# CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

# **Authentication (Continued)**

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Tadayoshi (Yoshi) Kohno yoshi@cs.Washington.edu

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Franziska Roesner, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

## **Admin**

- HW2: Due Nov 7, 4:30pm
- Looking ahead, rough plan:
- Lab 2 out Nov 5, due Nov 20, 4:30pm
  - Quiz section this week extended office hours
- HW 3 out ~Nov 19, due ~Nov 30
- Lab 3 out ~Nov 26, due Dec 7 (Quiz Section on Nov 29)
- No class Nov 21; video review assignment instead

#### **Admin**

- Final Project Proposals: Nov 16 group member names and brief description
- Final Project Checkpoint: Nov 30 preliminary outline and references
- Final Project Presentation: Dec 10 12-15-minute video –
   must be on time
- Explore something of interest to you, that could hopefully benefit you or your career in some way – technical topics, current events, etc

# Review: Many Ways to Prove Who You Are

- What you know
  - Passwords
  - Answers to questions that only you know
- Where you are
  - IP address, geolocation
- What you are
  - Biometrics
- What you have
  - Secure tokens, mobile devices

# Review: Other Password Security Issues

- Keystroke loggers
  - Hardware
  - Software (spyware)
- Shoulder surfing
- Same password at multiple sites
- Broken implementations
  - TENEX timing attack

# Review: Examples from One Company



#### **Review: Even More Issues**

- Usability
  - Hard-to-remember passwords?
  - Carry a physical object all the time?
- Denial of service
  - Attacker tries to authenticate as you, account locked after three failures
- Social engineering

#### **Default Passwords**

- Examples from Mitnick's "Art of Intrusion"
  - U.S. District Courthouse server: "public" / "public"
  - NY Times employee database: pwd = last 4 SSN digits
- Mirai IoT botnet
  - Weak and default passwords on routers and other devices

#### **Weak Passwords**

RockYou hack



- "Social gaming" company
- Database with 32 million user passwords from partner social networks
- Passwords stored in the clear
- December 2009: entire database hacked using an SQL injection attack and posted on the Internet
- One of many such examples!

#### **Weak Passwords**

#### RockYou hack



#### Password Popularity - Top 20

Password	Number of Users with Password (absolute)
123456	290731
12345	79078
123456789	76790
Password	61958
iloveyou	51622
princess	35231
rockyou	22588
1234567	21726
12345678	20553
abc123	17542
	123456 12345 123456789 Password iloveyou princess rockyou 1234567 12345678

Rank	Password	Number of Users with Password (absolute)
11	Nicole	17168
12	Daniel	16409
13	babygirl	16094
14	monkey	15294
15	Jessica	15162
16	Lovely	14950
17	michael	14898
18	Ashley	14329
19	654321	13984
20	Qwerty	13856

[Inglesant and Sasse, "The True Cost of Unusable Password Policies"]

#### **Password Policies**

- Old recommendation:
  - 7 or 8 characters, at least 3 out of {digits, upper-case, lower-case, non-alphanumeric}, no dictionary words, change every 4 months, password may not be similar to previous 12 passwords...

# **Password Usability**





Image from <a href="http://www.interactivetools.com/staff/dave/damons\_office/">http://www.interactivetools.com/staff/dave/damons\_office/</a>

#### **Password Policies**

- Old recommendation:
  - 7 or 8 characters, at least 3 out of {digits, upper-case, lower-case, non-alphanumeric}, no dictionary words, change every 4 months, password may not be similar to previous 12 passwords...
- But ... results in frustrated users and <u>less</u> security
  - Burdens of devising, learning, forgetting passwords
  - Users construct passwords insecurely, write them down
    - Can't use their favorite password construction techniques (small changes to old passwords, etc.)
  - Heavy password re-use across systems
  - (Password managers can help)

## More Password / Authentication Issues

- Credential Stuffing (using stolen credentials on other sites)
- Website permits brute force / automated guesses
- Not supporting multi-factor authentication (future slides)
- Weak password recovery mechanisms (next slides)
- Application timeouts too long

# **Recovering Passwords**

#### Palin E-Mail Hacker Says It Was Easy

By Kim Zetter September 18, 2008 | 10:05 am | Categories: Elections, Hacks and Cracks


A p obt priv sur rev too Re

after the password recovery was reenabled, it took seriously 45 mins on wikipedia and google to find the info, Birthday? 15 seconds on wikipedia, zip code? well she had always been from wasilla, and it only has 2 zip codes (thanks online postal service!)

the second was somewhat harder, the question was "where did you meet your spouse?" did some research, and apparently she had eloped with mister palin after college, if youll look on some of the screenshits that I took and other fellow anon have so graciously put on photobucket you will see the google search for "palin eloped" or some such in one of the tabs.

I found out later though more research that they met at high school, so I did variations of that, high, high school, eventually hit on "Wasilla high" I promptly changed the password to popcorn and took a cold shower...

# Wired Cover Story (Dec 2012)



#### Also in this issue


Kill the Password: Why a String of Characters Can't Protect Us Anymore

"This summer, hackers destroyed my entire digital life in the span of an hour. My Apple, Twitter, and Gmail passwords were all robust—seven, 10, and 19 characters, respectively, all alphanumeric, some with symbols thrown in as well—but the three accounts were linked, so once the hackers had conned their way into one, they had them all. They really just wanted my Twitter handle: @mat."

# Improving(?) Passwords

- Add biometrics
  - For example, keystroke dynamics or voiceprint
- Graphical passwords
  - Goal: easier to remember? no need to write down?
- Password managers
  - Examples: LastPass, built into browsers
  - Can have security vulnerabilities...
- Two-factor authentication
  - Leverage phone (or other device) for authentication

### **Multi-Factor Authentication**



## **FIDO + Hardware Two Factors**



# **Graphical Passwords**

- Many variants... one example: Passfaces
  - Assumption: easy to recall faces











 Problem: to make passwords easy to remember, users choose predictable faces


# **Graphical Passwords**

Another variant: draw on the image (Windows 8)



Problem: users choose predictable points/lines

#### **Unlock Patterns**



#### • Problems:

- Predictable patterns (sound familiar by now??)
- Smear patterns
- Side channels: apps can use accelerometer and gyroscope to extract pattern!

#### What About Biometrics?


- Authentication: What you are
- Unique identifying characteristics to authenticate user or create credentials
  - Biological and physiological: Fingerprints, iris scan
  - Behaviors characteristics how perform actions:
     Handwriting, typing, gait
- Advantages:
  - Nothing to remember
  - Passive
  - Can't share (generally)
  - With perfect accuracy, could be fairly unique

#### **Issues with Biometrics**

- Private, but not secret
  - Maybe encoded on the back of an ID card?
  - Maybe encoded on your glass, door handle, ...
  - Sharing between multiple systems?
- Revocation is difficult (impossible?)
  - Sorry, your iris has been compromised, please create a new one...
- Physically identifying
  - Soda machine to cross-reference fingerprint with DMV?
- Birthday paradox
  - With false accept rate of 1 in a million, probability of false match is above 50% with only 1609 samples

# **Web Tracking**

### **Ads That Follow You**



# **Third-Party Web Tracking**



These ads allow **criteo.com** to link your visits between sites, even if you never click on the ads.

## Concerns About Privacy (2010 - 2011)

## E WALL STREET JOURN

The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets

A Jou busir

## The New Hork Times

May 6, 2011, 5:01 pm | 7 3 Comments





#### 'Do Not Track' Privacy Bill Appears in Congress

By TANZINA VEGA

Hidd all to


And the privacy legislation just keeps on coming.

The

On Friday, two bills were introduced in Washington in support of a Do Not Track mechanism that would give users control over how much of their data was collected by advertisers and other online companies.


#### **First and Third Parties**

- First-party cookie: belongs to top-level domain.
- Third-party cookie: belongs to domain of embedded content (such as image, iframe).



# **Anonymous Tracking**

Trackers included in other sites use third-party cookies containing unique identifiers to create browsing profiles.



# **Basic Tracking Mechanisms**

- Tracking requires:
  - (1) re-identifying a user.
  - (2) communicating id + visited site back to tracker.

```
→ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
```

▶ GET /pixel/p-3aud4J6uA4Z6Y.gif?labels=InvisibleBox&busty=2710 HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: pixel.quantserve.com\r\n

Connection: keep-alive\r\n

Accept: image/webp,\*/\*;q=0.8\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_9\_2) AppleWebKit/537.36

Referer: http://www.theonion.com/\r\n Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch\r\n

Accept Language, on HE on a=0.0\r\r

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8\r\n

Cookie: mc=52a65386-f1de1-00ade-0b26e; d=ENkBRgGHD4GYEA35MMIL74MKiyDs1A2MQI1Q

# **Tracking Technologies**

- HTTP Cookies
- HTTP Auth
- HTTP Etags
- Content cache
- IE userData
- HTML5 protocol and content handlers
- HTML5 storage

- Flash cookies
- Silverlight storage
- TLS session ID & resume
- Browsing history
- window.name
- HTTP STS
- DNS cache

 "Zombie" cookies that respawn (http://samy.pl/evercookie)

11/8/2018 40

# Fingerprinting Web Browsers

- User agent
- HTTP ACCEPT headers
- Browser plug-ins
- MIME support
- Clock skew

- Installed fonts
- Cookies enabled?
- Browser add-ons
- Screen resolution
- HTML5 canvas (differences in graphics SW/HW!)