

CSE 484 / CSE M 584 (Autumn 2011)

# User Authentication and Human Factors

---

Daniel Halperin  
Tadayoshi Kohno

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

# Updates, 11/14

- Lab #2
  - Due ~~Friday~~ **next Monday, 11/21**
  - If you haven't, mail cse484-tas with group ASAP
- Generally: **mail cse484-tas** unless you really want only me to see the mail
- I'm on that list too; better response time overall
- **Look ahead:** Second security review & current event due 12/2 (extra credit for every week early)

# Multi-Factor Authentication

---

Passwords are easy to steal from users, often guessable, and websites get broken into all the time.

For better security, require **two or more factors**:


- ◆ Something you **know** (e.g., password)
- ◆ Something you **have** (e.g., key, smart card, phone)
- ◆ Something you **are** (biometrics)

# What About Biometrics?

---

- ◆ Authentication: **What you are**
- ◆ Unique identifying characteristics to authenticate user or create credentials
  - Biological and physiological: Fingerprints, iris scan
  - Behaviors characteristics - how perform actions: Handwriting, typing, gait
- ◆ Advantages:
  - Nothing to remember
  - Passive
  - Can't share (generally)
  - With perfect accuracy, could be fairly unique

# Overview [from Matsumoto]



Tsutomu Matsumoto's image, from <http://web.mit.edu/6.857/OldStuff/Fall03/ref/gummy-slides.pdf>

Dashed lines for enrollment; solid for verification or identification

# Biometric Error Rates (Non-Adversarial)

---

- ◆ “Fraud rate” vs. “insult rate”
  - Fraud = system incorrectly accepts (false accept)
  - Insult = system rejects valid user (false reject)
- ◆ Increasing acceptance threshold increases fraud rate, decreases insult rate
- ◆ For biometrics, U.K. banks set target fraud rate of 1%, insult rate of 0.01% [Ross Anderson]

# Biometrics

---

- ◆ Face recognition (by a computer algorithm)
  - High error rates even under reasonable variations in lighting, viewpoint and expression
- ◆ Fingerprints
  - Traditional method for identification
  - 1911: first US conviction on fingerprint evidence
  - U.K. traditionally requires 16-point match
    - Probability of false match is 1 in 10 billion
    - No successful challenges until 2000
  - Fingerprint damage impairs recognition

# Other Biometrics

---

## ◆ Iris scanning

- Irises are very random, but stable through life
  - Different between the two eyes of the same individual
- 256-byte iris code based on concentric rings between the pupil and the outside of the iris
- Equal error rate better than 1 in a million
- Among best biometric mechanisms

## ◆ Hand geometry

- Used in nuclear premises entry control, INSPASS (discontinued in 2002)

# Other Biometrics

---

## ◆ Vein

- Pattern on back of hand

## ◆ Handwriting

## ◆ Typing

- Timings for character sequences

## ◆ Gait

## ◆ DNA

# Any issues with this?

---

## Canon Files For DSLR Iris Registration Patent

Posted by kdawson on Tuesday February 12, @07:39PM  
from the **biological-metadata** dept.

An anonymous reader writes

"Canon has filed for a patent for using iris watermarking (as in the iris of your eye) to take photographer's copyright protection to the next level. You set up the camera to capture an image of your eye through the viewfinder. Once captured, this biological reference is embedded as metadata into every photo you take. Canon claims this will help with copyright infringement of photos online."



# Issues with Biometrics

---

## ◆ Private, but not secret

- Maybe encoded on the back of an ID card?
- Maybe encoded on your glass, door handle, ...
- Sharing between multiple systems?

## ◆ Revocation is difficult (impossible?)

- Sorry, your iris has been compromised, please create a new one...

## ◆ Physically identifying

- Soda machine to cross-reference fingerprint with DMV?

# Issues with Biometrics

---

- ◆ Criminal gives an inexperienced policeman fingerprints in the wrong order
  - Record not found; gets off as a first-time offender
- ◆ Can be attacked using recordings
  - Ross Anderson: in countries where fingerprints are used to pay pensions, there are persistent tales of “Granny’s finger in the pickle jar” being the most valuable property she bequeathed to her family
- ◆ Birthday paradox
  - With false accept rate of 1 in a million, probability of false match is above 50% with only 1609 samples

# Issues with Biometrics

---

- ◆ Anecdotally, car jackings went up when it became harder to steal cars without the key
- ◆ But what if you need your fingerprint to start your car?
  - Stealing cars becomes harder
  - So what would the car thieves have to do?

# Risks of Biometrics

**BBC**  
**NEWS**

 **OPEN** **The News in 2 minutes**



**News services**  
Your news when  
you want it

**News Front  
Page**



**Africa**

**Americas**

**Asia-Pacific**

**Europe**

**Middle East**

**South Asia**

**UK**

**Business**

**Health**

**Science/Nature**

**Technology**

**Entertainment**

Last Updated: Thursday, 31 March, 2005, 10:37 GMT 11:37 UK

 [E-mail this to a friend](#)

 [Printable version](#)

## Malaysia car thieves steal finger

By Jonathan Kent  
BBC News, Kuala Lumpur

**Police in Malaysia are hunting for members of a violent gang who chopped off a car owner's finger to get round the vehicle's hi-tech security system.**

The car, a Mercedes S-class, was protected by a fingerprint recognition system.

Accountant K Kumaran's ordeal began when he was run down by four men in a small car as he was about to get into his Mercedes in a Kuala Lumpur suburb.

### SEE ALSO:

- ▶ [Malaysia to act against pirates](#)  
16 Mar 05 | [Asia](#)

### RELATED INTEREST

- ▶ [Malaysian police](#)  
The BBC is not responsible for the content of internet sites

### TOP ASIA-PACIFIC STORIES

- ▶ [Australians warn of cuts](#)
- ▶ [Taiwan campus](#)

# Biometric Error Rates (Adversarial)

---

- ◆ Want to minimize “fraud” and “insult” rate
  - “Easy” to test probability of accidental misidentification (fraud)
  - But what about adversarial fraud
- ◆ An adversary might try to steal the biometric information
  - Malicious fingerprint reader
    - Consider when biometric is used to derive a cryptographic key
  - Residual fingerprint on a glass

# Voluntary: Making a Mold

[Matsumoto]



**Put the plastic into hot water to soften it.**



**Press a live finger against it.**



**The mold**

**It takes around 10 minutes.**

# Voluntary: Making a Finger

[Matsumoto]



**Pour the liquid into the mold.**



**Put it into a refrigerator to cool.**




**The gummy finger**

**It takes around 10 minutes.**

# Involuntary


[Matsumoto]




# Involuntary

[Matsumoto]


## Gelatin Liquid



**Drip the liquid onto the mold.**




**Put this mold into a refrigerator to cool, and then peel carefully.**



# Involuntary

[Matsumoto]



# Authentication by Handwriting

[Ballard, Monrose, Lopresti]

- ◆ Maybe a computer could also forge some biometrics

<i>graphic language</i> target
<i>graphic language</i> human forgery
<i>graphic language</i> generative forgery

<i>crisis management</i> target
<i>crisis management</i> human forgery
<i>crisis management</i> generative forgery

<i>solo concert</i> target
<i>solo concert</i> human forgery
<i>solo concert</i> generative forgery

# Authentication by Handwriting

[Ballard, Monrose, Lopresti]

- ◆ Maybe a computer could also forge some biometrics

graphic language target	crisis management target	solo concert target
graphic language human forgery	crisis management human forgery	solo concert human forgery
graphic language generative forgery	crisis management generative forgery	solo concert generative forgery


Generated by computer algorithm trained on handwriting samples

# Human Factors in User Authentication

## Passwords

# The problem

Alice needs passwords for all the websites that she visits



# Possible solutions

- **Easy to remember:** Use **same password** on all websites. Use “**weak**” password.
  - Poor security (don't share password between bank website and small website)
- **More secure:** Use **different, strong passwords** on all websites.
  - Hard to remember, unless write down.

# Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 'hacked into emails of rivals and journalists'

By MAIL FOREIGN SERVICE

Last updated at 2:09 AM on 06th March 2010

[Comments \(5\)](#) | [Add to My Stories](#)

Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has been accused of hacking into the email accounts of rivals and journalists.

The CEO of the world's most successful social networking website was accused of at least two breaches of privacy in a series of articles run by BusinessInsider.com.

As part of a two-year investigation detailing the founding of Facebook, the magazine uncovered what it claimed was evidence of the hackings in 2004.



# Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 'hacked into emails of rivals and journalists'

By MAIL FOREIGN SERVICE

Last updated at 2:09 AM on 06th March 2010



Business Insider claimed he then told a friend how he had hacked into the accounts of Crimson staff.

Facebook  
been a  
account

He allegedly told the friend that he used TheFacebook.com to search for members who said they were Crimson staff.

The CB  
social m  
at least  
of artic

Then, he allegedly examined a report of failed logins to see if any of the Crimson members had ever entered an incorrect password into TheFacebook.com.

In the instances where they had, Business Insider claimed that Zuckerberg said he tried using those incorrect passwords to access the Crimson members' Harvard email accounts.

As part  
detailin  
magaz  
eviden

In two instances, the magazine claimed, he succeeded - and was able to read emails between Crimson staff discussing the possibility of writing an article on the accusations surrounding him.

'In other words,' Business Insider claimed, 'Mark appears to have used private login data from TheFacebook to hack into the separate email accounts of some TheFacebook users'.

# Classroom Survey

## Who here...

- repeats 1 password across many sites?
- uses 1 password with site-specific variations?
- uses 2 passwords, one low-security and one high-security for special sites?
- uses truly unique passwords for special sites?
- uses a truly unique password on every site?
- Does something else?

# Alternate solution: Password managers

- Password managers handle creating and “remembering” strong passwords
- Potentially:
  - Easier for users
  - More secure
- Examples:
  - PwdHash (Usenix Security 2005)
  - Password Multiplier (WWW 2005)

# Key mechanisms

- User remembers a ***single “master” password***
- Password managers
  - On input: (1) the user’s single password and (2) information about the website
  - Compute: Strong, site-specific password
- Goal: Avoid problems with passwords