

Anonymity

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Admin

- **Homework #3:** Due today!
- **Lab #3:** Due next Friday!
- **Next week:**
 - Last week of classes!
 - Ethics panel on Wednesday
 - **No section** on Thursday (use the time to work with your project groups, etc.)



The New Yorker,
1993

"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

Privacy on Public Networks

- Internet is designed as a public network
 - Machines on your LAN may see your traffic, network routers see all traffic that passes through them
- Routing information is public
 - IP packet headers identify source and destination
 - Even a passive observer can figure out **who is talking to whom**
- Encryption does not hide identities
 - **Encryption hides payload, but not routing information**
 - Even IP-level encryption (tunnel-mode IPSec/ESP) reveals IP addresses of IPSec gateways
- **Modern web: Accounts, web tracking, etc. ...**

Questions

Q1: What is anonymity?

← hiding identity — digital
← real life identity
! widely links between identity & actions

Q2: Why might people **want** anonymity on the Internet?

← access "controversial" content

protect
vuln populations

Q3: Why might people **not want** anonymity on the Internet?

← we live accounts

← allow "illegal" activities

What is Anonymity?

- Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a **set of subjects**
 - You cannot be anonymous by yourself!
 - Big difference between anonymity and confidentiality
 - Hide your activities among others' similar activities
- Unlinkability of action and identity ←
 - For example, sender and email he/she sends are no more related after observing communication than before
- Unobservability (hard to achieve) ←
 - Observer cannot even tell whether a certain action took place or not

Applications of Anonymity (I)

- Privacy
 - Hide online transactions, Web browsing, etc. from intrusive governments, marketers and archivists
- Untraceable electronic mail
 - Corporate whistle-blowers
 - Political dissidents
 - Socially sensitive communications (online AA meeting)
 - Confidential business negotiations
- Law enforcement and intelligence
 - Sting operations and honeypots
 - Secret communications on a public network

Applications of Anonymity (II)

- Digital cash
 - Electronic currency with properties of paper money (online purchases unlinkable to buyer's identity)
- Anonymous electronic voting
- Censorship-resistant publishing

Part 1: Anonymity in Datasets

How to release an anonymous dataset?

A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749

By MICHAEL BARBARO and TOM ZELLER Jr.; Saul Hansell contributed reporting for this article.
Published: August 9, 2006

Buried in a list of 20 million Web search queries collected by AOL and recently released on the Internet is user No. 4417749. The number was assigned by the company to protect the searcher's anonymity, but it was not much of a shield.

No. 4417749 conducted hundreds of searches over a three-month period on topics ranging from "numb fingers" to "60 single men" to "dog that urinates on everything."

And search by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 became easier to discern. There are queries for "landscapers in Lilburn, Ga," several people with the last name Arnold and "homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia."

It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., frequently researches her friends' medical ailments and loves her three dogs. "Those are my searches," she said, after a reporter read part of the list to her.

 FACEBOOK

 TWITTER

 GOOGLE+

 EMAIL


 SHARE

 PRINT

 REPRINTS

How to release an anonymous dataset?

- Possible approach: remove identifying information from datasets?



11¹⁰

Massachusetts
medical+voter data
[Sweeney 1997]

Figure 1 Linking to re-identify data

[Sweeney 2002]

k-Anonymity

- Each person contained in the dataset cannot be distinguished from at least $k-1$ others in the data.

Name	Age	Gender	State of domicile	Religion	Disease
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Female	Tamil Nadu	*	Cancer
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Female	Kerala	*	Viral infection
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Female	Tamil Nadu	*	TB
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Male	Karnataka	*	No illness
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Female	Kerala	*	Heart-related
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Male			
*	Age ≤ 20	Male			
*	20 < Age ≤ 30	Male			
*	Age ≤ 20	Male			
*	Age ≤ 20	Male	Kerala	*	Viral infection

Doesn't work for high-dimensional datasets (which tend to be **sparse**)

Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov

The University of Texas at Austin

Differential Privacy

- **Setting:** Trusted party has a database
- **Goal:** allow queries on the database that are useful but preserve the privacy of individual records
- **Differential privacy intuition:** add noise so that an output is produced with similar probability whether any single input is included or not
- Privacy of the computation, not of the dataset


Part 2: Anonymity in Communication

Chaum's Mix

- Early proposal for anonymous email
 - David Chaum. “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms”. Communications of the ACM, February 1981.
- Modern anonymity systems use Mix as the basic building block

Before spam, people thought anonymous email was a good idea 😊


Basic Mix Design



Adversary knows all senders and all receivers, but cannot link a sent message with a received message


Anonymous Return Addresses

M includes $\{K_1, A\}_{pk(mix)}$, K_2 where K_2 is a fresh public key



Secrecy without authentication
(good for an online confession service 😊)

Mix Cascades and Mixnets




- Messages are sent through a **sequence of mixes**
 - Can also form an arbitrary network of mixes (“mixnet”)
- Some of the mixes may be controlled by attacker, but even a single good mix ensures anonymity
- Pad and buffer traffic to foil **correlation attacks**

Disadvantages of Basic Mixnets

- Public-key encryption and decryption at each mix are **computationally expensive**
- Basic mixnets have **high latency**
 - OK for email, not OK for anonymous Web browsing
- Challenge: **low-latency anonymity network**



Another Idea: Randomized Routing

e.g., Onion Routing



- Sender chooses a random sequence of routers
 - Some routers are honest, some controlled by attacker
 - Sender controls the length of the path

Onion Routing




- Routing info for each link encrypted with router's public key
- Each router learns only the identity of the next router

Tor

- Second-generation onion routing network
 - <http://tor.eff.org>
 - Developed by Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson
 - Specifically designed for **low-latency** anonymous Internet communications
- Running since October 2003
- “Easy-to-use” client proxy
 - Freely available, can use it for anonymous browsing


Tor Circuit Setup (1)

- Client proxy establishes a symmetric session key and circuit with Onion Router #1




Tor Circuit Setup (2)

- Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric session key with Onion Router #2
 - Tunnel through Onion Router #1




Tor Circuit Setup (3)

- Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric session key with Onion Router #3
 - Tunnel through Onion Routers #1 and #2



Using a Tor Circuit

- Client applications connect and communicate over the established Tor circuit.



How do you know who to talk to?


- Directory servers
 - Maintain lists of active onion routers, their locations, current public keys, etc.
 - Control how new routers join the network
 - “Sybil attack”: attacker creates a large number of routers
 - Directory servers’ keys ship with Tor code

Issues and Notes of Caution

- Passive traffic analysis
 - Infer from network traffic who is talking to whom
 - To hide your traffic, must carry other people's traffic!
- Active traffic analysis
 - Inject packets or put a timing signature on packet flow
- Compromise of network nodes
 - Attacker may compromise some routers
 - Powerful adversaries may compromise “too many”
 - It is not obvious which nodes have been compromised
 - Attacker may be passively logging traffic
 - Better not to trust any individual router
 - Assume that some fraction of routers is good, don't know which

Issues and Notes of Caution

- Tor isn't completely effective by itself
 - Tracking cookies, fingerprinting, etc.
 - Exit nodes can see everything!



Issues and Notes of Caution

- The simple act of using Tor could make one a target for additional surveillance
- Hosting an exit node could result in illegal activity coming from your machine