CSE/EE 461 – Lecture 23
Security

Last Time

• Naming
• Focus
  – How do we name hosts etc.?
• Topics
  – Domain Name System (DNS)

This Time

• Network security
• Focus
  – How do we secure distributed systems?
• Topics
  – Privacy, integrity, authenticity
  – Cryptography
  – Practical security
What do we mean by “Security”?  

- Networks are fundamentally shared  
  - Need means to protect messages sent by legitimate participants from others with access to the network  

- Privacy: messages can’t be eavesdropped  
- Integrity: messages can’t be tampered with  
- Authenticity: messages were sent by the right party  

- These are in addition to the need to protect networked systems from intrusions and compromise by attackers

Approaches at 10,000 ft  

- Physical security  
  - Tackle the problem of sharing directly  
- “Security through obscurity”  
  - Hope no-one will find out what you’re doing!  
- Throw math at the problem  
  - Cryptography  

- Why is security difficult?  
  - It’s a negative goal: can you be sure there are no flaws?  
  - Often assumptions turn out to be invalid, esp. randomness

Basic Encryption for Privacy  

- Cryptographer chooses functions E, D and keys KF, KP  
  - Mathematical basis  
- Cryptanalyst try to “break” the system  
  - Depends on what is known: E and D, M and C?
Secret Key Functions (DES, IDEA)

- Single key (symmetric) is shared between parties
  - Often chosen randomly, but must be communicated

Basics of DES

- DES uses a 64 bit key (56 + 8)
- Message encrypted 64 bits at a time
- 16 rounds in the encryption
- Each round scrambles 64 bits

DES (cont.)

- Repeat process for larger messages with "chaining"
Public Key Functions (RSA)

- Public and private key related mathematically
  - Public key can be published; private is a secret

Authentication Protocols

- Three-way handshake for mutual authentication
  - Client and server share secrets, e.g., login password

  ![Three-way handshake diagram](image)

- Client authenticates server here
- Server authenticates client here
- Session key exchanged

Authenticity and Integrity

- Sometimes we care about knowing messages authentic, but don’t care about privacy.
- If only sender and receiver knew the keys we would be done … but that’s often not the case
  - A pair of keys for each pair of communicating parties?
- In public key (RSA) systems the "encryption" key is potentially known by everyone
  - anyone could have sent us a confidential message by encrypting with our public key
**RSA Digital Signature**

- Notice that we reversed the role of the keys (and the math just works out) so only one party can send the message but anyone can check it’s authenticity.

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**A Faster “RSA Signature”**

- Encryption can be expensive, e.g., RSA 1Kbps.
- To speed up, let’s sign just the checksum instead!
  - Check that the encrypted bit is a signature of the checksum.
- Problem: Easy to alter data without altering checksum.
- Answer: Cryptographically strong “checksums” called message digests where it’s computationally difficult to choose data with a given checksum.
  - But they still run much more quickly than encryption.
  - MD5 (128 bits) is the most common example.

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**Message Digests (MD5, SHA)**

- Act as a cryptographic checksum or hash.
  - Typically small compared to message (MD5 128 bits).
  - “One-way”: infeasible to find two messages with same digest.

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Cryptography in Protocols

- These techniques can be applied at different levels:
  - IP packets (IPSEC)
  - Web transfers or other transports (SSL/TLS, Secure HTTP)
  - Email (PGP)

Practical issues

- In practice, systems are not that secure
  - hackers can go after weakest link
  - any system with bugs is vulnerable
  - vulnerability often not anticipated
    - usually not a brute force attack against encryption system
  - often can’t tell if system is compromised
  - hackers hide their tracks
  - can be hard to re-secure system after breakin
    - hackers can leave hard-to-detect backdoors

Password dictionary attacks

- Moore’s law: brute force attacks get cheaper with time
- UNIX passwords:
  - time to check all 5 letter passwords (lower case)?
    - \(26^5 = 10\) million passwords
    - 1975: 1 day
    - 1992: 10 seconds
    - 2002: 0.01 seconds
  - how about six letters, requiring upper, lower, number, and control character?
    - \(70^6 = 600\) billion passwords
    - 1992: 6 days
    - 2002: with 100 PC’s in parallel, <60 seconds (!!!)
What do you trust? Why?

• Can you trust your login prompt?
  – how do you know the person before you really logged out?
• Can you trust your web browser?
  – what if somebody modified the installed version to capture your passwords and bank account numbers?
  – did you download the browser over the web? How do you know it wasn’t modified at the source, or in flight?
  – does your browser have vulnerabilities? How do you know the web sites you’ve visited haven’t exploited them?
• Can you trust your email?
  – how do you know the sender sent the mail, and that it wasn’t modified in flight?

The lure: an email message

Dear PayPal,

We recently noticed one or more attempts to log in to your PayPal account from a foreign IP address.

If you recently accessed your account while traveling, the unusual log in attempts may have been initiated by you. However, if you did not initiate the log in, please visit PayPal as soon as possible to verify your identity.


Verify your identity is a security measure that will ensure that you are the only person with access to the account.

Thanks for your patience as we work together to protect your account.

Sincerely,
PayPal

The mimicked website...
The sinker…

How did this work? (1/3)

• The email message itself is spam
  – sent to hundreds of millions of destination addresses
  – attacker only needs to harvest tiny fraction

• Spam is typically transmitted through “relays”
  – compromised PCs forced to run relay software
  – makes it harder to trace and shut down attacker

How did this work? (2/3)

• The link in the email message is really an image
  – like the web, email can contain hyperlinked images
    – clicking on the image takes you to the linked web page
  – the image is:
    https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_login
  – the link takes you to:
    http://218.246.224.203/cgi-bin/cp-bin/webservermd_login.php
  – 218.246.224.203 is some machine in China
  – most likely a compromised PC
How did this work?  (3/3)

• The web page contains content that…
  – instructs IE not to show the real address bar
  – hides "http://218.246.224.203/icons/..." from user
  – displays images and text that spoofs an address bar containing a falsified URL.

Internet worms

• Worm performs the following steps:
  while(1) {
    pick random IP address;
    scan IP address for known remote vulnerability;
    if is vulnerable {
      exploit vulnerability and copy self to remote host;
    }
  }

• Deadly, but can do much better
  – non-random scanning, multiple vulnerabilities, etc.
Why are worms bad?

• They cause damage to victims
  - worms can carry "payloads"
    - e.g., install spyware
    - e.g., mount coordinated attack on a Web site

• They cause damage to the Internet
  - probing for victims and spreading causes Internet traffic
    - a fast-spreading worm can overwhelm Internet links

Famous examples

• Code Red v2 [2002]
  - attacked Microsoft IIS web servers
  - infected 500,000 victims within 10 hours
  - doubled in size every 37 minutes

• Sapphire [2003]
  - attacked Microsoft SQL server
  - infected 75,000 victims within 10 minutes
  - doubled in size every 8.5 seconds

Worse case scenario

• Hypothetical “hitlist” worm
  - probe for potential victims before releasing worm
  - attack these susceptible victims first
  - avoids “random probe” that most worms perform

• In principle, would infect millions within seconds
Ping of Death

- IP packets can be fragmented and reordered in flight
- Reassembly done at remote host
  - can get fragments out of order, so host OS much allocate a buffer to hold fragments
- Malformed IP fragment is possible
  - offset + length > max packet size
  - Windows didn’t check this
  - could overflow buffer in Windows kernel
- Was used for denial of service (crash Windows)
  - but could have been used for worm propagation

DNS cache poisoning

- DNS queries/responses are unauthenticated
  - no encryption used
- Many attacks possible as a result
- DNS cache poisoning:
  - attacker monitors network for a DNS query flowing by
    - e.g., for www.google.com
  - attacker spoofs a reply to “poison” the cache of whomever asked the query
  - spoofed response points to server of attacker’s choosing
    - Imagine if Comcast’s DNS servers are poisoned…

Browser hacks

- Netscape used to use time of day, process ID to seed random number generator
  - random number used to pick conversation key
  - easy to predict, and therefore break
- Netscape used to be downloaded without encryption
  - four byte change to executable made it use attacker’s key
- Plenty of browser bugs
  - drive-by download: web server exploits bug to own client
    - phishing attacks: attack web site looks like authoritative site
      - often combined with homograph attack:
        - www.google.com
Social engineering

- Con person into giving out information
- Phone secretary, say:
  - “Hi. I’m your company’s IT administrator. Your boss is currently traveling, and I can’t reach them. I need their password to verify their account hasn’t been broken into. This is really urgent.”
- Somebody phones you, and says:
  - “Hi. I’m with the Bank of America credit card fraud division. We’ve detected suspicious activity on your account, and we want to ensure you haven’t become a victim of identity theft. Before we start, I need to verify your identity. What is your bank account number? SSN?”
- Often far more effective than technical attack
  - requires all people with access to sensitive information to be conscious of security issues

Denial of Service in the News

*Network World Fusion* News

Denial-of-service attack cripples Microsoft for second day

By John Fontana

Adding insult to injury, attackers launched a denial-of-service attack against Microsoft Thursday that crippled access to the company’s Web sites for a second day.

What is Denial of Service?

- Attacker can deny service to legitimate users if they can overwhelm the system providing the service
  - System is full of bugs, just send it packets that trigger them
  - System has limited bandwidth, CPU, memory, etc., just sent it too many packets to handle
- Big issue in practice and lack of effective solutions
  - Today, patch as found (CERT) or build implementation to tolerate DOS
  - Tomorrow, design protocols to withstand, possibly network support for shutting down attack?
- Two broad classes:
  - Nasty packets trigger implementation bugs, e.g., Ping of Death
  - Packet floods target bandwidth, CPU, memory, e.g., SYN flood
Complication: Spoofed Addresses

- Why reveal your real address? Instead, “spoof” it.
  - Can implicate others and appear to be many hosts

- Solution?
  - Ingress filtering (ISP’s check validity of source addresses) helps, but has poor incentive patterns and is not a complete solution

- Opportunity: “backscatter analysis”
  - Host responds to spoofed packet, sends response packet to essentially random IP
  - If you have a large number of unused IPs, just listen and you’ll hear the backscatter—can measure DOS attacks!

Complication: Reflectors & Amplifiers

- Some packets arriving “out of the blue” trigger a reply
  - Use this with spoofing to launder attack traffic (e.g., DNS)
  - Use with broadcast addresses to amplify attack (e.g., Smurf)

Distributed DOS (DDOS)

- Use automated tools to set up a network of zombies
  - Trin00, TFN, mstream, Stacheldraht, …
Lessons

- Encryption is a powerful tool
  - strong mathematical properties
  - used to provide integrity, authenticity, privacy
  - must be used correctly
- Many other security issues in practice
  - non-mathematical, “best practice” based
  - easy to get wrong
- In the end, people are the weak link
  - social engineering