

Shakin' Hands and Living in SYN: A TCP Tale

CSE 461 Section


Joke Later!

- Let's learn things first!



TCP Is Reliable

- What do we mean by “reliable?”
 - We know when the other party receives or doesn't receive certain data
 - Data arrives intact
 - Data arrives in the correct order (to the application layer, at least)




Where This Reliability Comes From

- What's the main mechanism for ensuring this reliability?
 - Sequence numbers!
 - They allow packets to be identified, acknowledged, and , implicitly re-requested
 - For TCP to work, clients must know each other's sequence number schemes




Starting Communication: The Three-Way Handshake

- Need to synchronize with each other's sequence numbers
- How can we do this?
- Active open vs. passive open
 - `connect()` vs. `listen()`
- SYN packet
 - Send own sequence number A
- SYN/ACK packet
 - Acknowledge with $A+1$, send own sequence number B
- ACK packet
 - Acknowledge with $B+1$
- Demonstration




Three-Way Handshake Diagram



Ending Communications

- We need a protocol for stopping communications
- What could we do?
- Let's send packets to close the connection!
- FIN/ACK sequence





TCP Half-Open

- TCP Half-Open
 - One client is in the open state; the other is not
- How could this happen?
 - One endpoint has crashed
 - One endpoint has removed the socket
 - One endpoint has received a SYN and sent a SYN/ACK, but the other side has not ACKed the SYN/ACK yet
 - One endpoint has sent a FIN and received an ACK, but the other side has not sent a FIN yet
 - RST packet often sent in these cases



SYN Flooding




SYN Flooding Countermeasures

- What ideas can we think of to make it so that SYN flooding doesn't work?
 - Constraint: we don't want to break TCP!)
 - Identify SYN flooders and filter their packets
 - Reduce our timeout until we garbage-collect TCBs
 - Recycle half-open TCP connections
 - Use SYN cookies
 - Sequence number encodes all of the data that would otherwise be stored
 - This allows us to garbage-collect our SYN queue and still respond to subsequent ACKs



TCP Connection Hijacking

- TCP is not (by default) encrypted
- This means anyone sniffing our packets can see the sequence numbers being used
- How is this a problem?
 - For many protocols, the sequence and acknowledgement numbers are the other “security”
 - Using these numbers can make a host think that you’re sending the next packet in a communication session
 - This can cause the communication to be re-addressed to a new IP address/port



TCP Veto

- In TCP, how does a server know to discard a duplicate packet? What does it check for?
 - Correct checksum
 - Same sequence number
- How are sequence numbers generated?
 - Randomly at first, then incremented
 - Often, this increment is unpredictable, and depends on received data length
 - How could we secret inject a packet into communication?
 - Predict the length and sequence number of some data in the future
 - Pre-empt that data with a similar packet



Joke Time

- Two jokes



Questions?

