

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Usable Security

Fall 2017

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Poor Usability Causes Problems


OFFICIAL BALLOT, GENERAL ELECTION
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
NOVEMBER 7, 2000

| | |
|---|------|
| (REPUBLICAN) | 3 ➔ |
| GEORGE W. BUSH - PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY - VICE PRESIDENT | |
| (DEMOCRATIC) | 5 ➔ |
| AL GORE - PRESIDENT JOE LIEBERMAN - VICE PRESIDENT | |
| (LIBERTARIAN) | 7 ➔ |
| HARRY BROWNE - PRESIDENT ART OLIVIER - VICE PRESIDENT | |
| (GREEN) | 9 ➔ |
| RALPH NADER - PRESIDENT WINONA LaDUKE - VICE PRESIDENT | |
| (SOCIALIST WORKERS) | 11 ➔ |
| JAMES HARRIS - PRESIDENT MARGARET TROWE - VICE PRESIDENT | |
| (NATURAL LAW) | 13 ➔ |
| JOHN HAGELIN - PRESIDENT NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT | |

OFFICIAL BALLOT, GENERAL ELECTION
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
NOVEMBER 7, 2000

| | |
|---|---|
| 4 ← | (REFORM) PAT BUCHANAN - PRESIDENT EZOLA FOSTER - VICE PRESIDENT |
| 6 ← | (SOCIALIST) DAVID McREYNOLDS - PRESIDENT MARY CAL HOLLIS - VICE PRESIDENT |
| 8 ← | (CONSTITUTION) HOWARD PHILLIPS - PRESIDENT J. CURTIS FRAZIER - VICE PRESIDENT |
| 10 ← | (WORKERS WORLD) MONICA MOOREHEAD - PRESIDENT GLORIA La RIVA - VICE PRESIDENT |
| WRITE-IN CANDIDATE To vote for a write-in candidate, follow the directions on the long stub of your ballot card. | |

TURN PAGE TO CONTINUE VOTING ➔



Importance in Security

- Why is usability important?
 - People are the critical element of any computer system
 - People are the real reason computers exist in the first place
 - Even if it is possible for a system to protect against an adversary, people may use the system in other, less secure ways

Usable Security Roadmap

- 2 case studies
 - Phishing
 - SSL warnings
- **Step back:** root causes of usability problems, and how to address


Case Study #1: Phishing

- Design question: How do you help users avoid falling for phishing sites?


A Typical Phishing Page




Safe to Type Your Password?




Safe to Type Your Password?



Safe to Type Your Password?



Safe to Type Your Password?




Experiments at Indiana University

- Reconstructed the social network by crawling sites like Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and Friendster
- Sent 921 Indiana University students a spoofed email that appeared to come from their friend
- Email redirected to a spoofed site inviting the user to enter his/her secure university credentials
 - Domain name clearly distinct from indiana.edu
- 72% of students entered their real credentials into the spoofed site


More Details

- Control group: 15 of 94 (16%) entered personal information
- Social group: 349 of 487 (72%) entered personal information
- 70% of responses within first 12 hours
- Adversary wins by gaining users' trust
- Also: If a site looks “professional”, people likely to believe that it is legitimate


Phishing Warnings



Passive (IE)



Active (IE)




Active (Firefox)

Are Phishing Warnings Effective?


- CMU study of 60 users
- Asked to make eBay and Amazon purchases
- All were sent phishing messages in addition to the real purchase confirmations
- Goal: compare active and passive warnings

Active vs. Passive Warnings

- Active warnings significantly more effective
 - Passive (IE): 100% clicked, 90% phished
 - Active (IE): 95% clicked, 45% phished
 - Active (Firefox): 100% clicked, 0% phished



Passive (IE)



Active (IE)



Active (Firefox)

User Response to Warnings

- Some fail to notice warnings entirely
 - Passive warning takes a couple of seconds to appear; if user starts typing, his keystrokes dismiss the warning
- Some saw the warning, closed the window, went back to email, clicked links again, were presented with the same warnings... repeated 4-5 times
 - Conclusion: “website is not working”
 - Users never bothered to read the warnings, but were still prevented from visiting the phishing site
 - Active warnings work!

Why Do Users Ignore Warnings?

- Don't trust the warning
 - “Since it gave me the option of still proceeding to the website, I figured it couldn't be that bad”
- Ignore warning because it's familiar (IE users)
 - “Oh, I always ignore those”
 - “Looked like warnings I see at work which I know to ignore”
 - “I thought that the warnings were some usual ones displayed by IE”
 - “My own PC constantly bombards me with similar messages”

Site Authentication Image (SiteKey)

Bank of America | Online Banking | SiteKey | Verify SiteKey - Windows Internet Explorer

https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signonSetup.do

Bank of America | Online Banking | ...


Bank of America Higher Standards Online Banking

Confirm that your SiteKey is correct

If you recognize your SiteKey, you'll know for sure that you are at the valid Bank of America site. Confirming your SiteKey is also how you'll know that it's safe to enter your Passcode and click the **Sign In** button.

An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:
pelicans



If you don't recognize your personalized SiteKey, don't enter your Passcode.

* Passcode:
(4 - 20 Characters, case sensitive)

Sign In

If you don't recognize your personalized SiteKey, don't enter your Passcode

Case Study #2: Browser SSL Warnings

- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?

The Lock Icon




Secure

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox>

- Goal: identify secure connection
 - SSL/TLS is being used between client and server to protect against active network attacker
- Lock icon should only be shown when the page is secure against **network attacker**
 - Semantics subtle and not widely understood by users
 - Whose certificate is it??
 - Problem in user interface design

Will You Notice?




Do These Indicators Help?

- “The Emperor’s New Security Indicators”
 - <http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/emperor.pdf>

| Score | First chose not to enter password... | Group | | | | Total |
|-------|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 ∪ 2 | |
| 0 | upon noticing HTTPS absent | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 1 | after site-authentication image removed | 0 0% | 0 0% | 2 9% | 0 0% | 2 4% |
| 2 | after warning page | 8 47% | 5 29% | 12 55% | 13 37% | 25 44% |
| 3 | never (always logged in) | 10 53% | 12 71% | 8 36% | 22 63% | 30 53% |
| Total | | 18 | 17 | 22 | 35 | 57 |



Users don't notice the **absence** of indicators!

Latest Design in Chrome



Firefox vs. Chrome Warning

33% vs. 70% clickthrough rate



Experimenting w/ Warning Design

| # | Condition | CTR | N |
|---|-------------------------------------|-----|---|
| 1 | Control (default Chrome warning) | | |
| 2 | Chrome warning with policeman | | |
| 3 | Chrome warning with criminal | | |
| 4 | Chrome warning with traffic light | | |
| 5 | Mock Firefox | | |
| 6 | Mock Firefox, no image | | |
| 7 | Mock Firefox with corporate styling | | |

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

| # | Condition | CTR | N |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Control (default Chrome warning) | 67.9% | 17,479 |
| 2 | Chrome warning with policeman | | |
| 3 | Chrome warning with criminal | | |
| 4 | Chrome warning with traffic light | | |
| 5 | Mock Firefox | | |
| 6 | Mock Firefox, no image | | |
| 7 | Mock Firefox with corporate styling | | |

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.




Figure 1. The default Chrome SSL warning (Condition 1).

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

| # | Condition | CTR | N |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Control (default Chrome warning) | 67.9% | 17,479 |
| 2 | Chrome warning with policeman | 68.9% | 17,977 |
| 3 | Chrome warning with criminal | 66.5% | 18,049 |
| 4 | Chrome warning with traffic light | 68.8% | 18,084 |
| 5 | Mock Firefox | | |
| 6 | Mock Firefox, no image | | |
| 7 | Mock Firefox with corporate styling | | |

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.



Figure 1. The default Chrome SSL warning (Condition 1).

Figure 4. The three images used in Conditions 2-4.

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

| # | Condition | CTR | N |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Control (default Chrome warning) | 67.9% | 17,479 |
| 2 | Chrome warning with policeman | 68.9% | 17,977 |
| 3 | Chrome warning with criminal | 66.5% | 18,049 |
| 4 | Chrome warning with traffic light | 68.8% | 18,084 |
| 5 | Mock Firefox | 56.1% | 20,023 |
| 6 | Mock Firefox, no image | 55.9% | 19,297 |
| 7 | Mock Firefox with corporate styling | | |

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.




Figure 2. The mock Firefox SSL warning (Condition 5).

Experimenting w/ Warning Design

| # | Condition | CTR | N |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Control (default Chrome warning) | 67.9% | 17,479 |
| 2 | Chrome warning with policeman | 68.9% | 17,977 |
| 3 | Chrome warning with criminal | 66.5% | 18,049 |
| 4 | Chrome warning with traffic light | 68.8% | 18,084 |
| 5 | Mock Firefox | 56.1% | 20,023 |
| 6 | Mock Firefox, no image | 55.9% | 19,297 |
| 7 | Mock Firefox with corporate styling | 55.8% | 19,845 |

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.






Figure 3. The Firefox SSL warning with Google styling (Condition 7).

Opinionated Design Helps!



| Adherence | N |
|-----------|-------|
| 30.9% | 4,551 |
| | |
| | |

Opinionated Design Helps!




The site's security certificate is not trusted!

You attempted to reach **192.168.17.129**, but the server presented a certificate not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may mean that the site is not secure, and your credentials, which Chrome cannot rely on for identity information, or any data you send to the site may be intercepted or tampered with before reaching the server.

You should not proceed, **especially** if you have never seen this warning before.

[Proceed anyway](#) [Back to safety](#)

[Help me understand](#)




Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **reddit.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Proceed to the site \(unsafe\)](#) [Back to safety](#)

[Advanced](#)




Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **www.example.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Advanced](#) [Back to safety](#)

| Adherence | N |
|--------------|--------------|
| 30.9% | 4,551 |
| 32.1% | 4,075 |
| 58.3% | 4,644 |

Challenge: Meaningful Warnings



Stepping Back: Root Causes?

- Computer systems are complex; users lack intuition
- Users in charge of managing own devices
 - Unlike other complex systems, like healthcare or cars.
- Hard to gauge risks
 - “It won’t happen to me!”
- Annoying, awkward, difficult
- Social issues
 - Send encrypted emails about lunch?...

How to Improve?

- Security education and training
- Help users build accurate mental models
- Make security invisible
- Make security the least-resistance path
- ...?