

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

# Cryptography


## [Symmetric Encryption]

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Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

# Confidentiality: Basic Problem




Given (Symmetric Crypto): both parties know the same **secret**.

Goal: send a message confidentially.

Ignore for now: How is this achieved in practice??

# One-Time Pad



Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are **as many possible keys as possible plaintexts**, and **every key is equally likely** (Claude Shannon, 1949)



# Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
  - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
  - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as theoretically possible
  - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
  - ... as long as the key sequence is truly random
    - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
  - ... as long as each key is same length as plaintext
    - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

# Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused

# Dangers of Reuse




Learn relationship between plaintexts

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 \oplus C_2 &= (P_1 \oplus K) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K) = \\ &= (P_1 \oplus P_2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P_1 \oplus P_2 \end{aligned}$$

# Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts

# Integrity?





# Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- (3) **Does not guarantee integrity**
  - **One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality**
  - **Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else**

# Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
  - When one-time pad is unrealistic...
- Use special cryptographic primitives:  
block ciphers, stream ciphers
  - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
  - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad


# Stream Ciphers

- **One-time pad:**  $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Message}) = \text{Message} \oplus \text{Key}$ 
  - Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message
- Idea: replace “random” with “pseudo-random”
  - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
  - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long “random-looking” sequence
    - E.g., 128-bit seed into a  $10^6$ -bit pseudo-random sequence
- $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Msg}) = \text{Msg} \oplus \text{PRNG}(\text{Key})$ 
  - Message processed bit by bit (like one-time pad)

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random


# Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk (“block”) of plaintext
  - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
  - Each key defines a different permutation
  - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



# Keyed Permutation

- Not just shuffling of input bits!
  - Suppose plaintext = “111”.  
Then “111” is not the only possible ciphertext!
- Instead:
  - **Permutation of possible outputs**
  - Use secret key to pick a permutation



# Keyed Permutation

input	possible output	possible output	etc.
000	010	111	...
001	111	110	...
010	101	000	...
011	110	101	...
...	...		...
111	000	110	...


Key = 00  
Key = 01

For N-bit input,  $2^N!$  possible permutations  
For K-bit key,  $2^K$  possible keys

# Block Cipher Security

- Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
  - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N-bit block cipher permutes over  $2^N$  inputs.
- Only computational guarantee of secrecy
  - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
    - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
  - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)





# Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

# DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/ $\mu$ s	Time required at $10^6$ encryptions/ $\mu$ s
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31} \mu s = 35.8$ minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55} \mu s = 1142$ years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127} \mu s = 5.4 \times 10^{24}$ years	$5.4 \times 10^{18}$ years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167} \mu s = 5.9 \times 10^{36}$ years	$5.9 \times 10^{30}$ years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26} \mu s = 6.4 \times 10^{12}$ years	$6.4 \times 10^6$ years


- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
  - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES ---> 3DES
  - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

# Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity
- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard**
  - New federal standard as of 2001
    - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
  - Based on the Rijndael algorithm
    - Selected via an open process
  - 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits


# Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size




- What should we do?

# Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

# Information Leakage in ECB Mode




Encrypt in ECB mode




[Wikipedia]

# Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
  - Still does not guarantee integrity


# CBC Mode: Decryption






# ECB vs. CBC


AES in ECB mode



AES in CBC mode




Similar plaintext blocks produce similar ciphertext blocks (**not good!**)



[Picture due to Bart Preneel]


# CBC and Electronic Voting



Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:

```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,  
totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```

# Counter Mode (CTR): Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Still does not guarantee integrity; Fragile if ctr repeats

# Counter Mode (CTR): Decryption

