 45% phished**
  - **Active (Firefox): 100% clicked, 0% phished**



Passive (IE)

Active (IE)




Active (Firefox)


# Modern anti-phishing

- Largely driven by Google Safe Browsing
  - Browser sends 32-bit prefix of hash(url)
  - API says: good or bad
- (Also Microsoft SafeScreen)

# Modern warnings



 **Dangerous** | testsafebrowsing.appspot.com/s/phishing.html



## Deceptive site ahead

Attackers on **testsafebrowsing.appspot.com** may trick you into doing something dangerous like installing software or revealing your personal information (for example, passwords, phone numbers, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

[Details](#) [Back to safety](#)



## Deceptive site ahead

Firefox blocked this page because it may trick you into doing something dangerous like installing software or revealing personal information like passwords or credit cards.

Advisory provided by [Google Safe Browsing](#).

Go back

See details







## The page ahead may try to charge you money

These charges could be one-time or recurring and may not be obvious.

Proceed

Go back





## The site ahead contains malware

Attackers currently on **testsafebrowsing.appspot.com** might attempt to install dangerous programs on your computer that steal or delete your information (for example, photos, passwords, messages, and credit cards). [Learn more](#)


Details

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# Which warning is 'better'?

- For user security?
- For user agency?
- For user understanding?
- For... what?

# Exceptional Access


Or, letting the government into locked devices

# A brief aside, useful for consideration

- DES S-boxes
- Dual\_EC\_DRBG


# DES S-boxes standardization

• Recall:



Procedure must be reversible  
(for decryption)

# DUAL\_EC\_DRBG



Annotated diagram from [Shumow-Ferguson presentation](#) (CRYPTO 2007).  
Colorful elements were added by yours truly. Thick green arrows mean 'this part is easy to reverse'. Thick red arrows should mean the opposite. Unless you're the NSA.

<https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/18/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg/>

<https://hovav.net/ucsd/dist/juniper.pdf>

# History: Dual-use

- Technologies under restriction regimes may be *dual-use*
- A missile is *not* dual-use
  - Hunting firearms *are* dual-use
- That is, military and civilian applications



# Discuss

# History: Cryptography

- Post WWII all cryptography was a 'munition'
  - Subject to export restrictions
  - Fundamentally a military technology
- This was (mostly) reasonable
- It stopped being (as) reasonable once electronic communications became a thing
  - Really clearly dual-use at this point

# History: The crypto wars (1<sup>st</sup>)

- Cold war ends in 1991
- Some export restrictions are lifted in 1992
  - <40bits of key systems allowed
  - 40 bits is crackable in days at the time
- PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) written in 1992
  - >>>40 bits
- “Crypto wars” kick off as a reaction to restrictions

# History: SSL in the 90s

- Netscape had SSL (HTTPS) for e-commerce
- Problem: SSL was 128bits of key
- Solution: Two versions of the browser
  - US Version: 128bits
  - International Version: 40bits (reveals 88bits)




# History: The Clipper Chip

- 1994 a new system is proposed: Skipjack
- 80-bits of security
- “Trap-door” built in to allow government recovery of messages
  - This was public
- Proposal was to put the “clipper chip” into everything

# History: The Clipper Chip

- Argument was that ‘terrorists’ would be caught
- This was... not well received
- It also had a number of serious technical flaws
- It died reasonably fast



By Source (WP:N FCC#4), Fair use,  
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=48926067>

<https://www.mattblaze.org/papers/escrow-acsc11.pdf>

# History: Crypto wars end

- In 2000 restrictions are eased
  - (Per 1996 order that made this possible)
- AES is standardized
- Cryptography 'golden age' starts

# Today: Continuation

- Cryptography is back in the headlines
- It is trivial to have encrypted data
  - Mobile phones
  - Backup systems
  - Messaging platforms
- Governments want access to encrypted data




# Good starting points

- Lawful Device Access without Mass Surveillance Risk: A Technical Design Discussion - Stefan Savage
  - <http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/lawful.pdf>
- The Export of Cryptography in the 20th Century and the 21<sup>st</sup> - Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau
  - [https://privacyink.org/pdf/export\\_control.pdf](https://privacyink.org/pdf/export_control.pdf)
- Key Escrow from a Safe Distance Looking Back at the Clipper Chip
  - <https://www.mattblaze.org/papers/escrow-ac sac11.pdf>

# Course Evaluation

- Please fill out the course evaluation!
  - <https://uw.iasystem.org/survey/297878>
  - Or check email



- A good activity for when you are done lockpicking or while you are waiting for locks 😊