

# Cryptography (cont.)

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Daniel Halperin  
Tadayoshi Kohno

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

# Updates Oct. 14th

- **Coffee/tea** signup sheet posted (optional)
  - Next is Tuesday @3 pm. Meet in CSE Atrium
- **Lab 1** due in 1 week
  - TA office hours Mon, Fri before class (CSE 002)
  - My office hours Mon, Wed after class (CSE 210)

# Checkpoint

- **Symmetric cryptography**
  - Both sides know **shared key**, no one else knows anything. Can **encrypt, decrypt, sign/MAC, verify**
  - Computationally lightweight
  - **Challenge:** How do you privately share a key?
- **Asymmetric cryptography**
  - Everyone has a **public** key that everyone else knows; and a paired **secret** key that is private
  - Public key can **encrypt**; only secret key can **decrypt**
  - Secret key can **sign/MAC**, public key can **verify**
  - Computationally expensive
  - **Challenge:** How do you validate a public key?

# Checkpoint

- **Where are public keys from?**
  - One solution: keys for **Certificate Authorities** *a priori* known by browser, OS, etc.
- **Where are shared keys from?**
  - In person exchange, snail mail, etc.
  - If we have verifiable public/private keys: **key exchange** protocol generates a shared key for symmetric cryptography

# Kerckhoffs's Principle

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- ◆ Security of a cryptographic object should depend **only** on the secrecy of the secret (private) key
- ◆ Security should not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm itself.

# How cryptosystems work today

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
## ◆ Layered approach:

- Cryptographic primitives, like block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions, and one-way trapdoor permutations
- Cryptographic protocols, like CBC mode encryption, CTR mode encryption, HMAC message authentication

## ◆ Public algorithms (Kerckhoff's Principle)

## ◆ Security proofs based on assumptions (not this course)

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# Attack Scenarios for Encryption

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- ◆ Ciphertext-Only
- ◆ Known Plaintext
- ◆ Chosen Plaintext
- ◆ Chosen Ciphertext (and Chosen Plaintext)
  
- ◆ (General advice: Target strongest level of privacy possible -- even if not clear why -- for extra "safety")

# Chosen-Plaintext Attack

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
# Chosen-Plaintext Attack

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


# Chosen-Plaintext Attack


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
# Chosen-Plaintext Attack



# Chosen-Plaintext Attack



# Chosen-Plaintext Attack



# Attack Scenarios for Integrity

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
- ◆ What do you think these scenarios should be?

# Perfect Secrecy

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Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are as many possible keys as possible plaintexts, and every key is equally likely (Claude Shannon)

# One-Time Pad



# Advantages of One-Time Pad

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
## ◆ Easy to compute

- Encryption and decryption are the same operation
- Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute

## ◆ As secure as theoretically possible


- Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
- ...as long as the key sequence is truly random
  - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
- ...as long as each key is same length as plaintext
  - But how does the sender communicate the key to receiver?

# Disadvantages




Disadvantage #1: Keys as long as messages.  
Impractical in most scenarios  
Still used by intelligence communities

# Disadvantages




Disadvantage #2: No integrity protection

# Disadvantages



Disadvantage #2: No integrity protection


# Disadvantages



Disadvantage #2: No integrity protection

# Disadvantages

Disadvantage #3: Keys cannot be reused




Learn relationship between plaintexts:

$$C1 \oplus C2 = (P1 \oplus K) \oplus (P2 \oplus K) = (P1 \oplus P2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P1 \oplus P2$$


# Visual Cryptography


- Generate a random bitmap

- Encode 0 as:



- Encode 1 as:






# Visual Cryptography

- Take a black and white bitmap image
- For a white pixel, send the same as the mask



- For a black pixel, send the opposite of the mask



See also <http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/yoshi/cs4hs/cse-vc.html>

# Visual Cryptography



- <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/vck/face.gif>

See also <http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/yoshi/cs4hs/cse-vc.html>


# Reducing Keysize

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- ◆ What do we do when we can't pre-share huge keys?
  - When OTP is unrealistic
- ◆ We use special cryptographic primitives
  - Single key can be reused (with some restrictions)
  - But no longer provable secure (in the sense of the OTP)
- ◆ Examples: Block ciphers, stream ciphers

# Background: Permutation

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


- ◆ For N-bit input,  $2^N!$  possible permutations
- ◆ Idea for how to use a **keyed** permutation: split plaintext into blocks; for each block use **secret key** to pick a permutation
  - Without the key, permutation should “look random”

# Block Ciphers

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- ◆ Operates on a single chunk (“block”) of plaintext
  - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
  - Each key defines a different permutation
  - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



# Block Cipher Security

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- ◆ Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
  - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N-bit block cipher permutes over  $2^N$  inputs.
- ◆ Only computational guarantee of secrecy
  - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
    - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
  - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)

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Block of plaintext

Key


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
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


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
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
# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)




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
# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



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


# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



Procedure must be reversible  
(for decryption)

# Feistel Structure (Stallings Fig 2.2)



# DES

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## ◆ Feistel structure

- “Ladder” structure: split input in half, put one half through the round and XOR with the other half
- After 3 random rounds, ciphertext indistinguishable from a random permutation if internal F function is a pseudorandom function (Luby & Rackoff)

## ◆ DES: Data Encryption Standard

- Feistel structure
- Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
- 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

# DES and 56 bit keys (Stallings Tab 2.2)

## ◆ 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/ $\mu$ s	Time required at $10^6$ encryptions/ $\mu$ s
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31} \mu\text{s} = 35.8$ minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55} \mu\text{s} = 1142$ years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127} \mu\text{s} = 5.4 \times 10^{24}$ years	$5.4 \times 10^{18}$ years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167} \mu\text{s} = 5.9 \times 10^{36}$ years	$5.9 \times 10^{30}$ years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26} \mu\text{s} = 6.4 \times 10^{12}$ years	$6.4 \times 10^6$ years

## ◆ 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines

- < 24 hours to find DES key

## ◆ DES ---> 3DES

- 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

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- ◆ New federal standard as of 2001
- ◆ Based on the **Rijndael** algorithm
- ◆ 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits
- ◆ Unlike DES, does not use Feistel structure
  - The entire block is processed during each round
- ◆ Design uses some very nice mathematics