### CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

### **Usable Security**

Fall 2017

Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

### **Poor Usability Causes Problems**

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	(REPUBLICAN) GEORGE W. BUSH - PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY - VICE PRESIDENT	3 🍉		(REFORM) PAT BUCHANAN - president	
	(DEMOCRATIC) AL GORE - president JOE LIEBERMAN - vice president	5	<b>4</b> 4	EZOLA FOSTER - VICE PRESIDENT (SOCIALIST)	
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ENT Jates will eir electors.)	ART OLIVIER - VICE PRESIDENT (GREEN) RALPH NADER - PRESIDENT	9	<b>*</b> 8	(CONSTITUTION) HOWARD PHILLIPS - president J. CURTIS FRAZIER - vice president	
p)	WINONA LADUKE - VICE PRESIDENT (SOCIALIST WORKERS) JAMES HARRIS - PRESIDENT	11	€ 10	(WORKERS WORLD) MONICA MOOREHEAD - president GLORIA LA RIVA - vice president	
	MARGARET TROWE - VICE PRESIDENT (NATURAL LAW) JOHN HAGELIN - PRESIDENT	13>	r	WRITE-IN CANDIDATE To vote for a write-in candidate, follow the directions on the long stub of your ballot card.	
	NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT			TURN PAGE TO CONTINUE VOTING	AP

### **Importance in Security**

- Why is usability important?
  - People are the critical element of any computer system
    - People are the real reason computers exist in the first place
  - Even if it is **possible** for a system to protect against an adversary, people may use the system in other, <u>less secure</u> ways

### **Usable Security Roadmap**

- 2 case studies
  - Phishing
  - SSL warnings
- Step back: root causes of usability problems, and how to address

### Case Study #1: Phishing

• Design question: How do you help users avoid falling for phishing sites?


# **A Typical Phishing Page**




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Bank of the West Phishing Page - Mozilla Firefox				
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Bank of the West				
Gives me you pa55w0rds!				
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
### **Experiments at Indiana University**

- Reconstructed the social network by crawling sites like Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and Friendster
- Sent 921 Indiana University students a spoofed email that appeared to come from their friend
- Email redirected to a spoofed site inviting the user to enter his/her secure university credentials
  - Domain name clearly distinct from indiana.edu
- 72% of students entered their real credentials into the spoofed site

### **More Details**

- Control group: 15 of 94 (16%) entered personal information
- Social group: 349 of 487 (72%) entered personal information
- 70% of responses within first 12 hours
- Adversary wins by gaining users' trust
- Also: If a site looks "professional", people likely to believe that it is legitimate

## **Phishing Warnings**



# **Are Phishing Warnings Effective?**

- CMU study of 60 users
- Asked to make eBay and Amazon purchases
- All were sent phishing messages in addition to the real purchase confirmations
- Goal: compare <u>active</u> and <u>passive</u> warnings

### [Egelman et al.]

### **Active vs. Passive Warnings**

- Active warnings significantly more effective
  - Passive (IE): 100% clicked, 90% phished
  - Active (IE): 95% clicked, 45% phished
  - Active (Firefox): 100% clicked, 0% phished



### **User Response to Warnings**

- Some fail to notice warnings entirely
  - Passive warning takes a couple of seconds to appear; if user starts typing, his keystrokes dismiss the warning
- Some saw the warning, closed the window, went back to email, clicked links again, were presented with the same warnings... repeated 4-5 times
  - Conclusion: "website is not working"
  - Users never bothered to read the warnings, but were still prevented from visiting the phishing site
  - Active warnings work!

# Why Do Users Ignore Warnings?

- Don't trust the warning
  - "Since it gave me the option of still proceeding to the website, I figured it couldn't be that bad"
- Ignore warning because it's familiar (IE users)
  - "Oh, I always ignore those"
  - "Looked like warnings I see at work which I know to ignore"
  - "I thought that the warnings were some usual ones displayed by IE"
  - "My own PC constantly bombards me with similar messages"

### Site Authentication Image (SiteKey)

🖉 Bank of America   Online Banking   SiteKey   '	Verify SiteKey - Windows Internet Explorer	
💽 🗸 🖉 https://sitekey.bankofamerica.co	pm/sas/signonSetup.do	
🚖 🕸 🔊 Bank of America   Online Banking		
Bank of America Higher Standards	Online Banking	-
Confirm that your SiteKey is correct		
If you recognize your SiteKey, you'll know for sure that you are at the valid Bank of America site. Confirming your SiteKey is also how you'll know that it's safe to enter your Passcode and click	the Sign In button.	
An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.	If you don't recognize y	-
Your SiteKey: pelicans	SiteKey, don't enter you	ir Passcode
If you don't recognize you don't enter your Passcod		
* Passcode: (4 - 20 Characters, case sensiti	ive)	
Sign In		

### Case Study #2: Browser SSL Warnings

- **Design question 1:** How to indicate encrypted connections to users?
- **Design question 2:** How to alert the user if a site's SSL certificate is untrusted?


### The Lock Icon

Secure https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox

- Goal: identify secure connection
  - SSL/TLS is being used between client and server to protect against active network attacker
- Lock icon should only be shown when the page is secure against network attacker
  - Semantics subtle and not widely understood by users
  - Whose certificate is it??
  - Problem in user interface design

### [Moxie Marlinspike]

### Will You Notice?



### **Do These Indicators Help?**

- "The Emperor's New Security Indicators"
  - http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/emperor.pdf

		Group					
Score	First chose not to enter password	1	2	3	$1\cup 2$	Total	
0	upon noticing HTTPS absent	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	
1	after site-authentication image removed	0 0%	0 0%	2 9%	0 0%	2 4%	
2	after warning page	8 47%	5 29%	12 55%	13 37%	25 44%	
3	never (always logged in)	10 53%	12 71%	8 36%	22 63%	30 53%	
	Total	18	17	22	35	57	

### Users don't notice the **absence** of indicators!

## Latest Design in Chrome

Secure https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox

http-password.badssl.com							
Developer Tools - http://http-password.badssl.com/							
1							
This page includes a password or credit card <u>http-password.badssl.com/:1</u> input in a non-secure context. A warning has been added to the URL bar. For more information, see <u>https://goo.gl/zmWq3m</u> .							

### **Firefox vs. Chrome Warning**

### 33% vs. 70% clickthrough rate

### **V**

#### This Connection is Untrusted

You have asked Chrome to connect securely to reddit.com, but we can't confirm that your connection is secure.

Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.

#### What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that someone is trying to impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

Get me out of here!

- Technical Details
- I Understand the Risks



#### This is probably not the site you are looking for!

You attempted to reach reddit.com, but instead you actually reached a server identifying itself as a248.e.akamal.met. This may be caused by a misconfiguration on the server or by something more serious. An attacker on your network could be trying to get you to visit a fake (and potentially harmful) version of reddit.com.

You should not proceed, especially if you have never seen this warning before for this site.

Proceed anyway Back to safety

Help me understand

### **Experimenting w/ Warning Design**

#	Condition C1	<b>R</b>	Ν
1	Control (default Chrome warning)		
2	Chrome warning with policeman		
3	Chrome warning with criminal		
4	Chrome warning with traffic light		
5	Mock Firefox		
6	Mock Firefox, no image		
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		
	Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for c	onditio	ns.

### **Experimenting w/ Warning Design**

	#	Condition	CTR	Ν
	1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
	2	Chrome warning with policeman		
	3	Chrome warning with criminal		
	4	Chrome warning with traffic light		
	5	Mock Firefox		
	6	Mock Firefox, no image		
	7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling		
4		Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size This is probably not the site you are looking You attempted to reach reddit.com, but instead you actually reached a server identify a248.e.akamai.net. This may be caused by a misconfiguration on the server or by sor An attacker on your network could be trying to get you to visit a take (and potentially h reddit.com. You should not proceed, especially if you have never seen this warning before for this	<b>J for!</b> ing itself as nething more serious armfu() version of	
		Proceed anyway Back to safety	379.	-

Figure 1. The default Chrome SSL warning (Condition 1).

### **Experimenting w/ Warning Design**

#	Condition	CTR	Ν
1	Control (default Chrome warning)	67.9%	17,479
2	Chrome warning with policeman	68.9%	17,977
3	Chrome warning with criminal	66.5%	18,049
4	Chrome warning with traffic light	68.8%	18,084
5	Mock Firefox		

- 6 Mock Firefox, no image
- 7 Mock Firefox with corporate styling

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.

4	This is probably not the site you ar You attempted to reach reddit.com, but instead you actually reache a248.e.akamai.net. This may be caused by a misconfiguration on th An attacker on your network could be trying to get you to visit a fake reddit.com. You should not proceed, especially if you have never seen this ware	
	Proceed anyway Back to safety	Figure 4. The three images used in Conditions 2-4.
	Help me understand	


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5	Mock Firefox	56.1%	20,023
6	Mock Firefox, no image	55.9%	19.297
7	Maals Einsfor with comparets stuling		

7 Mock Firefox with corporate styling


Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.



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4	Chrome warning with traffic light	68.8%	18,084
5	Mock Firefox	56.1%	20,023
6	Mock Firefox, no image	55.9%	19,297
7	Mock Firefox with corporate styling	55.8%	19,845

Table 1. Click-through rates and sample size for conditions.



**Figure 3. The Firefox SSL warning with Google styling (Condition 7).** 

### **Opinionated Design Helps!**

### The site's security certificate is not trusted!

You attempted to reach **192.168.17.129**, but the server presented a certificate issued by an entity that is not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may mean that the server has generated its own security credentials, which Chrome cannot rely on for identity information, or an attacker may be trying to intercept your communications.

You should not proceed, especially if you have never seen this warning before for this site.

Proceed anyway Back to safety


Help me understand

Adherence	Ν
30.9%	4,551

### **Opinionated Design Helps!**

	The site's security certificate is not tru				
	You attempted to reach <b>192.168.17.129</b> , but the server presented a certi- trusted by your computer's operating system. This may mean that the se- credentials, which Chrome cannot rely on for identity information, or an a your communications. You should not proceed, <b>especially</b> if you have never seen this warning <u>Proceed anyway</u> <u>Back to safety</u>	Attack messa Proce	IF CONNECTION IS NOT PRIVATE ers might be trying to steal your information from reddit.com ages, or credit cards). ed to the site (unsafe) Back to safety anced		
	▶ <u>Help me understand</u>				
			Adherence	Ν	
Your co	nnection is not private		30.9%	4,551	
	ight be trying to steal your information from <b>www.example.com</b> (for asswords, messages, or credit cards).		32.1%	4,075	
			<b>58.3</b> %	лблл	

# **Challenge: Meaningful Warnings**



# **Stepping Back: Root Causes?**

- Computer systems are complex; users lack intuition
- Users in charge of managing own devices
  Unlike other complex systems, like healthcare or cars.
- Hard to gauge risks
  - "It won't happen to me!"
- Annoying, awkward, difficult
- Social issues
  - Send encrypted emails about lunch?...

### How to Improve?

- Security education and training
- Help users build accurate mental models
- Make security invisible
- Make security the least-resistance path

• ...?