Announcements

• If you’re on the class mailing list, you should have received several emails.

• Switch from Google Group to Piazza.

• Ethics form: Due next Wednesday (10/2).

• Homework #1: Due next Friday (10/4)
  – Start forming groups, feel free to use Piazza
Challenge Problem from Email
Challenge Problem from Email

• You have been asked to come to the final exam for a course, where you know in advance that the only question on the exam will be: “Write down the first 100 digits of Pi.”

• You can cheat and in fact are encouraged to cheat.

• The only criteria is that you are not caught by the TAs or instructor, who will be proctoring the exam. And, of course, the TA and instructor expect that you will be cheating (cheating is a requirement!), so your method to cheat has to be very subtle.
From Worksheets

• You can change groups between labs
• Partner does not need to be in same section
• Stories, background on work we’ve done at UW – I’ll try to provide them over time 😊
• Worst “hacking” movies
  – I haven’t watched this yet, but PhD student in the lab recommended:
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZQz9tkEHIg&feature=youtu.be
Challenges: What is “Security”?

• What does security mean?
  – Often the hardest part of building a secure system is figuring out what security means
  – What are the assets to protect?
  – What are the threats to those assets?
  – Who are the adversaries, and what are their resources?
  – What is the security policy or goals?

• Perfect security does not exist!
  – Security is not a binary property
  – Security is about risk management

Current events, security reviews, and other discussions are designed to exercise our thinking about these issues.
Two Key Themes of this Course

1. How to think about security
   – The “Security Mindset” – a “new” way to think about systems

2. Technical aspects of security
   – Vulnerabilities and attack techniques
   – Defensive technologies
   – Topics including: software security, cryptography, malware, web security, web privacy, smartphone security, authentication, usable security, anonymity, physical security, security for emerging technologies
What This Course is Not About

• **Not** a comprehensive course on computer security
  – Computer security is a broad discipline!
  – Impossible to cover everything in one quarter
  – So be careful in industry or wherever you go!
• **Not** about all of the latest and greatest attacks
  – Read news, discuss on forum
• **Not** a course on ethical, legal, or economic issues
  – We will touch on these issues, but the topic is huge
• **Not** a course on how to “hack” or “crack” systems
  – Yes, we will learn about attacks ... but the ultimate goal is to develop an understanding of attacks so that you can build more secure systems
Theme 1: Security Mindset

• Thinking critically about designs, challenging assumptions
• Being curious, thinking like an attacker
• “That new product X sounds awesome, I can’t wait to use it!” versus “That new product X sounds cool, but I wonder what would happen if someone did Y with it…”

• Why it’s important
  – Technology changes, so learning to think like a security person is more important than learning specifics of today
  – Will help you design better systems/solutions
  – Interactions with broader context: law, policy, ethics, etc.
Example
Learning the Security Mindset

• Several approaches for developing “The Security Mindset” and for exploring the broader contextual issues surrounding computer security
  – Homework #1
    • Current event reflections and security reviews
    • May work in groups of up to 3 people (groups are encouraged – lots of value in discussing security with others!)
  – In class discussions and activities
  – Participation in Piazza (e.g., critiquing movies)
Where is Security Applicable

• Q1 on the worksheet: What are some interesting / exciting / unusual / new technologies for which computer security and privacy might be important?
Security: Not Just for PCs

- smartphones
- voting machines
- EEG headsets
- medical devices
- wearables
- RFID
- mobile sensing platforms
- cars
- game platforms
- airplanes
For Whom is Security Important?

• Q2 on the worksheet: For whom might computer security and privacy be important?
THREAT MODELING
Threat Modeling

• There’s no such thing as perfect security
  – But, attackers have limited resources
  – Make them pay unacceptable costs to succeed!

• Defining security per context: identify assets, adversaries, motivations, threats, vulnerabilities, risk, possible defenses
Threat Modeling (Security Reviews)

- **Assets**: What are we trying to protect? How valuable are those assets?
- **Adversaries**: Who might try to attack, and why?
- **Vulnerabilities**: How might the system be weak?
- **Threats**: What actions might an adversary take to exploit vulnerabilities?
- **Risk**: How important are assets? How likely is exploit?
- **Possible Defenses**
What’s Security, Anyway?

- Common general security goals: “CIA”
  - Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Authenticity
  - Availability
Confidentiality (Privacy)

- Confidentiality is concealment of information.

Eavesdropping, packet sniffing, illegal copying
Integrity

• Integrity is prevention of unauthorized changes.
Authenticity

• Authenticity is knowing who you’re talking to.
Availability

• Availability is ability to use information or resources.
Threat Modeling Example: Electronic Voting

• Popular replacement to traditional paper ballots
Pre-Election

**Pre-election**: Poll workers load “ballot definition files” on voting machine.
Active voting: Voters obtain **single-use** tokens from poll workers. Voters use tokens to **activate machines** and vote.
Active Voting: Votes encrypted and stored. Voter token canceled.
Post-Election

Post-election: Stored votes transported to tabulation center.
Security and E-Voting (Simplified)

• Functionality goals:
  – Easy to use, reduce mistakes/confusion

• Security goals (Q3 on worksheet, can also answer Q4):
  – Adversary should not be able to tamper with the election outcome
    • By changing votes (integrity)
    • By voting on behalf of someone (authenticity)
    • By denying voters the right to vote (availability)
  – Adversary should not be able to figure out how voters vote (confidentiality)
Q2: Can You Spot Any Potential Issues?

Voter token

Ballot definition file

Poll worker

Interactively vote

Voter token

Interactively vote

Voter

Encrypted votes

Recorded votes

Tabulator
Potential Adversaries

- Voters
- Election officials
- Employees of voting machine manufacturer
  - Software/hardware engineers
  - Maintenance people
- Other engineers
  - Makers of hardware
  - Makers of underlying software or add-on components
  - Makers of compiler
- ...
- Or any combination of the above
Problem: An adversary (e.g., a poll worker, software developer, or company representative) able to control the software or the underlying hardware could do whatever he or she wanted.
KEYS TO THE KINGDOM

Photo taken from Diebold's online store. The keys that open every Diebold touch-screen voting machine. Working copies have been made from the photo.
**Problem:** Ballot definition files are not authenticated.

**Example attack:** A malicious poll worker could modify ballot definition files so that votes cast for “Mickey Mouse” are recorded for “Donald Duck.”
Problem: Smartcards can perform cryptographic operations. But there is no authentication from voter token to terminal.

Example attack: A regular voter could make his or her own voter token and vote multiple times.
Problem: Encryption key ("F2654hD4") hard-coded into the software since (at least) 1998. Votes stored in the order cast.

Example attack: A poll worker could determine how voters vote.
**Problem:** When votes transmitted to tabulator over the Internet or a dialup connection, they are **decrypted first**; the cleartext results are sent the tabulator.

**Example attack:** A sophisticated outsider could determine how voters vote.