Protection and the Control of Information Sharing in Multics

From: James Welle (jwelle_at_Exchange.Microsoft.com)
Date: Wed Jan 07 2004 - 08:26:52 PST

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            This paper describes in detail the security mechanisms of
    Multics. A lot of the ideas regarding security presented in this paper
    are still prevalent in computing today.
            Multics was a very sophisticated operating system in terms of
    security. Many of today's mainstream operating systems do not have
    security as strong as that found in Multics. In fact, the second level
    of Multics security is implemented mostly in hardware, something that
    Microsoft and others are only investigating today for desktop computer
    systems.
            The design principles presented initially in this paper are
    still applicable today and yet Microsoft hasn't really followed these
    principles. Permission is denied by default, the security mechanisms are
    very open and available for review, and all processes run with least
    privilege. These are all standards that Microsoft is starting to adhere
    to today given all the security problems of late.
            The first level of security of Multics is centered on access
    control lists. These lists permit or deny access to segments. A segment
    is just a unit of storage. Access can be denied or granted to a user,
    project, or compartment in the system. Different modes of access (read,
    write, execute) are also supported by the system. The second level of
    security is centered on descriptors which live in memory. Every process
    has a set of descriptors that contain the locations of segments in
    storage and also whether or not the process has access to that segment.
    The descriptor also has the ability to protect subsystems which are
    accessible through the segment. These are called "gates" and can be
    enforced in hardware. The paper finishes with a list of weaknesses of
    the system. All of the reasons for taking security shortcuts; time
    constraints, performance, and lack of understanding are still big
    problems today.
            I found the idea of "traps" very appealing. Today, some systems
    allow a parent to control the hours of the day his/her child can access
    the Internet or some other resource, which is one of the presented uses
    of traps. Being able to determine arbitrary access constraints seems
    like a very powerful security feature.
            User authentication in Multics was also advanced. Threat
    monitoring logs remind me of current firewall software. The discussion
    of the security weaknesses in Multics shows how much the authors have
    thought about security in the system. Security is clearly one of the top
    priorities in the Multics system.


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