

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: **Computer Security and Privacy**

Autumn 2019

Tadayoshi (Yoshi) Kohno
yoshi@cs.Washington.edu

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Franz Roesner, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Announcements


- TA office hours as usual, and great place for lab discussions
- I will again mute HW1 😊, until I've looked at all of them
- Guest lecturers next Monday and Wednesday 😊 But no office hours for me next week 😞

Misc

- How to think about security, paranoia, etc

Research Discussions

- Monday (10/14): Peter Ney on Bio-Cyber Security and Cell Site Simulators
- Monday (10/21): Karl Koscher on Automotive Cyber Security
- Wednesday (10/23): Ivan Evtimov on Adversarial Machine Learning
- Monday (10/28): Emily McReynolds on Law and Policy




Broad Classes of Security Research

- Measurement
 - Analysis / attack exploration
 - Building secure systems
 - Human-computer interaction
-
- Guest lectures connected to threat modeling and to buffer overflows as well

Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
 - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string K** , called the **key**.
 - **Challenge: How do you privately share a key?**
- Asymmetric cryptography
 - Each party creates a public key **pk** and a secret key **sk** .
 - **Challenge: How do you validate a public key?**


Confidentiality: Basic Problem



Given (Symmetric Crypto): both parties know the same **secret**.
Goal: send a message confidentially.

Ignore for now: How is this achieved in practice??

One-Time Pad



Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are **as many possible keys as possible plaintexts**, and **every key is equally likely** (Claude Shannon, 1949)



Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
 - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
 - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as theoretically possible
 - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
 - ... as long as the key sequence is truly random
 - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
 - ... as long as each key is same length as plaintext
 - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused

Dangers of Reuse




Learn relationship between plaintexts

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 \oplus C_2 &= (P_1 \oplus K) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K) = \\ &= (P_1 \oplus P_2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P_1 \oplus P_2 \end{aligned}$$

Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
 - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts

Integrity?



Problems with One-Time Pad

- (1) Key must be as long as the plaintext
 - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
 - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- (2) Insecure if keys are reused
 - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- (3) **Does not guarantee integrity**
 - **One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality**
 - **Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else**

Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
 - When one-time pad is unrealistic...
- Use special cryptographic primitives:
block ciphers, stream ciphers
 - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
 - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad


Stream Ciphers

- **One-time pad:** $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Message}) = \text{Message} \oplus \text{Key}$
 - Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message
- Idea: replace “random” with “pseudo-random”
 - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
 - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long “random-looking” sequence
 - E.g., 128-bit seed into a 10^6 -bit pseudo-random sequence
- $\text{Ciphertext}(\text{Key}, \text{Msg}) = \text{Msg} \oplus \text{PRNG}(\text{Key})$
 - Message processed bit by bit (unlike block cipher)

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random


Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk (“block”) of plaintext
 - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
 - Each key defines a different permutation
 - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



Keyed Permutation

- Not just shuffling of input bits!
 - Suppose plaintext = “111”.
Then “111” is not the only possible ciphertext!
- Instead:
 - Permutation of possible outputs
 - For N-bit input, $2^N!$ possible permutations
 - Use secret key to pick a permutation



Example: With 3-bit Blocks

Key = 0000000

Input	Output
000	111
001	101
010	001
011	000
100	110
101	010
110	100
111	011

Key = 0000001

Input	Output
000	000
001	101
010	010
011	001
100	100
101	011
110	111
111	110

Key = 0000010


Input	Output
000	001
001	000
010	010
011	011
100	111
101	101
110	100
111	110

...

Block Cipher Security

- Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
 - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N -bit block cipher permutes over 2^N inputs.
- Only computational guarantee of secrecy
 - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
 - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
 - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
 - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
 - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
 - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/ μ s	Time required at 10^6 encryptions/ μ s
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31} \mu$ s = 35.8 minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55} \mu$ s = 1142 years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127} \mu$ s = 5.4×10^{24} years	5.4×10^{18} years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167} \mu$ s = 5.9×10^{36} years	5.9×10^{30} years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26} \mu$ s = 6.4×10^{12} years	6.4×10^6 years


- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
 - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES ---> 3DES
 - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
 - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
 - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
 - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity
- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard**
 - New federal standard as of 2001
 - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
 - Based on the Rijndael algorithm
 - Selected via an open process
 - 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits


Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we have got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size





- What should we do?

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

Information Leakage in ECB Mode



Encrypt in ECB mode



[Wikipedia]