CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Software Security: Buffer Overflow Attacks

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Announcements

• Where to find what

- Course website:
 - Schedule (with slide decks, assignment links)
 - Assignments (all homeworks, labs, research readings, final project)
- Canvas:
 - Assignment / Lab / Readings / Project turn-in
 - In-class Activities ("Quizzes")
 - Zoom links and cloud recordings
- Ed:
 - Discussion board (questions, discussion)
- Things Due:
 - Ethics form: Due next Wednesday (4/8)
 - Homework #1: Due next Friday (4/10)

TOWARDS DEFENSES

Approaches to Security

- Prevention
 - Stop an attack
- Detection
 - Detect an ongoing or past attack
- Response
 - Respond to attacks
- The threat of a response may be enough to deter some attackers

Whole System is Critical

- Securing a system involves a whole-system view
 - Cryptography
 - Implementation
 - People
 - Physical security
 - Everything in between
- This is because "security is only as strong as the weakest link," and security can fail in many places
 - No reason to attack the strongest part of a system if you can walk right around it.

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Whole System is Critical



Attacker's Asymmetric Advantage



Attacker's Asymmetric Advantage



- Attacker only needs to win in one place
- Defender's response: Defense in depth

From Policy to Implementation

- After you've figured out what security means to your application, there are still challenges:
 - Requirements bugs
 - Incorrect or problematic goals
 - Design bugs
 - Poor use of cryptography
 - Poor sources of randomness
 - ..
 - Implementation bugs
 - Buffer overflow attacks
 - •
 - Is the system usable?

Many Participants

- Many parties involved
 - System developers
 - Companies deploying the system
 - The end users
 - The adversaries (possibly one of the above)
- Different parties have different goals
 - System developers and companies may wish to optimize cost
 - End users may desire security, privacy, and usability
 - But the relationship between these goals is quite complex (will customers choose features or security?)

Better News

- There are a lot of defense mechanisms

 We'll study some, but by no means all, in this course
- It's important to understand their limitations
 - "If you think cryptography will solve your problem, then you don't understand cryptography... and you don't understand your problem" -- Bruce Schneier

SOFTWARE SECURITY

Adversarial Failures

• Software bugs are bad

Consequences can be serious

- Even worse when an intelligent adversary wishes to exploit them!
 - Intelligent adversaries: Force bugs into "worst possible" conditions/states
 - Intelligent adversaries: Pick their targets
- Buffer overflows bugs: <u>Big</u> class of bugs
 - Normal conditions: Can sometimes cause systems to fail
 - Adversarial conditions: Attacker able to violate security of your system (control, obtain private information, ...)

BUFFER OVERFLOWS

A Bit of History: Morris Worm

- Worm was released in 1988 by Robert Morris
 - Graduate student at Cornell, son of NSA chief scientist
 - Convicted under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
 3 years probation and 400 hours of community service
 - Now an EECS professor at MIT



- Worm was intended to propagate slowly and harmlessly measure the size of the Internet
- Due to a coding error, it created new copies as fast as it could and overloaded infected machines
- \$10-100M worth of damage

Morris Worm and Buffer Overflow

- One of the worm's propagation techniques was a buffer overflow attack against a vulnerable version of fingerd on VAX systems
 - By sending special string to finger daemon, worm caused it to execute code creating a new worm copy

Buffer overflows remain a common source of vulnerabilities and exploits today! (Especially in embedded systems.)


Attacks on Memory Buffers

- Buffer is a pre-defined data storage area inside computer memory (stack or heap)
- Typical situation:



- A function takes some input that it writes into a preallocated buffer.
- The developer forgets to check that the size of the input isn't larger than the size of the buffer.
- Uh oh.
 - "Normal" bad input: crash
 - "Adversarial" bad input : take control of execution

Stack Buffers



- No bounds checking on strcpy()
- If str is longer than 126 bytes
 - Program may crash
 - Attacker may change program behavior

Example: Changing Flags

buf

Suppose Web server contains this function


```
void func(char *str) {
    char buf[126];
    ...
    strcpy(buf,str);
    ...
}
```

- Authenticated variable non-zero when user has extra privileges
- Morris worm also overflowed a buffer to overwrite an authenticated flag in fingerd

I (:-)!)


Memory Layout

- Text region: Executable code of the program
- Heap: Dynamically allocated data
- Stack: Local variables, function return addresses; grows and shrinks as functions are called and return




Stack Buffers

• Suppose Web server contains this function:



 When this function is invoked, a new frame (activation record) is pushed onto the stack.



Execute code at this address after func() finishes


What if Buffer is Overstuffed?

• Memory pointed to by str is copied onto stack...

strcpy does NOT check whether the string at *str contains fewer than 126 characters


• If a string longer than 126 bytes is copied into buffer, it will overwrite adjacent stack locations.

This will be interpreted as return address!



Executing Attack Code

- Suppose buffer contains attacker-created string
 - For example, str points to a string received from the network as the URL



- When function exits, code in the buffer will be executed, giving attacker a shell ("shellcode")
 - Root shell if the victim program is setuid root

Buffer Overflows Can Be Tricky...

- Overflow portion of the buffer must contain correct address of attack code in the RET position
 - The value in the RET position must point to the beginning of attack assembly code in the buffer
 - Otherwise application will (probably) crash with segfault
 - Attacker must correctly guess in which stack position his/her buffer will be when the function is called

Problem: No Bounds Checking

• strcpy does <u>not</u> check input size

- strcpy(buf, str) simply copies memory contents into buf starting from *str until "\0" is encountered, ignoring the size of area allocated to buf
- Many C library functions are unsafe
 - strcpy(char *dest, const char *src)
 - strcat(char *dest, const char *src)
 - gets(char *s)
 - scanf(const char *format, ...)
 - printf(const char *format, ...)

Does Bounds Checking Help?

- strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
 - If strncpy is used instead of strcpy, no more than n characters will be copied from *src to *dest
 - Programmer has to supply the right value of n
- Potential overflow in htpasswd.c (Apache 1.3):

strcpy(record,user);
strcat(record,":");
strcat(record,cpw);


Copies username ("user") into buffer ("record"), then appends ":" and hashed password ("cpw")

• Published fix:

```
strncpy(record,user,MAX_STRING_LEN-1);
strcat(record,":")
strncat(record,cpw,MAX_STRING_LEN-1);
```

What About This?

• Home-brewed range-checking string copy



Breakout Activity


Canvas -> Quizzes -> April 3

(This one still won't be graded. We will send out an update via email about how we will be counting "in-class" activities before Monday.)


https://canvas.uw.edu/courses/1371936/quizzes /1234443

Misuse of strncpy in htpasswd "Fix"

• Published "fix" for Apache htpasswd overflow:




MAX_STRING_LEN bytes allocated for record buffer




What About This?

• Home-brewed range-checking string copy



Off-By-One Overflow

Home-brewed range-checking string copy



 1-byte overflow: can't change RET, but can change pointer to previous stack frame...