CSE 484 / CSE M 584:
Side Channel Attacks

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Announcements

- Next week:
  - Last week of class!
  - Wednesday: lock picking day ☺
    - Not recorded
  - Thursday: **NO SECTION**
    - Instead: extended office hours in the section locations

- Final project due Tuesday, December 12
  - No late days

Side Channel Attacks

- Attacks based on information that can be gleaned from the physical implementation of a system, rather than breaking its theoretical properties
  - Initially most commonly discussed in the context of cryptosystems
  - But also prevalent in many contexts
    - E.g., we discussed the TENEX password implementation
    - E.g., we discussed browser fingerprinting

Examples on Cryptosystems

- Timing attacks
- Power analysis

- Good overview:
 http://www.nicolascourtois.com/papers/sc/sidech_attacks.pdf

If you do something different for secret key bits 1 vs. 0, attacker can learn something...

Example Timing Attacks

- **RSA:** Leverage key-dependent timings of modular exponentiations
  - https://www.rambus.com/timing-attacks-on-implementations-of-diffie-hellman-rsa-dss-and-other-systems/
  - http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf

- **Block Ciphers:** Leverage key-dependent cache hits/misses

Power Analysis

- **Simple power analysis:** Directly read off bits from powerline traces

- **Differential power analysis:** Look for statistical differences in power traces, based on guesses of a key bit

Cryptographic device (e.g., smart card and reader)

Control, Cyphertexts

vitale

Oscilloscope

Control, Waveform data

Computer

Key Extraction via Electric Potential

Genkin et al. "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop: Physical Side-Channel Key-Extraction Attacks On PCs" CHES 2014

Key = 1110111011…

Keyboard Eavesdropping

Zhuang et al. "Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited" CCS 2005
Vuagnoux et al. "Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards" USENIX Security 2009

# Identifying Web Pages: Traffic Analysis

Figure 1: Website fingerprinting scenario and conceivable attackers

Herrmann et al. "Website Fingerprinting: Attacking Popular Privacy Enhancing Technologies with the Multinomial Naïve-Bayes Classifier" CCSW 2009

SPECTRE

Spectre

Exploit **(1) speculative execution** and
          (2) cache timing information

to extract private information from the same process

- Example: JavaScript running in web page
  - Until recently **(Site Isolation)**, iframes were in the same process as their parent pages
- Note there are other variants (new ones still appearing often!)

Instruction Speculation

Many steps (cycles) to execute one instruction; time flows left to right →

add

load

Go Faster! Pipelining, branch prediction, & instruction speculation

add

load

branch   `Predict direction: target or fall thru`

and   `Speculate!`

store   `Speculate more!`

If speculation correct: Commit architectural changes of **and** (register) & **store** (memory) -- quick!

If mis-speculate: Abort architectural changes (registers, memory); go in other branch direction

Speculation affects the cache!

Cache Timing Attacks

- **Basic idea:** Manipulate cache to a known state, wait for victim activity, then examine what has changed.

- Example: "Flush + Reload"

  1. Flush relevant addresses from cache

  2. Wait for victim *(here: execute Spectre attack)*

  3. Reload relevant addresses, and time how long it takes to access

     If timing was fast, victim accessed relevant address;
     if timing was slow, victim did not.

Spectre Threat Model

```
if (x < array1_size)
    y = array2[array1[x] * 4096];
```

- Given code above, suppose that:
  - Adversary can run code, in the same process.
  - Adversary can control the value x.
  - Adversary has access to array2.
  - Adversary cannot just read arbitrary memory in the process.
  - There is some secret value, elsewhere in the process, that the adversary would like to learn.
    - Specifically: **Attacker's goal is to read secret memory at address array1+x, for some too-large x**

Spectre Attack Sketch

```
if (x < array1_size)
    y = array2[array1[x] * 4096];
```

1. Train branch predictor to follow one branch of conditional.

2. After training, make the followed branch access information that the code should *not* be allowed to access (`secret=array1[x]`).

3. The secret information will affect **which part** of `array2` is loaded into the cache (`array2[secret*4096]`).

4. After the hardware determines that the branch was incorrectly executed, the logic of the program will be rolled back *but* the cache will still be impacted.

5. Time reads to cache (e.g., Flush+Reload) for accesses to `array2`, to see which cache lines are read more efficiently.

It's A Party

More and more:

- Foreshadow – attacks SGX
- SPOILER – mem dependence
- Etc. etc.

[From Canella et al.]

Other Types of Side Channel Attacks?

- Canvas Activity

Accelerometer Eavesdropping

Aviv et al. "Practicality of Accelerometer Side Channels on Smartphones" ACSAC 2012

Gyroscope Eavesdropping

Michalevsky et al. "Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech
from Gyroscope Signals" USENIX Security 2014

More Gyroscope

Chen et al. "TouchLogger: Inferring Keystrokes On Touch Screen From Smartphone Motion" HotSec 2011

Compromising Reflections

Audio from Video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKXOucXB4a8

Davis et al. "The Visual Microphone: Passive Recovery of Sound from Video" SIGGRAPH 2014

Identifying Web Pages: Electrical Outlets


(a) Time-domain plots

(b) Spectrogram plots

Fig. 1: Time- and frequency-domain plots of several power traces as a MacBook loads two different pages. In the frequency domain, brighter colors represent more energy at a given frequency. Despite the lack of obviously characteristic information in the time domain, the classifier correctly identifies all of the above traces.

Clark et al. "Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet" ESORICS 2013

Powerline Eavesdropping

Figure 1: Frequency spectrogram showing various electrical appliances in the home. Washer cycle on (1) and off (2). CFL lamp turning off briefly (3) and then on (4). Note that the TV's (Sharp 42" LCD) EMI shifts in frequency, which happens as screen content changes.

Enev et al.: Televisions, Video Privacy, and Powerline Electromagnetic Interference, CCS 2011

Shared Files in Android

Figure 5: Activity inference attack overview.

Chen et al., "Peeking Into Your App Without Actually Seeing It", USENIX Security 2014