

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Cryptography

[Symmetric Encryption]

Spring 2020

Franziska (Franzi) Roesner

franzi@cs.washington.edu

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Admin


- **Lab 1:** Checkpoint due today!
 - **Please make sure that you sign up for a Lab 1 Group in Canvas.** You will need to scroll **really** far down in the Groups interface... 🤪

Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
 - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string K** , called the **key**.
- Asymmetric cryptography
 - Each party creates a public key **pk** and a secret key **sk** .
 - *Hard concept to understand, and revolutionary!*
Inventors won Turing Award 😊


Symmetric Setting

Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string K , called the **key**.



Asymmetric Setting

Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk .



Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
 - Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string K , called the key.
- Asymmetric cryptography
 - Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk .

Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
 - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string K** , called the **key**.
 - Challenge: How do you privately share a key?
 - Asymmetric cryptography
 - Each party creates a public key **pk** and a secret key **sk** .
 - Challenge: How do you validate a public key?
- ↑ ignore for now*

Ingredient: Randomness

- Many applications (especially security ones) require randomness
- Explicit uses:
 - Generate secret cryptographic keys ✓
 - Generate random initialization vectors for encryption ✓
- Other “non-obvious” uses:
 - Generate passwords for new users
 - Shuffle the order of votes (in an electronic voting machine)
 - Shuffle cards (for an online gambling site)

C's rand() Function


- C has a built-in random function: **rand()**

```
unsigned long int next = 1;
/* rand:  return pseudo-random integer on 0..32767 */
int rand(void) {
    next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
    return (unsigned int) (next/65536) % 32768;
}
/* srand:  set seed for rand() */
void srand(unsigned int seed) {
    next = seed;
}
```

Hand-drawn diagram illustrating the state of the rand() function. A green arrow points from the underlined 'seed' parameter in the srand() function call to a box containing '682'. Another green arrow points from this box to a box containing '682', which then points to a box containing '???A'. A final green arrow points from the '???A' box to a box containing '8', which then points to a box containing 'C'. A green arrow also points from the 'C' box back to the top of the 'C' box, forming a loop.

- Problem: don't use **rand()** for security-critical applications!
 - Given a few sample outputs, you can predict subsequent ones





More details: “How We Learned to Cheat at Online Poker: A Study in Software Security”

http://www.cigital.com/papers/download/developer_gambling.php

PS3 and Randomness

Hackers obtain PS3 private cryptography key due to epic programming fail? (update)

<http://www.engadget.com/2010/12/29/hackers-obtain-ps3-private-cryptography-key-due-to-epic-programm/>


- 2010/2011: Hackers found/released private root key for Sony's PS3
- Key used to sign software – now can load any software on PS3 and it will execute as “trusted”
- Due to bad random number: same “random” value used to sign all system updates

Obtaining Pseudorandom Numbers

- For security applications, want “cryptographically secure pseudorandom numbers”
- Libraries include cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNG)
↳
- Linux:
 - /dev/random ← blocks
 - /dev/urandom - nonblocking, possibly less entropy ←
- Internally:
 - Entropy pool gathered from multiple sources
 - e.g., mouse/keyboard timings
- Challenges with embedded systems, saved VMs ←

Now: Symmetric Encryption

Confidentiality: Basic Problem




Given (Symmetric Crypto): both parties know the same **secret**.

Goal: send a message confidentially.

Ignore for now: How is this achieved in practice??

One-Time Pad



Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are **as many possible keys as possible plaintexts**, and **every key is equally likely** (Claude Shannon, 1949)

Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
 - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
 - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as theoretically possible
 - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
 - ... as long as the key sequence is truly random
 - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
 - ... as long as each key is same length as plaintext
 - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

Problems with One-Time Pad



- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused

111010001
101101101
repeated key

② what about integrity?

Dangers of Reuse

→ ① what can you learn about P_1 & P_2 ?



$$P_2 + C_2 = K \quad \leftarrow$$

Learn relationship between plaintexts


$$C_1 \oplus C_2 = (P_1 \oplus K) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K) = (P_1 \oplus P_2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P_1 \oplus P_2$$

$P_1 \oplus P_2$ (circled in green)
 ↳ no randomness

Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) **Insecure if keys are reused**
 - **Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts**

Integrity?




Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
 - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- (3) **Does not guarantee integrity**
 - One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality
 - Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else

Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
 - When one-time pad is unrealistic...
- Use special cryptographic primitives:
block ciphers, stream ciphers
 - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
 - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad

Stream Ciphers




- **One-time pad:** $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Message}) = \text{Message} \oplus \text{Key}$
 - Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message
- Idea: replace “random” with “pseudo-random”
 - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
 - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long “random-looking” sequence
 - E.g., 128-bit seed into a 10^6 -bit pseudo-random sequence
- $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Msg}) = \text{Msg} \oplus \text{PRNG}(\text{Key})$
 - Message processed bit by bit (like one-time pad)

PRNG
(seed)

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random

Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk (“block”) of plaintext
 - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
 - Each key defines a different **permutation**
 - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



More on block ciphers next time!