Multics Review

From: Nathan Dire (ndire_at_cs.washington.edu)
Date: Wed Jan 07 2004 - 15:09:43 PST

  • Next message: Gang Zhao: "On behalf of David Winkler -- Review: Protection and the Control of Information Sharing in Multics"

    Saltzer's paper "Protection and the Control of Information Sharing in Multics"
    describes an impressive security structure for a multi-user system . The
    paper includes everything from the design principles to a discussion of the
    weaknesses in the system.

    The five design principles outlined by the author appear to have been chosen
    wisely as they all remain quite relevant today. It seems even modern systems
    struggle to adhere to those principles; the secrecy of design, for example, is
    a major criticism of current electronic voting systems. The functional
    objectives he names, "decentralization of the setting of protection
    specifications" and ability to created a custom "protection environment", seem
    to have remained an important part of security system, I see them reflected
    strongly in enterprise directory services products, such as Microsoft's Active
    Directory.

    In addition, there's much to admire in the implementation of the system. The
    system uses Access Control Lists, which seem quite similar to their modern
    counterparts, which are now part of the POSIX standard. The system even
    anticipates mechanical brute-force attacks by introducing a delay after 10
    failed logins "to frustrate systematic penetration attempts." With regards to
    the primary memory protection, the measures taken to "protect against
    accidental overuse of supervisor privileges" suggest an approach to the
    supervisor that I had not anticipated.

    I'm not an expert on security by any means, so I find it very difficult to
    find many faults with the system that's presented in this paper. Two of the
    weaknesses which the author lists stand out in my mind. The first is that
    there is no restriction on user passwords to make them difficult to crack.
    Even the system-generated passwords seem relatively weak.

    The second weakness I would draw attention too is the usability. While the
    "initial access control list" in directories removes the burden of specifying
    an ACL for each new object, I think some form of inheritance would make it
    significantly easier to maintain a larger directory structure. In addition,
    users are forced to specify a single project and compartment to use for the
    duration of a session, in addition to their personal name, for creation of the
    user's "principle identifier."


  • Next message: Gang Zhao: "On behalf of David Winkler -- Review: Protection and the Control of Information Sharing in Multics"

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