CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Third-Party Tracking on the Web

Fall 2016

Ada (Adam) Lerner lerner@cs.washington.edu

Thanks to Franziska Roesner, Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Announcements


- Please form groups for the final project. For the project, you will choose a computer security/privacy topic and explain it twice:
 - Once for a relevant "lay" audience, and
 - Once for a technical audience.
- Submit who will be in your group and what topic you will discuss by next Monday.

Announcements

• More details on the final project will be landing in the next couple days.

Security Mindset Anecdote





11/16/16

5


"Panopticon"

 Prison design by Jeremy Bentham in England in the late 18th century.

 Idea: design a prison so that guard might be watching all the prisoners at all times.
 Prisoners will have to behave as though they are watched all the time, even if they are not.

- Bentham described the Panopticon as
 - "a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example."


- "a mill for grinding rogues honest"
- [see Wikipedia article for citations]





Ads That Follow You





Third-Party Web Tracking



These ads allow **criteo.com** to link your visits between sites, even if you never click on the ads.

Concerns About Privacy (2010 – 2011)



11/16/16

Intriguing experiments by Alessandro Acquisti, a behavioral economist, suggest that people often reveal more than they mean to online. Left Swanson for The New York Times

Outline

- 1. Understanding web tracking
- 2. Measuring web tracking
- 3. Defenses


First and Third Parties


- First-party cookie: belongs to top-level domain.
- Third-party cookie: belongs to domain of embedded content (such as image, iframe).





Anonymous Tracking















logo	the ONION®	
ad		












	logo	the ONION®
	ad	America's Finest News Source
track er.co m:	logo	
id=7 89	ad	





Browsing profile for user 789: theonion.com


















Basic Tracking Mechanisms

• Tracking requires:

(1) re-identifying a user.

(2) telling the tracker which first party site we're on



Tracking Technologies

- HTTP Cookies
- HTTP Auth
- HTTP Etags
- Content cache
- IE userData
- HTML5 protocol and content handlers
- HTML5 storage

- Flash cookies
- Silverlight storage
- TLS session ID & resume
- Browsing history
- window.name
- HTTP STS
- DNS cache
- "Zombie" cookies that respawn (<u>http://samy.pl/evercookie</u>)

Fingerprinting Web Browsers

- User agent
- HTTP ACCEPT headers
- Browser plug-ins
- MIME support
- Clock skew

- Installed fonts
- Cookies enabled?
- Browser add-ons
- Screen resolution
- HTML5 canvas (differences in graphics SW/HW!)







A research project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation



Is your browser configuration rare or unique? If so web sites

Test	Result	
Is your browser blocking tracking ads?	🗸 yes	
Is your browser blocking invisible trackers?	🗸 yes	
Does your browser unblock 3rd parties that promise to honor Do Not Track?	🗸 yes	
Does your browser protect from fingerprinting?	X your browser has a unique fingerprint	



Panopticlick Example

Plugin o: Adobe Acrobat; Adobe Acrobat Plug-In Version 7.00 for Netscape; nppdf32.dll; (Acrobat Portable Document Format; application/pdf; pdf) (Acrobat Forms Data Format; application/vnd.fdf; fdf) (XML Version of Acrobat Forms Data Format; application/vnd.adobe.xfdf; xfdf) (Acrobat XML Data Package; application/vnd.adobe.xdp+xml; xdp) (Adobe FormFlow99 Data File; application/vnd.adobe.xfd+xml; xfd). Plugin 1: Adobe Acrobat; Adobe PDF Plug-In For Firefox and Netscape; nppdf32.dll; (Acrobat Portable Document Format; application/pdf; pdf) (Adobe PDF in XML


Format; (Acroba vnd.ado File; app

84% of browser fingerprints are unique With Flash or Java, 94% are unique

iars) on/ 9 Data

application/x-vnd.google.onecickctn.o;). Plugin 3: MicrosoftA® Windows Media Player Firefox Plugin; np-ms wmp; npmswmp.dll; (np-mswmp; application/x-ms-wmp; *) (; application/asx; *) (; video/x-ms-asf-plugin; *) (; application/xmplayer2; *) (; video/x-ms-asf; asf,asx,*) (; video/x-ms-wm; wm,*) (; audio/x-ms-wma; wma,*) (; audio/x-ms-wax; wax,*) (; video/x-ms-wmv; wmv,*) (; video/x-ms-wvx; wvx,*). Plugin 4: Move Media Player; npmnqmp 07103010; npmnqmp07103010.dll; (npmnqmp; application/x-vnd.moveplayer.qm; qmx,qpl) (npmnqmp; application/xvnd.moveplay2.qm;) (npmnqmp; application/x-vnd.movenetworks.qm;). Plugin 5: Mozilla Default Plug-in; Default Plugin; npnul32.dll; (Mozilla Default Plug-in; *; *). Plugin 6: Shockwave Flash; Shockwave Flash 10.0 r32; NPSWF32.dll; (Adobe Flash movie; application/x-shockwave-flash; swf) (FutureSplash movie; application/futuresplash; spl). Plugin 7: Windows Genuine Advantage; 1.7.0059.0; npLegitCheckPlugin.dll; (npLegitCheckPlugin; application/WGA-plugin; *).

How does Third Party Web Tracking Work?



History Sniffing

Courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse484/16au/


- ttps://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse484/16au/ CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security
- https://catalyst.uw.edu Catalyst Account Page Starred
- https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse484/16sp/ CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security
- codered.cs.washington.edu/lab2/pmc/simple.php? Pikachu, Meowth, and Cookies Stage 1
- Q conflict android app installed android studio DuckDuckGo Search
- Conflict android app installed

С

History Sniffing

How can a webpage figure out which sites you visited previously?

- Color of links
 - CSS :visited property
 - getComputedStyle()
- Cached Web content timing
- DNS timing





This is a link

CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Fall 2016


Understanding the Tracking Ecosystem

- In 2011, much discussion about tracking, but limited understanding of how it actually works.
- Our Goal: systematically study web tracking ecosystem to inform policy and defenses.
- Challenges:
 - No agreement on definition of tracking.
 - No automated way to detect trackers.
 (State of the art: blacklists)

Our Tracking Taxonomy [NSDI '12]

- In the wild, tracking is much more complicated.
- (1) Trackers don't just use cookies.
 Flash cookies, HTML5 LocalStorage, etc.
- (2) Trackers exhibit different behaviors.
 - Within-site vs. cross-site.
 - Anonymous vs. non-anonymous.
 - Specific behavior types:
 analytics, vanilla, forced, referred, personal.


Other Trackers?



"Personal" Trackers



Personal Tracking



- Tracking is not anonymous (linked to accounts).
- Users directly visit tracker's site \rightarrow evades some defenses.

How Websites Get Your Identity

Personal trackers



Leakage of identifiers

GET http:/ /ad.doubleclick.net/adj/... Referer: http:/ /submit.SPORTS.com/...?email=jdoe@email.com Cookie: id=35c192bcfe0000b1...

Security bugs

Third party buys your identity

Outline

- 1. Understanding web tracking
- 2. Measuring web tracking
- 3. Defenses


Measurement Study (2011)

- Questions:
 - How prevalent is tracking (of different types)?
 - How much of a user's browsing history is captured?
 - How effective are defenses?
- Approach: Build tool to automatically crawl web, detect and categorize trackers based on our taxonomy.

Longitudinal studies since then: tracking has increased and become more complex.


How prevalent is tracking?

524 unique trackers on Alexa top 500 websites (homepages + 4 links)




How prevalent is tracking?

524 unique trackers on Alexa top 500 websites (homepages + 4 links)



Who/what are the top trackers? (2011)



How are users affected?

- Question: How much of a real user's browsing history can top trackers capture?
- Measurement challenges:
 - Privacy concerns.
 - Users may not browse realistically while monitored.
- Insight: AOL search logs (released in 2006) represent real user behaviors.

How are users affected?

- Idea: Use AOL search logs to create 30 hypothetical browsing histories.
 - 300 unique queries per user \rightarrow top search hits.
- Trackers can capture a large fraction:
 - Doubleclick: Avg 39% (Max 66%)
 - Facebook: Avg 23% (Max 45%)
 - Google: Avg 21% (Max 61%)

How are users affected?

POLICY & LAW US & WORLD NATIONAL SECURITY

NSA reportedly 'piggybacking' on Google advertising cookies to home in on surveillance targets

By Nathan Ingraham on December 10, 2013 10:41 pm 🛛 Email 🈏 @NateIngraham

- Trackers can capture a large fraction:
 - Doubleclick: Avg 39% (Max 66%)
 - Facebook: Avg 23% (Max 45%)
 - Google: Avg 21% (Max 61%)

LocalStorage and Flash Cookies

- Surprisingly little use of these mechanisms!
- Of 524 trackers on Alexa Top 500:
 Only 5 set unique identifiers in LocalStorage
 35 set unique identifiers in Flash cookies
- Respawning:
 - $-LS \rightarrow Cookie: 1 case; Cookie \rightarrow LS: 3 cases$
 - Flash \rightarrow Cookie: 6 cases; Cookie \rightarrow Flash: 7 cases

Outline

- 1. Understanding web tracking
- 2. Measuring web tracking
- 3. Defenses

• Do Not Track proposal?

Send a 'Do Not Track' request with your browsing traffic

Do Not Track is not a technical defense: trackers must honor the request.

- Do Not Track proposal?
- Private browsing mode?


Private browsing mode protects against local, not network, attackers.

You've gone incognito. Pages you view in incognito tabs won't stick around in your browser's history, cookie store, or search history after you've closed all of your incognito tabs. Any files you download or bookmarks you create will be kept.



However, you aren't invisible. Going incognito doesn't hide your browsing from your employer, your internet service provider, or the websites you visit.

- Do Not Track proposal?
- Private browsing mode?
- Third-party cookie blocking?



Quirks of 3rd Party Cookie Blocking

Cookies

- Allow local data to be set (recommended)
- Keep local data only until I quit my browser
- Block sites from setting any data
- Block third-party cookies and site data

Manage exceptions...

All cookies and site data ...


In some browsers, this option means third-party cookies cannot be set, but they CAN be sent.

So if a third-party cookie is somehow set, it can be used.


How to get a cookie set? One way: be a first party.



What 3rd Party Cookie Blocking Misses



What 3rd Party Cookie Blocking Misses



- Do Not Track header?
- Private browsing mode?
 - party cookie blocking?



- Third-party cookie blocking?
- Browser extensions?

Chostery Lightbeam

"uses algorithmic methods to decide what is and isn't tracking"

https://www.eff.org/ privacybadger

Often rely on blacklists, which may be incomplete.