# Network verification and synthesis

**CSE 599N1** 

Sep 25, 2019

#### Who are we?

Ratul Mahajan

- $UW \rightarrow MSR \rightarrow Intentionet \rightarrow UW$
- One of the first paper was "Understanding BGP misconfiguration" (2002)

#### **Ryan Beckett**

- Princeton  $\rightarrow$  MSR
- Recently finished thesis: Network Control Plane Synthesis and Verification
  - Won the ACM SIGCOMM dissertation award and ACM Honorable Mention

#### What is verification?

"Mathematical analysis of a system to determine rigorously if it meets some end-to-end goal"

#### Why bother with verification?

#### Mission critical systems








Ariane-5 self-destruction software interface issue

Northeast Blackout power control software

Boeing 737 Max crash control software bug

#### Why bother with network verification?



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[A]n unplanned data center outage costs companies more than \$7,900 per minute, and the cost continues to rise. The cost of downtime per minute has risen an incredible 41% since 2010...the average cost per incident is now at a staggering \$690,200.

"Networks have become **the infrastructure for the infrastructure**... the cloud is holding up the computation that supports the planet so **it is mission critical and can not have glitches**." -- Albert Greenberg (head of Azure)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b94Iv-oN91s

## **Course Logistics**

### Why this course?

Lots of research activity in the past few years

- Has opened a new sub-field of networking
- Hard to make sense of it all

Important (and fun!) topic

• Combines networking with formal methods and programming languages

### Course goals

We will collectively

- Synthesize work in this area
- Identify open research problems and promising new directions

Stretch goal: Write a survey paper with our experience and findings

### Course organization

Primarily paper reading and projects

- One main paper per lecture
  - Each student will lead the discussion of at least one paper
    - $\blacksquare \quad Sign up now! Via Canvas \rightarrow Collaborations \rightarrow Paper signup$
- Highly encourage you to read additional material
- Projects in groups of 2-3
  - Follow recommended plan (next slide)
  - Or, you may pick your own -- come talk to us first

#### Recommended project plan

Based on a small language for data plane and control plane (later today)

- 1. Dataplane verification [2 weeks]
- 2. Incremental or scalable dataplane verification [2 weeks]
- 3. Control plane simulation [2 week]
- 4. Control plane verification [2 weeks]
- 5. Control plane synthesis [2 weeks]

(Deadlines will go on the Web page soon)

### Turning in projects

Code (pointer) and a short report

- Ideal: host on GitHub with a README.md
  - We should be able to clone and run (easily)
- Report should be no more than 2 pages
  - Detail the approach you took
  - Benchmark performance as a function of network size


#### Grades


Class participation: 40%


- Offline and in-class discussion
  - Additional reading is excellent fodder for offline discussion
- Paper presentation

Projects: 60%

## **Networking Background**








Complications


- Distributed protocols
- Complex interactions
- Vendor languages
- Middleboxes

**Rich policies** 

- Business preferences
- Security
- Traffic engineering
- Fault tolerance

How to get data packets across the network





## Assignment 1

### Our dataplane language

Dataplane:

- Abstracts away many details
- Topology, forwarding tables, ACLs
- YAML based format

Specification:

- Collection of reachability statements
- Specifies packet headers, ingress + egress locations
- YAML based format

Fields are always fully specified for simplicity

#### Dataplane format

#### **Device** interfaces

Forwarding table rules as an ordered list

Devices: - Name: r1 Interfaces: - Name: r1@Eth0 Neighbor: null InAcl: null OutAcl: null - Name: r1@Eth1 Neighbor: r2@Eth1 InAcl: null OutAcl: r2\_outbound\_host\_permit - Name: r1@Eth2 Neighbor: r3@Eth1 InAcl: null OutAcl: r2\_outbound\_host\_permit ForwardingTable: - Prefix: 70.4.193.0/24 Interface: r1@Eth1 - Prefix: 70.4.193.0/24 Access control lists Interface: r1@Eth2 - Prefix: 10.0.0.1/32 Interface: r1@Eth1 - Prefix: 10.0.0.1/32 Interface: r1@Eth2 - Prefix: 70.4.194.0/24 Interface: r1@Eth0 Acls: - Name: r2\_outbound\_host\_permit DefaultAction: Deny Rules: - Description: "allow srcip for host" DstIp: 0.0.0.0/0 SrcIp: 70.4.194.0/24 Protocol: 0-255 DstPort: 0-65535 SrcPort: 0-65535

Action: Allow

### Query format

If a packet enters one of these ingress interfaces

Then the packet must exit one of these egress interfaces Ingress: [r1@Eth0]
Egress: [r4@Loopback0]
DstIp: [10.0.0.1/32]
SrcIp: [0.0.0.0/0]
Protocol: [0-255]
DstPort: [0-65535]
SrcPort: [0-65535]

So long as the packet has one of these headers

#### Questions?