

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: **Computer Security and Privacy**

Autumn 2019

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Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Franz Roesner, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...


Announcements

- My office hours next week: Wed 12:30pm, CSE1 403
- HW 2 available
- Lab 1 due

- Book suggestions: Mitnick on Social Engineering; Chris Hadnagy on Social Engineering; “No Tech Hacking” book

Research Discussions

- Monday (10/14): Peter Ney on Bio-Cyber Security and Cell Site Simulators
- Monday (10/21): Karl Koscher on Automotive Cyber Security
- Wednesday (10/23): Ivan Evtimov on Adversarial Machine Learning
- Monday (10/28): Emily McReynolds on Law and Policy



Begin Crypto Review

- Also quiz section yesterday
- Also good anyway, recalling “spiral learning” process

Flavors of Cryptography


- Symmetric cryptography
 - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string K** , called the **key**.
- Asymmetric cryptography
 - Each party creates a public key **pk** and a secret key **sk** .

How Cryptosystems are Made

- Primitives first (like block ciphers or RSA)
- Schemes second (like ECB, CTR mode)
- Protocols third (like SSL/TLS, SSH)

Block Ciphers and Keyed Permutation

- Not just shuffling of input bits!
 - Suppose plaintext = “111”.
Then “111” is not the only possible ciphertext!
- Instead:
 - Permutation of possible outputs
 - For N-bit input, $2^N!$ possible permutations
 - Use secret key to pick a permutation



Question from Last Time

- Question written on a worksheet: If/how you would use block ciphers with keys that are larger than blocks
- The way I think about this:
 - Think about keys and blocks separately
 - Keys determine *which* permutation to use
 - Blocks are the inputs/outputs to the keyed permutations

Example: With 3-bit Blocks

Key = 0000000

Input	Output
000	111
001	101
010	001
011	000
100	110
101	010
110	100
111	011

Key = 0000001

Input	Output
000	000
001	101
010	010
011	001
100	100
101	011
110	111
111	110

Key = 0000010


Input	Output
000	001
001	000
010	010
011	011
100	111
101	101
110	100
111	110

...

Standard Block Ciphers



- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
 - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
 - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
 - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity
- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard**
 - New federal standard as of 2001
 - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
 - Based on the Rijndael algorithm
 - Selected via an open process
 - 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode




- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

Information Leakage in ECB Mode




Encrypt in ECB mode



[Wikipedia]


End Review

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption




- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
 - Still does not guarantee integrity

CBC Mode: Decryption




ECB vs. CBC



[Picture due to Bart Preneel]


CBC and Electronic Voting



Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:


```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,  
totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```

Counter Mode (CTR): Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Still does not guarantee integrity; Fragile if ctr repeats

Counter Mode (CTR): Decryption




Stepping Back: Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
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- Asymmetric cryptography
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
Symmetric Setting

Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string K , called the key.



Asymmetric Setting

Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk .



Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
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Asymmetric (Public Key) Encryption

- Let's now look at an asymmetric building block: RSA
- Don't need to memorize details (for HW2, you can always look up details)
- Should try to understand “API-level” details (I'll clarify this as we go through slides)

Requirements for Public Key Encryption

- **Key generation:** computationally easy to generate a pair (public key PK , private key SK)
- **Encryption:** given plaintext M and public key PK , easy to compute ciphertext $C = E_{PK}(M)$
- **Decryption:** given ciphertext $C = E_{PK}(M)$ and private key SK , easy to compute plaintext M
 - Infeasible to learn anything about M from C without SK
 - Trapdoor function: $Decrypt(SK, Encrypt(PK, M)) = M$

Some Number Theory Facts

- Euler totient function $\varphi(n)$ ($n \geq 1$) is the number of integers in the $[1, n]$ interval that are relatively prime to n
 - Two numbers are relatively prime if their greatest common divisor (gcd) is 1
 - Easy to compute for primes: $\varphi(p) = p-1$
 - Note that $\varphi(ab) = \varphi(a) \varphi(b)$
- Main thing to “remember”:
 - Easy to compute $\varphi(ab)$ if know a and b , for two primes a and b
 - Not known how to efficiently compute $\varphi(ab)$ if a and b unknown, for two primes a and b

RSA Cryptosystem [Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 1977]

- Key generation:
 - Generate large primes p, q
 - Say, 2048 bits each (need primality testing, too)
 - Compute $n=pq$ and $\varphi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$
 - Choose small e , relatively prime to $\varphi(n)$
 - Typically, $e=3$ or $e=2^{16}+1=65537$
 - Compute unique d such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$
 - Modular inverse: $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ ← How to compute?
 - Public key = (e, n) ; private key = (d, n)
- Encryption of m (m a number between 0 and $n-1$):
 $c = m^e \pmod n$
- Decryption of c : $c^d \pmod n = (m^e \pmod n)^d \pmod n = m$

Why Decryption Works (FYI)

- Decryption of c : $c^d \bmod n = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = (m^e)^d \bmod n = m$
- Recall $n=pq$ and $\varphi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$ and $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$
- Chinese Remainder Theorem: To show $m^{ed} \bmod n \equiv m \bmod n$, sufficient to show:
 - $m^{ed} \bmod p \equiv m \bmod p$
 - $m^{ed} \bmod q \equiv m \bmod q$
- If $m \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \rightarrow m^{ed} \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$
- Else $m^{ed} = m^{ed-1}m = m^{k(q-1)(p-1)}m = m^{h(p-1)}m$ for some k , and $h=k(q-1)$. Why? Recall how d was chosen and the definition of mod.
- Fermat Little Theorem: $m^{(p-1)h} m \equiv 1^h m \pmod{p} \equiv m \pmod{p}$

Why is RSA “Secure”?

- **RSA problem:** given c , $n=pq$, and e such that $\gcd(e, \varphi(n))=1$, find m such that $m^e=c \pmod n$
 - In other words, recover m from ciphertext c and public key (n,e) by taking e^{th} root of c modulo n
 - There is no known efficient algorithm for doing this
- **Factoring problem:** given positive integer n , find primes p_1, \dots, p_k such that $n=p_1^{e_1}p_2^{e_2}\dots p_k^{e_k}$
- If factoring is easy, then RSA problem is easy (knowing factors means you can compute $d = \text{inverse of } e \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$)
 - It may be possible to break RSA without factoring n -- but if it is, we don't know how

Caveats and Why RSA is “Insecure”

- Encrypted message needs to be an integer less than n
- Don't use RSA **directly** for privacy – **output is deterministic!** Need to pre-process input somehow
 - Recall ECB mode privacy concerns
- Plain RSA also does not provide integrity
 - **Can tamper with encrypted messages**
 - Suppose adversary sees two ciphertext c_1 and c_2 , and then sends $c_3 = c_1 * c_2 \bmod n$ to the recipient. What would that decrypt to?

How to Use RSA to Encrypt

- In practice, OAEP is used: instead of encrypting M , encrypt $M \text{ xor } G(r); r \text{ xor } H(M \text{ xor } G(r))$
 - r is random and fresh, G and H are hash functions
- We will return to this after discussing hash functions

Some notes on modular arithmetic

- Can take modulus at any time in operation
- Try online tools, like <https://www.wolframalpha.com/>