CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption

Spring 2015

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Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Basic Problem



Given: both parties already know the same secret.

Goal: send a message confidentially.

How is this achieved in practice?

Any communication system that aims to guarantee confidentiality must solve this problem.

Reminder: Kerckhoff's Principle

- An encryption scheme should be secure even if enemy knows everything about it except the key
  - Attacker knows all algorithms
  - Attacker does not know random numbers
- Do not rely on secrecy of the algorithms ("security by obscurity")



Easy lesson:
use a good random number generator!

One-Time Pad



Cipher achieves perfect secrecy if and only if there are as many possible keys as possible plaintexts, and every key is equally likely (Claude Shannon, 1949)

Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
  - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
  - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as theoretically possible
  - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
  - … as long as the key sequence is truly random
    - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
  - … as long as each key is same length as plaintext
    - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

Problems with One-Time Pad

- Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- Does not guarantee integrity
  - One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality
  - Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else

Dangers of Reuse



Learn relationship between plaintexts

C1⊕C2 = (P1⊕K)⊕(P2⊕K) =

(P1⊕P2)⊕(K⊕K) = P1⊕P2

No Integrity



Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
  - When one-time pad is unrealistic…
- Use special cryptographic primitives:
  block ciphers, stream ciphers
  - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
  - Not as theoretically secure as one-time pad

Stream Ciphers

- One-time pad: Ciphertext(Key,Message)=Message⊕Key
  - Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message
- Idea: replace "random" with "pseudo-random"
  - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
  - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long "random-looking" sequence
    - E.g., 128-bit seed into a 10^6-bit pseudo-random sequence

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random

- Ciphertext(Key,Msg)=Msg⊕PRNG(Key)
  - Message processed bit by bit (unlike block cipher)

Background for Block Ciphers: Permutation



- For N-bit input, $2^N!$ possible permutations
- Idea for how to use a keyed permutation: split plaintext into blocks; for each block use secret key to pick a permutation
  - Without the key, permutation should "look random"

Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk ("block") of plaintext
  - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
  - Each key defines a different permutation
  - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



Block Cipher Security

- Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
  - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N-bit block cipher permutes over 2^N inputs.

- Only computational guarantee of secrecy
  - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
    - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
  - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



DES: Data Encryption Standard

- Feistel structure
  - Builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - "Ladder" structure: split input in half, put one half through the round and XOR with the other half
  - Theoretical support: After 3 random rounds, ciphertext indistinguishable from a random permutation if internal F function is a pseudorandom function (Luby & Rackoff)
- DES: Data Encryption Standard
  - Feistel structure
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/μs	Time required at 10^6 encryptions/μs
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31}\ \mu s = 35.8$ minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55}\ \mu s = 1142$ years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127}\ \mu s = 5.4 \times 10^{24}$ years	5.4×10^{18} years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167}\ \mu s = 5.9 \times 10^{36}$ years	5.9×10^{30} years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26}\ \mu s = 6.4 \times 10^{12}$ years	6.4×10^{6} years

- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
  - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES ---> 3DES
  - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- New federal standard as of 2001
- Based on the Rijndael algorithm
- 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits
- Unlike DES, does not use Feistel structure
  - The entire block is processed during each round
- Design uses some very nice mathematics

Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size



- What should we do?

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

Information Leakage in ECB Mode



[Wikipedia]

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
  - Still does not guarantee integrity

CBC Mode: Decryption



ECB vs. CBC



[Picture due to Bart Preneel]

CBC and Electronic Voting



Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:

```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,
        totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```