CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Side Channels

Winter 2023

Tadayoshi (Yoshi) Kohno yoshi@cs.Washington.edu

UW Instruction Team: David Kohlbrenner, Yoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner. Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Announcements

- Monday, 3/6: Last day of lecture (side channels)
- Wednesday, 3/8: Informal conversation about security, research, industry, etc (meeting in CSE2, smaller room)
- Friday, 3/10: Charlie Reis (Google, Chrome, Site Isolation)

Side Channel Attacks

- Attacks based on information that can be gleaned from the physical implementation of a system, rather than breaking its theoretical properties
 - Initially most commonly discussed in the context of cryptosystems
 - But also prevalent in many contexts
 - E.g., we discussed the TENEX password implementation

Examples on Cryptosystems

- Timing attacks
- Power analysis

• Good overview:

http://www.nicolascourtois.com/papers/sc/sidech_attacks.pdf


If you do something different for secret key bits 1 vs. 0, attacker can learn something...

Example Timing Attacks


- RSA: Leverage key-dependent timings of modular exponentiations
 - https://www.rambus.com/timing-attacks-on-implementations-of-diffie-hellman-rsa-dss-andother-systems/
 - http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
- Block Ciphers: Leverage key-dependent cache hits/misses

Power Analysis

- Simple power analysis:
 Directly read off bits from powerline traces
- Differential power analysis:
 Look for statistical differences
 in power traces, based on
 guesses of a key bit



Key Extraction via Electric Potential



Genkin et al. "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop: Physical Side-Channel Key-Extraction Attacks On PCs" CHES 2014

Keyboard Eavesdropping



Zhuang et al. "Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited" CCS 2005 Vuagnoux et al. "Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards" USENIX Security 2009

Identifying Web Pages: Traffic Analysis





Figure 1: Website fingerprinting scenario and conceivable attackers

Herrmann et al. "Website Fingerprinting: Attacking Popular Privacy Enhancing Technologies with the Multinomial Naïve-Bayes Classifier" CCSW 2009



SPECTRE


Spectre

Exploit (1) speculative execution and (2) cache timing information to extract private information from the same process

- Example: JavaScript running in web page
 - Until recently, iframes were in the same process as their parent pages (until Site Isolation, as you heard from Charlie Reis)
- Note there are other variants (new ones still appearing often!)

Instruction Speculation

Many steps (cycles) to execute one instruction; time flows left to right \rightarrow



If speculation correct: Commit architectural changes of and (register) & store (memory) -- quick!

If mis-speculate: Abort architectural changes (registers, memory); go in other branch direction

Speculation affects the cache!

Cache Timing Attacks

- **Basic idea:** Manipulate cache to a known state, wait for victim activity, then examine what has changed.
- Example: "Flush + Reload"
 - 1. Flush relevant addresses from cache
 - 2. Wait for victim (here: execute Spectre attack)
 - 3. Reload relevant addresses, and time how long it takes to access If timing was fast, victim accessed relevant address; if timing was slow, victim did not.

Spectre Threat Model

```
if (x < array1_size)
 y = array2[array1[x] * 4096];</pre>
```


- Given code above, suppose that:
 - Adversary can run code, in the same process.
 - Adversary can control the value x.
 - Adversary has access to array2.
 - Adversary cannot just read arbitrary memory in the process.
 - There is some secret value, elsewhere in the process, that the adversary would like to learn.
 - Specifically: Attacker's goal is to read secret memory at address array1+x, for some too-large x

Spectre Attack Sketch

if (x < array1_size)
 y = array2[array1[x] * 4096];</pre>

- 1. Train branch predictor to follow one branch of conditional.
- After training, make the followed branch access information that the code should not be allowed to access (secret=array1[x]).
- 3. The secret information will affect which part of array2 is loaded into the cache (array2[secret*4096]).
- After the hardware determines that the branch was incorrectly executed, the logic of the program will be rolled back but the cache will still be impacted.
- 5. Time reads to cache (e.g., Flush+Reload) for accesses to array2, to see which cache lines are read more efficiently.

It's A Party




More and more:

- Foreshadow attacks SGX
- SPOILER mem dependence
- Etc. etc.

Other Types of Side Channel Attacks?


• Canvas Activity

Accelerometer Eavesdropping




Aviv et al. "Practicality of Accelerometer Side Channels on Smartphones" ACSAC 2012

Gyroscope Eavesdropping



Michalevsky et al. "Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech from Gyroscope Signals" USENIX Security 2014

More Gyroscope




Chen et al. "TouchLogger: Inferring Keystrokes On Touch Screen From Smartphone Motion" HotSec 2011

[Backes et al.]


Compromising Reflections





Audio from Video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKXOucXB4a8



Davis et al. "The Visual Microphone: Passive Recovery of Sound from Video" SIGGRAPH 2014

Identifying Web Pages: Electrical Outlets




Fig. 1: Time- and frequency-domain plots of several power traces as a MacBook loads two different pages. In the frequency domain, brighter colors represent more energy at a given frequency. Despite the lack of obviously characteristic information in the time domain, the classifier correctly identifies all of the above traces.

Clark et al. "Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet" ESORICS 2013

Powerline Eavesdropping





Figure 1: Frequency spectrogram showing various electrical appliances in the home. Washer cycle on (1) and off (2). CFL lamp turning off briefly (3) and then on (4). Note that the TV's (Sharp 42" LCD) EMI shifts in frequency, which happens as screen content changes.

Enev et al.: Televisions, Video Privacy, and Powerline Electromagnetic Interference, CCS 2011

Lasers to Voice Assistants



Suguwara et al. "Light Commands: Laser-Based Audio Injection Attacks on Voice-Controllable Systems" USENIX Security 2020 (microphones often unintentionally respond to light as if it was sound)

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