

CSE 484 : Computer Security and Privacy

Usable Security

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...

Admin

- Lab 3 out soon™
- Homework 2 grades out
 - <https://forms.gle/C2RJNcTGv2N1dF197>

Importance of Usability in Security

- Why is usability important?
 - People are the critical element of any computer system
 - People are the reason computers exist in the first place
 - Even if it is possible for a system to protect against an adversary, people may use the system in other, less secure ways


Usable Security Roadmap

- 3 case studies
 - HTTPS indicators + SSL warnings
 - Phishing
 - Password managers
- **Step back:** root causes of usability problems, and how to address

Case Study #1: Browser HTTPS Indicators


- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?
 - You discussed this in section a couple weeks ago

The Lock Icon



- Goal: identify secure connection
 - SSL/TLS is being used between client and server to protect against active network attacker
- Lock icon should only be shown when the page is secure against **network attacker**
 - Semantics subtle and not widely understood by users
 - Whose certificate is it??
 - Problem in user interface design

Will You Notice?



Do These Indicators Help? (2007)

- “The Emperor’s New Security Indicators”
 - <http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/emperor.pdf>


Score	First chose not to enter password...	Group				Total
		1	2	3	1 ∪ 2	
0	upon noticing HTTPS absent	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
1	after site-authentication image removed	0 0%	0 0%	2 9%	0 0%	2 4%
2	after warning page	8 47%	5 29%	12 55%	13 37%	25 44%
3	never (always logged in)	10 53%	12 71%	8 36%	22 63%	30 53%
<i>Total</i>		18	17	22	35	57

Lesson:


Users don't notice the **absence** of indicators!


Newer Versions of Chrome

c. 2017

 **Secure** | <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox>


2020

 mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox


 **Not Secure** | [http-password.badssl.com](http://password.badssl.com)

Case Study #1: Browser HTTPS Indicators

- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?
 - You discussed this in section a couple weeks ago
 - Recall: Opinionated design



Challenge: Meaningful Warnings



See current designs for different conditions at <https://badssl.com/>.

Case Study #2: Phishing

- **Design question:** How do you help users avoid falling for phishing sites?

A Typical Phishing Page

PayPal - Welcome

http://www.ipaypal.szm.sk/login.html

Weird URL
http instead of https

PayPal®

Welcome | Log In | Help

Welcome Send Auction Tools

Member Log-In [Forgot your email address?](#)
[Forgot your password?](#)

Email Address

Password

Join PayPal Today
Now Over
100 million accounts

Learn more about
[PayPal Worldwide](#)

Shop Without Sharing
Your Financial Information
PayPal. Privacy is built in. [Learn more](#)

How PayPal works.
[Learn more](#)

Text To Buy
X-Men 2
for only \$5.98
[Buy Now](#)

Buyers **eBay Sellers** **Merchants**

[Send money](#) to anyone with an email address in 55 countries and regions.
PayPal is [free](#) for


[Free eBay tools](#) make selling easier.
PayPal works hard to help [protect sellers](#).

[Accept credit cards](#) on your website using PayPal.
[Compare our solutions](#) to merchant accounts


PayPal Mobile
[Learn more](#)

What's New


Safe to Type Your Password?




Safe to Type Your Password?



Safe to Type Your Password?




Safe to Type Your Password?




“Picture-in-picture attacks”
Trained users are more likely to fall victim to this!

Phishing Warnings (2008)



Passive (IE)




Active (IE)



Active (Firefox)

Active vs. Passive Warnings

- Active warnings significantly more effective
 - **Passive (IE): 100% clicked, 90% phished**
 - **Active (IE): 95% clicked, 45% phished**
 - **Active (Firefox): 100% clicked, 0% phished**



Passive (IE)

Active (IE)



Active (Firefox)

FYI: Site Authentication Image

Bank of America | Online Banking | SiteKey | Verify SiteKey - Windows Internet Explorer

https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signonSetup.do

Bank of America | Online Banking | ...


Bank of America Higher Standards Online Banking

Confirm that your SiteKey is correct

If you recognize your SiteKey, you'll know for sure that you are at the valid Bank of America site. Confirming your SiteKey is also how you'll know that it's safe to enter your Passcode and click the **Sign In** button.

An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:
pelicans



If you don't recognize your personalized SiteKey, don't enter your Passcode.

* Passcode:
(4 - 20 Characters, case sensitive)

Sign In

If you don't recognize your personalized "SiteKey", don't enter your Passcode

Case Study #3: Password Managers

- **Password managers** handle creating and “remembering” strong passwords
- Potentially:
 - **Easier** for users
 - **More secure**
- Early examples:
 - PwdHash (Usenix Security 2005)
 - Password Multiplier (WWW 2005)

PwdHash



@@ in front of passwords to protect; or F2

sitePwd = Hash(pwd, domain)



Prevent phishing attacks

Password Multiplier



Activate with Alt-P or double-click

sitePwd = Hash(username, pwd, domain)

Both solutions target simplicity and transparency.

Usability Testing

- Are these programs **usable**? If not, what are the problems?
- Approaches for evaluating usability:
 - **Usability inspection** (no users)
 - Cognitive walkthroughs
 - Heuristic evaluation
 - **User study**
 - Controlled experiments
 - Real usage

Task Completion Results

	Success	Potentially Causing Security Exposures			
		Dangerous Success	Failures		
			Failure	False Completion	Failed due to Previous
PwdHash					
Log In	48%	44%	8%	0%	N/A
Migrate Pwd	42%	35%	11%	11%	N/A
Remote Login	27%	42%	31%	0%	N/A
Update Pwd	19%	65%	8%	8%	N/A
Second Login	52%	28%	4%	0%	16%
Password Multiplier					
Log In	48%	44%	8%	0%	N/A
Migrate Pwd	16%	32%	28%	20%	N/A
Remote Login	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Update Pwd	16%	4%	44%	28%	N/A
Second Login	16%	4%	16%	0%	16%

Problem: Mental Model

- Users seemed to have **misaligned mental models**
 - Not understand that one needs to put “@@” before *each* password to be protected.
 - Think different passwords generated for each session.
 - Think successful when were not.
 - Not know to click in field before Alt-P.
 - Don't understand what's happening: “Really, I don't see how my password is safer because of two @'s in front”

Problem: Transparency

- Unclear to users **whether actions successful** or not.
 - Should be obvious when plugin activated.
 - Should be obvious when password protected.
- Users feel that they **should** be able to **know** their **own password**.

Problem: Dangerous Errors

- Tendency to **try all passwords**
 - A poor security choice – phishing site could collect many passwords!
 - **May make** the use of PwdHash or Password Multiplier **worse than not using any password manager.**
- **Usability problem leads to security vulnerabilities.**
 - **Theme in course: sometimes things designed to increase security can also increase other risks**

Root Causes? How to Improve?

Stepping Back: Root Causes?

- Computer systems are complex; users lack intuition
- Users in charge of managing own devices
 - Unlike other complex systems, like healthcare or cars.
- Hard to gauge risks
 - “It won’t happen to me!”
- Annoying, awkward, difficult
- Social issues
 - Send encrypted emails about lunch?...

How to Improve?


- Security education and training
- Help users build accurate mental models
- Make security invisible
- Make security the least-resistance path
- ...?


Beyond Specific Tools: Different User Groups

- Not all users are the same!
- Designing for one group of users, or “generic” users, may leads to **dangerous failures** or **reasons that people will not use security tools**
- Examples from (qualitative) research at UW:
 - **Journalists** (**most sources are not like Snowden!**)
 - **Refugees in US** (**security measures may embed US cultural assumptions!**)

Firefox vs. Chrome Warning

33% vs. 70% clickthrough rate



 **This Connection is Untrusted**

You have asked Chrome to connect securely to **reddit.com**, but we can't confirm that your connection is secure.


Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.


What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that someone is trying to impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

[Get me out of here!](#)

- **Technical Details**
- **I Understand the Risks**



 **This is probably not the site you are looking for!**

You attempted to reach **reddit.com**, but instead you actually reached a server identifying itself as **a248.e.akamai.net**. This may be caused by a misconfiguration on the server or by something more serious. An attacker on your network could be trying to get you to visit a fake (and potentially harmful) version of **reddit.com**.

You should not proceed, **especially** if you have never seen this warning before for this site.

[Proceed anyway](#) [Back to safety](#)

▸ [Help me understand](#)

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

#	Condition	CTR	N
1	Control (default Chrome warning)		
2	Chrome warning with policeman		
3	Chrome warning with criminal		
4	Chrome warning with traffic light		
5	Mock Firefox		
6	Mock Firefox, no image		
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

#	Condition	CTR	N
1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
2	Chrome warning with policeman		
3	Chrome warning with criminal		
4	Chrome warning with traffic light		
5	Mock Firefox		
6	Mock Firefox, no image		
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.




Figure 1. The default Chrome SSL warning (Condition 1).

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

#	Condition	CTR	N
1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
2	Chrome warning with policeman	68.9%	17,977
3	Chrome warning with criminal	66.5%	18,049
4	Chrome warning with traffic light	68.8%	18,084
5	Mock Firefox		
6	Mock Firefox, no image		
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.



Figure 1. The default Chrome SSL warning (Condition 1).

Figure 4. The three images used in Conditions 2-4.

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

#	Condition	CTR	N
1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
2	Chrome warning with policeman	68.9%	17,977
3	Chrome warning with criminal	66.5%	18,049
4	Chrome warning with traffic light	68.8%	18,084
5	Mock Firefox	56.1%	20,023
6	Mock Firefox, no image	55.9%	19,297
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.




Figure 2. The mock Firefox SSL warning (Condition 5).

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

#	Condition	CTR	N
1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
2	Chrome warning with policeman	68.9%	17,977
3	Chrome warning with criminal	66.5%	18,049
4	Chrome warning with traffic light	68.8%	18,084
5	Mock Firefox	56.1%	20,023
6	Mock Firefox, no image	55.9%	19,297
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling	55.8%	19,845

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.





Figure 3. The Firefox SSL warning with Google styling (Condition 7).

Opinionated Design Helps!



Adherence	N
30.9%	4,551

Opinionated Design Helps!

The site's security certificate is not trusted!

You attempted to reach **192.168.17.129**, but the server presented a certificate not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may mean that the server's credentials, which Chrome cannot rely on for identity information, or an attacker intercepted your communications.

You should not proceed, **especially** if you have never seen this warning.

[Proceed anyway](#) [Back to safety](#)

[Help me understand](#)

Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **reddit.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Proceed to the site \(unsafe\)](#) [Back to safety](#)

[Advanced](#)


Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **www.example.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Advanced](#) [Back to safety](#)

Adherence	N
30.9%	4,551
32.1%	4,075
58.3%	4,644

Today's Warning



Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **untrusted-root.badssl.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_INVALID

Help improve Chrome security by sending [URLs of some pages you visit, limited system information, and some page content](#) to Google. [Privacy policy](#).

Advanced Reload

Which warning is 'better'?

- For user security?
- For user agency?
- For user understanding?
- For... what?