CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption [continued]

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Reminder

- Checkpoint for lab #1 due Monday @ 8pm
  – Submit md5 hashes to Catalyst dropbox

Recap: Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
  - Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string K, called the key.
- Asymmetric cryptography
  - Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk.

Achieving Privacy (Symmetric)

Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy.



Message = M

Ciphertext = C

Achieving Privacy (Asymmetric)

Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy.



Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
  - When one-time pad is unrealistic…
- Use special cryptographic primitives: block ciphers, stream ciphers
  - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
  - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad

Stream Ciphers

- One-time pad: Ciphertext(Key,Message)=Message⊕Key
  - Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message
- Idea: replace "random" with "pseudo-random"
  - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
  - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long "random-looking" sequence
    - E.g., 128-bit seed into a 10^6-bit pseudo-random sequence

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random

- Ciphertext(Key,Msg)=Msg⊕PRNG(Key)
  - Message processed bit by bit (unlike block cipher)

Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk ("block") of plaintext
  - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
  - Each key defines a different permutation
  - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



Permutations



- For N-bit input, $2^N!$ possible permutations
- Idea for how to use a keyed permutation: split plaintext into blocks; for each block use secret key to pick a permutation
  - Without the key, permutation should "look random"

Block Cipher Security

- Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
  - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N-bit block cipher permutes over 2^N inputs.
- Only computational guarantee of secrecy
  - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
    - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
  - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



Add some secret key bits to provide confusion

Each S-box transforms its input bits in a "random-looking" way to provide diffusion (spread plaintext bits throughout ciphertext)

Procedure must be reversible (for decryption)

Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/μs	Time required at 10^6 encryptions/μs
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31}\ \mu s = 35.8$ minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55}\ \mu s = 1142$ years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127}\ \mu s = 5.4 \times 10^{24}$ years	5.4×10^{18} years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167}\ \mu s = 5.9 \times 10^{36}$ years	5.9×10^{30} years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26}\ \mu s = 6.4 \times 10^{12}$ years	6.4×10^6 years

- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
  - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES ---> 3DES
  - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
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  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity
- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard**
  - New federal standard as of 2001
    - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
  - Based on the Rijndael algorithm
    - Selected via an open process
  - 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits

Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size



- What should we do?

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

Information Leakage in ECB Mode



[Wikipedia]

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
  - Still does not guarantee integrity

CBC Mode: Decryption



ECB vs. CBC



AES in ECB mode

AES in CBC mode



Similar plaintext blocks produce similar ciphertext blocks (not good!)



[Picture due to Bart Preneel]

CBC and Electronic Voting



Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:

```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,
          totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```

Counter Mode (CTR): Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Can compute in parallel (unlike CBC)
- Still does not guarantee integrity; Fragile if ctr repeats

Counter Mode (CTR): Decryption



When is an Encryption Scheme "Secure"?

- Hard to recover the key?
  - What if attacker can learn plaintext without learning the key?
- Hard to recover plaintext from ciphertext?
  - What if attacker learns some bits or some function of bits?
- Fixed mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts?
  - What if attacker sees two identical ciphertexts and infers that the corresponding plaintexts are identical?
  - Implication: encryption must be randomized or stateful

How Can a Cipher Be Attacked?

- Attackers knows ciphertext and encryption algthm
  - What else does the attacker know? Depends on the application in which the cipher is used!
- Ciphertext-only attack
- KPA: Known-plaintext attack (stronger)
  - Knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
- CPA: Chosen-plaintext attack (even stronger)
  - Can obtain ciphertext for any plaintext of his choice
- CCA: Chosen-ciphertext attack (very strong)
  - Can decrypt any ciphertext except the target

Chosen Plaintext Attack



… repeat for any PIN value

Very Informal Intuition

Minimum security requirement for a modern encryption scheme

- Security against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
  - Ciphertext leaks no information about the plaintext
  - Even if the attacker correctly guesses the plaintext, he cannot verify his guess
  - Every ciphertext is unique, encrypting same message twice produces completely different ciphertexts
- Security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA)
  - Integrity protection – it is not possible to change the plaintext by modifying the ciphertext

Why Hide Everything?

- Leaking even a little bit of information about the plaintext can be disastrous
- Electronic voting
  - 2 candidates on the ballot (1 bit to encode the vote)
  - If ciphertext leaks the parity bit of the encrypted plaintext, eavesdropper learns the entire vote
- Also, want a strong definition, that implies other definitions (like not being able to obtain key)