### CSE 473: Artificial Intelligence Spring 2017

#### **Adversarial Search**

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Based on slides adapted Luke Zettlemoyer, Dan Klein, Pieter Abbeel. Dan Weld. Stuart Russell or Andrew Moore

## Game Playing State-of-the-Art 2017

- Checkers: Chinook ended 40-year-reign of human world champion Marion Tinsley in 1994. Used an endgame database defining perfect play for all positions involving 8 or fewer pieces on the board, a total of 443,748,401,247 positions. Checkers is now solved!
- Chess: Deep Blue defeated human world champion Gary Kasparov in a six-game match in 1997. Deep Blue examined 200 million positions per second, used very sophisticated evaluation and undisclosed methods for extending some lines of search up to 40 ply. Current programs are even better, if less historic.
- Othello: Human champions refuse to compete against computers, which are too good.
- Go: In March 2016, AlphaGo beats 9-dan master Lee Sedol (3 wins, 1 loss, 1 win). Combines Monte-Carlo tree search with deep reinforcement learning.
- Poker: In December 2016, computer beats professional players at no-limit Texas hold 'em

### **Adversarial Search**



## **Game Playing**

- Many different kinds of games!
- Choices:
  - Deterministic or stochastic?
  - One, two, or more players?
  - Perfect information (can you see the state)?
- Want algorithms for calculating a strategy (policy) which recommends a move in each state

### **Deterministic Games**


- Many possible formalizations, one is:
  - States: S (start at s<sub>0</sub>)
  - Players: P={1...N} (usually take turns)
  - Actions: A (may depend on player / state)
  - lacktriangle Transition Function: S x A ightarrow S
  - Terminal Test: S → {t,f}
  - Terminal Utilities: S x P → R
- Solution for a player is a policy: S → A


### Zero-Sum Games








- Zero-Sum Games
  - Agents have opposite utilities (values on outcomes)
  - Lets us think of a single value that one maximizes and the other minimizes
  - Adversarial, pure competition
- General Games
  - Agents have independent utilities (values on outcomes)
  - Cooperation, indifference, competition, & more are possible
















































































# Alpha-Beta Pruning Properties

- This pruning has no effect on final result at the root
- Values of intermediate nodes might be wrong!
  - but, they are bounds
- Good child ordering improves effectiveness of pruning
- With "perfect ordering":
  - Time complexity drops to O(b<sup>m/2</sup>)
  - Doubles solvable depth!
  - Full search of, e.g. chess, is still hopeless...

#### Alpha-Beta Implementation α: MAX's best option on path to root β: MIN's best option on path to root def max-value(state, $\alpha$ , $\beta$ ): def min-value(state , $\alpha$ , $\beta$ ): initialize $v = -\infty$ initialize $v = +\infty$ for each successor of state: for each successor of state: v = min(v, value(successor, α, β)) v = max(v,value(successor, $\alpha$ , $\beta$ )) if $v \le \alpha$ return vif $v \ge \beta$ return v $\beta = \min(\beta, v)$ $\alpha = \max(\alpha, v)$ return v return v Slide from Dan Klein & Pieter Abbeel - ai.berkeley.edu

