

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Usable Security

Fall 2022

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Announcements

- **Lab 2: Ongoing**
- **Guest lecture on Monday**
 - Umar Iqbal (UW postdoctoral scholar)
 - Topic: Web privacy and tracking
- **No class next Wednesday or Friday**
 - Happy Thanksgiving!

Importance of Usability in Security

- Why is usability important?
 - People are the critical element of any computer system
 - People are the reason computers exist in the first place 😊
 - Even if it is **possible** for a system to protect against an adversary, people may use the system in other, **less secure** ways


Usable Security Roadmap

- 3 case studies
 - HTTPS indicators + SSL warnings
 - Phishing
 - Password managers
- **Step back:** root causes of usability problems, and how to address

Case Study #1: Browser HTTPS Indicators


- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?
 - You discussed this in section last week

The Lock Icon



- Goal: identify secure connection
 - SSL/TLS is being used between client and server to protect against active network attacker
- Lock icon should only be shown when the page is secure against **network attacker**
 - Semantics subtle and not widely understood by users
 - Whose certificate is it??
 - Problem in user interface design

Will You Notice?



Do These Indicators Help? (2007)

- “The Emperor’s New Security Indicators”
 - <http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/emperor.pdf>


Score	First chose not to enter password...	Group				Total
		1	2	3	1 ∪ 2	
0	upon noticing HTTPS absent	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
1	after site-authentication image removed	0 0%	0 0%	2 9%	0 0%	2 4%
2	after warning page	8 47%	5 29%	12 55%	13 37%	25 44%
3	never (always logged in)	10 53%	12 71%	8 36%	22 63%	30 53%
<i>Total</i>		18	17	22	35	57

Lesson:


Users don't notice the **absence** of indicators!


Newer Versions of Chrome

c. 2017

 **Secure** | <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox>


2020

 mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox


 **Not Secure** | <http-password.badssl.com>

Case Study #1: Browser HTTPS Indicators

- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?
 - You discussed this in section last week
 - Recall: Opinionated design



Challenge: Meaningful Warnings



See current designs for different conditions at <https://badssl.com/>.

Case Study #2: Phishing

- **Design question:** How do you help users avoid falling for phishing sites?

A Typical Phishing Page

PayPal - Welcome

http://www.ipaypal.szm.sk/login.html

Najít na stránce Najít další Hlas Autorský mód Všechny obrázky Přizpůsobit šířce 100%

PayPal [Sign Up](#) | [Log In](#) | [Help](#)

Welcome Send Auction Tools

Member Log-In [Forgot your email address?](#)
[Forgot your password?](#)

Email Address

Password

Join PayPal Today
Now Over 100 million accounts

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Shop Without Sharing
Your Financial Information
PayPal. Privacy is built in. [Learn more](#)

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Text To Buy
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for only \$5.98
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Buyers **eBay Sellers** **Merchants**

[Send money](#) to anyone with an email address in 55 countries and regions.
PayPal is [free](#) for


[Free eBay tools](#) make selling easier.
PayPal works hard to help [protect sellers](#).

[Accept credit cards](#) on your website using PayPal.
[Compare our solutions](#) to merchant accounts


PayPal Mobile
[Learn more](#)

What's New


Safe to Type Your Password?




Safe to Type Your Password?




Safe to Type Your Password?



Safe to Type Your Password?




Phishing Warnings (2008)



Passive (IE)




Active (Firefox)




Active (IE)

Active vs. Passive Warnings

- Active warnings significantly more effective
 - Passive (IE): 100% clicked, 90% phished
 - Active (IE): 95% clicked, 45% phished
 - Active (Firefox): 100% clicked, 0% phished



Passive (IE)



Active (IE)



Active (Firefox)

FYI: Site Authentication Image

Bank of America | Online Banking | SiteKey | Verify SiteKey - Windows Internet Explorer

https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signonSetup.do

Bank of America | Online Banking | ...


Bank of America Higher Standards Online Banking

Confirm that your SiteKey is correct

If you recognize your SiteKey, you'll know for sure that you are at the valid Bank of America site. Confirming your SiteKey is also how you'll know that it's safe to enter your Passcode and click the Sign In button.

An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:
pelicans



If you don't recognize your personalized SiteKey, don't enter your Passcode.

* Passcode:
(4 - 20 Characters, case sensitive)

Sign In

If you don't recognize your personalized "SiteKey", don't enter your Passcode

Case Study #3: Password Managers

- Password managers handle creating and “remembering” strong passwords
- Potentially:
 - Easier for users
 - More secure
- Early examples with some usable security lessons:
 - PwdHash (Usenix Security 2005)
 - Password Multiplier (WWW 2005)

PwdHash




@@ in front of passwords
to protect; or F2

sitePwd = Hash(pwd, domain)



Prevent phishing attacks

Password Multiplier



Activate with Alt-P or
double-click

sitePwd = Hash(username,
pwd, domain)

Both solutions target simplicity and transparency.

Usability Testing

- Are these programs **usable**? If not, what are the problems?
- Approaches for evaluating usability:
 - Usability inspection (no users)
 - Cognitive walkthroughs
 - Heuristic evaluation
 - User study
 - Controlled experiments
 - Real usage

Task Completion Results

	Success	Potentially Causing Security Exposures			
		Dangerous Success	Failures		
			Failure	False Completion	Failed due to Previous
PwdHash					
Log In	48%	44%	8%	0%	N/A
Migrate Pwd	42%	35%	11%	11%	N/A
Remote Login	27%	42%	31%	0%	N/A
Update Pwd	19%	65%	8%	8%	N/A
Second Login	52%	28%	4%	0%	16%
Password Multiplier					
Log In	48%	44%	8%	0%	N/A
Migrate Pwd	16%	32%	28%	20%	N/A
Remote Login	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Update Pwd	16%	4%	44%	28%	N/A
Second Login	16%	4%	16%	0%	16%

Problem: Mental Model

- Users seemed to have **misaligned mental models**
 - Not understand that one needs to put “@@” before *each* password to be protected.
 - Think different passwords generated for each session.
 - Think successful when were not.
 - Not know to click in field before Alt-P.
 - Don’t understand what’s happening: “Really, I don’t see how my password is safer because of two @’s in front”

Problem: Transparency

- Unclear to users whether actions successful or not.
 - Should be obvious when plugin activated.
 - Should be obvious when password protected.
- Users feel that they should be able to know their own password.

Problem: Dangerous Errors

- Tendency to **try all passwords**
 - A poor security choice – phishing site could collect many passwords!
 - **May make** the use of PwdHash or Password Multiplier **worse than not using any password manager.**
- **Usability problem leads to security vulnerabilities.**
 - Theme in course: sometimes things designed to increase security can also increase other risks

Root Causes? How to Improve?

Stepping Back: Root Causes?

- Computer systems are complex; users lack intuition
- Users in charge of managing own devices
 - Unlike other complex systems, like healthcare or cars.
- Hard to gauge risks
 - “It won’t happen to me!”
- Annoying, awkward, difficult
- Social issues
 - Send encrypted emails about lunch?...

How to Improve?

- Security education and training
- Help users build accurate mental models
- Make security invisible
- Make security the least-resistance path
- ...?

Beyond Specific Tools: Different User Groups

- Not all users are the same!
- Designing for one group of users, or “generic” users, may lead to **dangerous failures** or **reasons that people will not use security tools**
- Examples from (qualitative) research at UW:
 - **Journalists** (**most sources are not like Snowden!**)
 - **Refugees in US** (**security measures may embed US cultural assumptions!**)