Scoring rules

- A different kind of mechanism design problem: how to
- elicit a good prediction of an uncertain event?
- Weather forecaster: will it rain tomorrow?
- Political pundit: will a Democrat or Republican win next election?
- Microsoft employee: will the next version of MS Office ship on time?

Scoring rules

- A different kind of mechanism design problem: how to elicit a good prediction of an uncertain event?
- Weather forecaster: will it rain tomorrow?
- Political pundit: will a Democrat or Republican win next election
- Microsoft employee: will the next version of MS Office ship on time?


ightarrowHow should we evaluate the quality of a possible prediction? incentivize the work needed to output the best prediction/pay based on the quality of predictions/

Scoring rules

 X finite set of possible outcomes of uncertain event.

- A scoring rule is a real-valued function S(q,i)
- q is a probability distribution over X (a prediction)
- i is some outcome in X (the realized outcome)

Scine S (7, 1) Eng Eng dont.



Strictly proper scoring rules

- X finite set of possible outcomes of uncertain event.
- A scoring rule is a real-valued function S(q,i)
- q is a probability distribution over X (a prediction)
- i is some outcome in X (the realized outcome)
- A scoring rule is strictly proper if, no matter unique best response is to report truthfully, what the true belief p of the forecaster is, her i.e. to set q = p.

Exp payoff = Example : A scoring rule is a real-valued function S(q,i) р. A scoring rule is strictly proper if, no matter what the true belief p of the X finite set of possible outcomes of uncertain event. forecaster is, her unique best response is to report truthfully, i.e. to set q = – q is a probability distribution over X (a prediction) i is some outcome in X (the realized outcome) Strictly proper scoring rules < (1-p) (1-q) (P, 1-P) 2 p: (ام)) 20 2 Q 1

9 1 1 1 $S(\vec{a},i) = q; -$ C for some i : **F**\ **A** Quadratic scoring rule no myter wat payal > 35 happuns. dour

8 TT S C SP $S(\vec{a},i) = q;$ r 0 Ś 091 P:9: Elser sometry proper **N** ? icx piqx .' () **Q** .

add Sm X E(sour) = $S(q_{1}) = long:$ fine costor con grownter von reg exp which . 9:20 やいして Logarithmic scoring rule NP: ME + long ししょう 9:28 メット |' C

oganit mic Incontrary have t feedback preductor manles sconto ne 's structures


Incentivizing honest feedback


Example: peer grading, where students grade the assignments of other students.

How to incentivize accurate grading, without direct verification?

Model


- Each player submits a report r_i to a mechanism.
- Mechanism pays player $\langle \pi_i(r_1, ..., r_n) \rangle$





Output Agreement

- For each player i
- Pick a random player $j \neq i$
- Set payoff π_i equal to 1 if they agree, 0 otherwise.



Output Agreement

- For each player *i*
- Pick a random player $j \neq i$
- Set payoff π_i equal to 1 if they agree, 0 otherwise.
- To the Nash a to report truly of Sy - O
- bood A cord S121 0='5 5,20 0./ 0.3 Deed 0.4 Soll 6992 0 . S 0,6 Ø .\ R(5, 20 5-0)= H

0

5,0

G

Machanism has bad

