

**CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and  
Privacy**

# **Cryptography**

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Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Franziska Roesner, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

# Admin


- Lab 1:
  - Due Oct 24, 4:30pm (Today!)
- TA Office Hours (especially for Lab 1): M 2:30, W 1:30, F 12
- My office hours (especially for crypto, research readings, administrivia, worksheet pick up): M 11:30

# Challenge Question from Last Time



- Alice and Bob are both cryptographers, and they are talking on the phone. They want to randomly flip a coin. If they were together, in person, they would flip a real coin and see if it was Heads or Tails. But they are not together, in person, and they don't trust each other enough to have one of them flip a coin and tell the other person the answer.
- Using the techniques we've discussed so far in class, how can Alice and Bob effectively flip a random coin together, over the phone, such that they both trust the answer even though they don't trust each other?




Pick bit  $b_A$  at random



Pick bit  $b_B$  at random



Now knows  $b_A$







Now knows  $b_B$

Both compute random bit at  $b_A \text{ xor } b_B$

Pick bit  $b_A$  at random

Pick  $R_A$  as long random string

$\parallel$  denotes concatenation



Pick bit  $b_B$  at random

Pick  $R_B$  as long random string

Verify that has of message equals  $C_1$

Verify that has of message equals  $C_2$


Both compute random bit at  $b_A \text{ xor } b_B$

# Stepping Back: Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
  - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string  $K$** , called the **key**.
- Asymmetric cryptography
  - Each party creates a public key  **$pk$**  and a secret key  **$sk$** .


# Symmetric Setting

Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string  $K$ , called the key.



# Asymmetric Setting

Each party creates a public key  $pk$  and a secret key  $sk$ .






# Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
  - Both communicating parties have access to a **shared random string  $K$** , called the **key**.
  - **Challenge: How do you privately share a key?**
- Asymmetric cryptography
  - Each party creates a public key  **$pk$**  and a secret key  **$sk$** .
  - **Challenge: How do you validate a public key?**

# Public Key Crypto: Basic Problem



Given: Everybody knows Bob's **public key**  
Only Bob knows the corresponding **private key**

Goals: 1. Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob  
2. Bob wants to authenticate himself

# Applications of Public Key Crypto

- Session key establishment
  - Exchange messages to create a secret session key
  - Then switch to symmetric cryptography (why?)
- Encryption for confidentiality
  - Anyone can encrypt a message
    - With symmetric crypto, must know secret key to encrypt
  - Only someone who knows private key can decrypt
  - Key management is simpler (or at least different)
    - Secret is stored only at one site: good for open environments
- Digital signatures for authentication
  - Can “sign” a message with your private key


# Session Key Establishment

# Modular Arithmetic

- Given  $g$  and prime  $p$ , compute:  
 $g^1 \bmod p, g^2 \bmod p, \dots, g^{100} \bmod p$ 
  - For  $p=11, g=10$ 
    - $10^1 \bmod 11 = 10, 10^2 \bmod 11 = 1, 10^3 \bmod 11 = 10, \dots$
    - Produces cyclic group  $\{10, 1\}$  (order=2)
  - For  $p=11, g=7$ 
    - $7^1 \bmod 11 = 7, 7^2 \bmod 11 = 5, 7^3 \bmod 11 = 2, \dots$
    - Produces cyclic group  $\{7, 5, 2, 3, 10, 4, 6, 9, 8, 1\}$  (order = 10)
    - $g=7$  is a “generator” of  $Z_{11}^*$
  - For  $p=11, g=3$ 
    - $3^1 \bmod 11 = 3, 3^2 \bmod 11 = 9, 3^3 \bmod 11 = 5, \dots$
    - Produces cyclic group  $\{3, 9, 5, 4, 1\}$  (order = 5)

# Diffie-Hellman Protocol (1976)

- Alice and Bob never met and share no secrets
- Public info:  $p$  and  $g$ 
  - $p$  is a large prime,  $g$  is a **generator** of  $Z_p^*$ 
    - $Z_p^* = \{1, 2 \dots p-1\}$ ; for all  $a$  in  $Z_p^*$  there exists  $i$  s.t.  $a = g^i \pmod p$
    - Modular arithmetic: numbers “wrap around” after they reach  $p$



Compute  $k = (g^y \pmod p)^x = g^{xy} \pmod p$       Compute  $k = (g^x \pmod p)^y = g^{xy} \pmod p$

# Why is Diffie-Hellman Secure?

- **Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem:**  
given  $g^x \bmod p$ , it's hard to extract  $x$ 
  - There is no known efficient algorithm for doing this
  - This is not enough for Diffie-Hellman to be secure!
- **Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:**  
given  $g^x \bmod p$  and  $g^y \bmod p$ , it's hard to compute  $g^{xy} \bmod p$ 
  - ... unless you know  $x$  or  $y$ , in which case it's easy
- **Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem:**  
given  $g^x \bmod p$  and  $g^y \bmod p$ , it's hard to tell the difference between  $g^{xy} \bmod p$  and  $g^r \bmod p$  where  $r$  is random

# Properties of Diffie-Hellman

- Assuming DDH problem is hard (depends on choice of parameters!), Diffie-Hellman protocol is a secure key establishment protocol against passive attackers
  - Common recommendation:
    - Choose  $p=2q+1$ , where  $q$  is also a large prime
    - Choose  $g$  that generates a subgroup of order  $q$  in  $Z_p^*$
  - Eavesdropper can't tell the difference between the established key and a random value
  - Often hash  $g^{xy} \bmod p$ , and use the hash as the key
  - Can use the new key for symmetric cryptography
- Diffie-Hellman protocol (by itself) does not provide authentication
  - Party in the middle attack (often called “man in the middle attack”)



# More on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- **Important Note: We have discussed discrete logs modulo integers.**
- **Significant advantages in using elliptic curve groups – groups with some similar mathematical properties (i.e., are “groups”) but have better security and performance (size) properties**

# Public Key Encryption

# Requirements for Public Key Encryption

- **Key generation:** computationally easy to generate a pair (public key  $PK$ , private key  $SK$ )
- **Encryption:** given plaintext  $M$  and public key  $PK$ , easy to compute ciphertext  $C = E_{PK}(M)$
- **Decryption:** given ciphertext  $C = E_{PK}(M)$  and private key  $SK$ , easy to compute plaintext  $M$ 
  - Infeasible to learn anything about  $M$  from  $C$  without  $SK$
  - Trapdoor function:  $Decrypt(SK, Encrypt(PK, M)) = M$