# CSE 484/M584: Computer Security (and Privacy)

Spring 2025

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
UW Instruction Team: David Kohlbrenner, Yoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner, Nirvan Tyagi. Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials

### Admin

- Lab 1b due tonight.
- Lab1a Writeup grades are out!
  - Regrade requests close on May 7<sup>th</sup> (hard deadline)
  - Exploit grades will be fixed later today.
- HW1 due next Wednesday
- Lab 2 (Cryptolab) goes out today!
  - We won't have covered everything, but worth reading through ASAP.


# Symmetric Encryption


### Goal: Confidentiality




Given: Both parties know a shared random key


Goal: Send a message without revealing information about the message







Cipher achieves perfect secrecy if key is chosen uniformly at random (Claude Shannon, 1949)



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### Advantages of One-Time Pad

#### Easy to compute

- Encryption and decryption are the same operation
- Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute

#### Perfect secrecy


- Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
- ...as long as the key sequence is truly random
  - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
- ...as long as each key is same length as plaintext
  - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

### Problems with the One-Time Pad?


#### <u>Gradescope</u>

- What potential security problems do you see with the one-time pad?
- Q1: Confidentiality: What if key is reused?
- Q2: Integrity: Any protection against corruption?

# Dangers of Reuse



### Dangers of Reuse



Learn relationship between plaintexts

$$C1 \oplus C2 = (P1 \oplus K) \oplus (P2 \oplus K) =$$
  
 $(P1 \oplus P2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P1 \oplus P2$ 


### Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios


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### One-Time Pad Integrity?



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### Problems with One-Time Pad


- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- (3) Does not guarantee integrity
  - One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality
  - Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else

### Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
  - When one-time pad is unrealistic...
- Use special cryptographic primitives: block ciphers
  - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
  - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad


# Symmetric Encryption Goal

- Operates on an arbitrary size plaintext
  - Each key defines a random and invertible mapping from plaintext space to ciphertext space




### Symmetric Encryption Goal


- Operates on an arbitrary size plaintext
  - Each key defines a random and invertible mapping from plaintext space to ciphertext space
- Block ciphers operate on a single chunk ("block") of plaintext
  - Block sizes on the order of 64 bits, 128 bits, 256 bits
  - Each key defines a "random" invertible permutation of inputs to possible outputs
  - Plan: Build encryption algorithm from block cipher building block



## **Keyed Permutation**




### **Keyed Permutation**



- Each key defines a permutation from the plaintext space to the ciphertext space
- Ideal: Permutation looks "random" if you don't know the key
  - Is that possible?
  - How many permutations exist?
- Next best: Computationally indistinguishable from random!

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For N-bit input: **2**<sup>N</sup>! possible permutations

For K-bit key: **2<sup>K</sup> possible keys** 

### **Block Cipher Security**

- Security: For a randomly selected key: Computationally hard to distinguish outputs of the block cipher from outputs of a truly random permutation
- Popular block ciphers (e.g., AES) do not have proofs of security!
  - Design is open and standard is created through public competition
  - Current best attacks against AES-128 take 2<sup>126</sup> time
  - Block ciphers with proofs of security exist but are less efficient

### Standard Block Ciphers

#### DES: Data Encryption Standard


- Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
- Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
- 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

#### AES: Advanced Encryption Standard


- New federal standard as of 2001
  - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
- Based on the Rijndael algorithm
  - Selected via an open process
- 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits

### Encrypting a Large Message


- How do we use block ciphers to encrypt larger messages?
- Plan: Build an encryption "mode" from a block cipher




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


Idea: Simply split up the plaintext into block-sized chunks!



In-class Activity 1/29: Good idea?

Idea: Simply split up the plaintext into block-sized chunks!



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and matchsblocksring 2025

## Information Leakage in ECB Mode

