

## Crypto and the Internet: Real-World Usage


Josh Benaloh  
Senior Cryptographer  
Microsoft Research

## Internet Security?

- The Internet was *not* designed for security.
- Sending data via the Internet is like sending post cards through the mail ...  
...when you don't trust the Post Office.

March 5, 2013

## A Typical Internet Session



March 5, 2013

## Basic Encryption

Can we at least protect the credit card number so that it won't be revealed to anyone except the intended merchant?

March 5, 2013

## Kerckhoffs's Principle (1883)

The security of a cryptosystem should depend only on the key.

You should assume that attackers know everything about your system *except* the key.

March 5, 2013

## PINs, Passwords, & Keys


Informally ...


- A *PIN* is a 4-6 digit speed bump.
- A *password* is a short, user-chosen, usually guessable selection from a small dictionary.
- A *key* is an unguessable, randomly chosen string – usually at least 128 bits.


March 5, 2013



## Stream Cipher Decryption

Ciphertext: 

PRNG(seed): 

Plaintext: 

March 5, 2013

## A PRNG: Alleged RC4

Initialization

$S[0..255] = 0, 1, \dots, 255; j = 0$   
 $K[0..255] = \text{Key}, \text{Key}, \text{Key}, \dots$   
 for  $i = 0$  to 255  
      $j = (j + S[i] + K[i]) \bmod 256$   
     swap  $S[i]$  and  $S[j]$

March 5, 2013

## A PRNG: Alleged RC4

Iteration

$i = (i + 1) \bmod 256$   
 $j = (j + S[i]) \bmod 256$   
 swap  $S[i]$  and  $S[j]$   
 $t = (S[i] + S[j]) \bmod 256$   
 Output  $S[t]$

March 5, 2013

## Some Good Properties

- Stream ciphers are typically very fast.
- Stream ciphers can be very simple.
- The same function is used for encryption and decryption.

March 5, 2013

## Stream Cipher Security

If two plaintexts are *ever* encrypted with the same stream cipher and key

$$C_1 = K \oplus P_1$$

$$C_2 = K \oplus P_2$$


an attacker can easily compute


$$C_1 \oplus C_2 = P_1 \oplus P_2$$


from which  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  can usually be teased apart easily.

March 5, 2013

## Stream Cipher Encryption

Plaintext: 

PRNG(seed): 

Ciphertext: 

March 5, 2013

## Stream Cipher Integrity

- It is easy for an adversary (even one who can't decrypt the ciphertext) to alter the plaintext in a known way.

March 5, 2013

## Stream Cipher Integrity

- It is easy for an adversary (even one who can't decrypt the ciphertext) to alter the plaintext in a known way.

Bob to Bob's Bank:

Please transfer \$0,000,002.00 to the account of my good friend Alice.

March 5, 2013

## Stream Cipher Integrity

- It is easy for an adversary (even one who can't decrypt the ciphertext) to alter the plaintext in a known way.

Bob to Bob's Bank:

Please transfer \$1,000,002.00 to the account of my good friend Alice.

March 5, 2013

## Symmetric Ciphers


Private-key (symmetric) ciphers are usually divided into two classes.

- Stream ciphers
- Block ciphers

March 5, 2013


## Block Ciphers

*AES, DES, 3DES, Twofish, etc.*



March 5, 2013

## How to Build a Block Cipher



March 5, 2013

### Feistel Ciphers

March 5, 2013

### Feistel Ciphers

March 5, 2013

### Feistel Ciphers

March 5, 2013

### Feistel Ciphers

March 5, 2013



### Feistel Ciphers

March 5, 2013



### Feistel Ciphers

- Typically, Feistel ciphers are iterated for about 10-16 rounds.
- Different “sub-keys” are used for each round.
- Even a weak round function can yield a strong Feistel cipher if iterated sufficiently.

March 5, 2013



- ### Feistel Ciphers
- Typically, Feistel ciphers are iterated for about 10-16 rounds.
  - Different “sub-keys” are used for each round.
  - Even a weak round function can yield a strong Feistel cipher if iterated sufficiently.
- March 5, 2013



- ### Asymmetric Encryption
- What if the user and merchant have no prior relationship?
  - Asymmetric encryption allows someone to encrypt a message for a recipient without knowledge of the recipient’s decryption key.
- March 5, 2013



## The Fundamental Equation

- $Z = Y^X \bmod N$

March 5, 2013

## The Fundamental Equation

- $Z = Y^X \bmod N$

When  $Z$  is unknown, it can be efficiently computed.

March 5, 2013

## The Fundamental Equation

- $Z = Y^X \bmod N$

When  $X$  is unknown, the problem is known as the *discrete logarithm* and is generally believed to be hard to solve.

March 5, 2013

## The Fundamental Equation

- $Z = Y^X \bmod N$

When  $Y$  is unknown, the problem is known as *discrete root finding* and is generally believed to be hard to solve ... without the factorization of  $N$ .

March 5, 2013

## The Fundamental Equation

- $Z = Y^X \bmod N$

The problem is not well-studied for the case when  $N$  is unknown.

March 5, 2013

How to compute  $Y^X \bmod N$ 

Compute  $Y^X$  and then reduce mod  $N$ .

- If  $X$ ,  $Y$ , and  $N$  each are 1,000-bit integers,  $Y^X$  consists of  $\sim 2^{1010}$  bits.
- Since there are roughly  $2^{250}$  particles in the universe, storage is a problem.

March 5, 2013

## How to compute $Y^X \bmod N$

- Repeatedly multiplying by  $Y$  by itself  $X$  times (with a modulo  $N$  reduction after each multiplication) solves the storage problem.
- However, we would need to perform  $\sim 2^{900}$  64-bit multiplications per second to complete the computation before the sun burns out.

March 5, 2013

## How to compute $Y^X \bmod N$

### Multiplication by Repeated Doubling

To compute  $X \cdot Y$ ,  
compute  $Y, 2Y, 4Y, 8Y, 16Y, \dots$   
and sum up those values dictated by the binary representation of  $X$ .

**Example:**  $26Y = 2Y + 8Y + 16Y$ .

March 5, 2013

## How to compute $Y^X \bmod N$

### Exponentiation by Repeated Squaring

To compute  $Y^X$ ,  
compute  $Y, Y^2, Y^4, Y^8, Y^{16}, \dots$   
and multiply those values dictated by the binary representation of  $X$ .

**Example:**  $Y^{26} = Y^2 \cdot Y^8 \cdot Y^{16}$ .

March 5, 2013

## How to compute $Y^X \bmod N$

• We can now perform a 1,000-bit modular exponentiation using  $\sim 1,500$  1,000-bit modular multiplications.

- 1,000 squarings:  $Y, Y^2, Y^4, \dots, Y^{2^{1000}}$
- $\sim 500$  "ordinary" multiplications

March 5, 2013

## The Fundamental Equation

$$Z = Y^X \bmod N$$

When  $Y$  is unknown, the problem is known as *discrete root finding* and is generally believed to be hard to solve ... without the factorization of  $N$ .

March 5, 2013

## RSA Encryption/Decryption

- Select two large primes  $p$  and  $q$ .
- Publish the product  $N = pq$ .
- The exponent  $X$  is typically fixed at 65537.
- Encrypt message  $Y$  as  $E(Y) = Y^X \bmod N$ .
- Decrypt ciphertext  $Z$  as  $D(Z) = Z^{1/X} \bmod N$ .
- Note  $D(E(Y)) = (Y^X)^{1/X} \bmod N = Y$ .

March 5, 2013



## RSA Signatures and Verification

- Not only is  $D(E(Y)) = (Y^X)^{1/X} \bmod N = Y$ , but also  $E(D(Y)) = (Y^{1/X})^X \bmod N = Y$ .
- To form a signature of message  $Y$ , create  $S = D(Y) = Y^{1/X} \bmod N$ .
- To verify the signature, check that  $E(S) = S^X \bmod N$  matches  $Y$ .

March 5, 2013

## Transfer of Confidential Data

You (client)                      Merchant (server)

March 5, 2013

## Transfer of Confidential Data

You (client)                      Merchant (server)

March 5, 2013

## Intermediary Attack

You (client)                      Intermediary                      Merchant (server)

March 5, 2013

## Digital Certificates



"Alice's public modulus is  $N_A = 331490324840 \dots$ "  
 -- signed ...  
 someone you trust.

March 5, 2013


## Transfer of Confidential Data

You (client)                      Merchant (server)

March 5, 2013



- ### SSL/PCT/TLS History
- 1994: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) V2.0
  - 1995: Private Communication Technology (PCT) V1.0
  - 1996: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) V3.0
  - 1997: Private Communication Technology (PCT) V4.0
  - 1999: Transport Layer Security (TLS) V1.0
- March 5, 2013



- ### SSL/PCT/TLS Agility
- A principal reason for the success of SSL/TLS is its agility.
- The handshake negotiates symmetric and asymmetric ciphers, the hash function, and even the protocol's own version.
  - This has allowed the protocol to survive and expand while many underlying primitives have been discredited or lost favor.
- March 5, 2013

- ### SSL/PCT/TLS Secure Channel
- Once the negotiation is complete, *all* subsequent secure messages are sent
- encrypted – using the negotiated session key, and
  - integrity checked with a keyed hash.
- March 5, 2013

## Hybrid Cryptography

- Asymmetric cryptography has many useful features not available in traditional symmetric cryptography.
- Symmetric cryptography is *much* more efficient than asymmetric.
- The practical hybrid is formed by using asymmetric cryptography to establish a secure channel and symmetric cryptography within the secure channel.

March 5, 2013

## Application: Verifiable Elections

- Current election technology requires trust in
  - the officials who manage elections,
  - the equipment and its manufacturers, and
  - the processes used in the election.
- Cryptography allows us to eliminate this trust.

March 5, 2013

## A Verifiable Election

| Voter Name    | Vote      |
|---------------|-----------|
| Alice Smith   | Jefferson |
| Bob Williams  | Adams     |
| Carol James   | Adams     |
| David Fuentes | Jefferson |
| Ellen Chu     | Jefferson |

| Totals    |   |
|-----------|---|
| Jefferson | 3 |
| Adams     | 2 |

## A Verifiable Election

| Voter Name    | Vote      |           |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| Alice Smith   | Jefferson | X37BM6YPM |
| Bob Williams  | Adams     | 2J8CNF2KQ |
| Carol James   | Adams     | VRSF5JQWZ |
| David Fuentes | Jefferson | MW5B2VA7Y |
| Ellen Chu     | Jefferson | 8VPPS2L39 |

| Totals    |   |
|-----------|---|
| Jefferson | 3 |
| Adams     | 2 |

## A Verifiable Election

| Voter Name    | Vote      |           |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| Alice Smith   | Jefferson | X37BM6YPM |
| Bob Williams  | Adams     | 2J8CNF2KQ |
| Carol James   | Adams     | VRSF5JQWZ |
| David Fuentes | Jefferson | MW5B2VA7Y |
| Ellen Chu     | Jefferson | 8VPPS2L39 |

| Totals    |   |
|-----------|---|
| Jefferson | 3 |
| Adams     | 2 |

## A Verifiable Election

| Voter Name    | Vote      |           |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| Alice Smith   | Jefferson | X37BM6YPM |
| Bob Williams  | Adams     | 2J8CNF2KQ |
| Carol James   | Adams     | VRSF5JQWZ |
| David Fuentes | Jefferson | MW5B2VA7Y |
| Ellen Chu     | Jefferson | 8VPPS2L39 |

| Totals    |   |
|-----------|---|
| Jefferson | 3 |
| Adams     | 2 |

## A Verifiable Election

|               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
|               | X37BM6YPM |
|               | 2J8CNF2KQ |
|               | VRSF5JQWZ |
|               | MW5B2VA7Y |
|               | 8VPPS2L39 |
| <b>Totals</b> |           |
| Jefferson     | 3         |
| Adams         | 2         |

## A Verifiable Election

|               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
|               | X37BM6YPM |
|               | 2J8CNF2KQ |
|               | VRSF5JQWZ |
|               | MW5B2VA7Y |
|               | 8VPPS2L39 |
| <b>Totals</b> |           |
| Jefferson     | 3         |
| Adams         | 2         |

Mathematical Proof

## The Voter's Perspective

Systems that produce verifiable elections can be built to look exactly like current systems ...

- paper-based
- fully-electronic
- in-person
- remote

... with one addition ...

## A Verifiable Receipt



## The Voter's Perspective

Voters can ...

- Use receipts to check their results are properly recorded on a public web site.
- Throw their receipts in the trash.
- Write and use their own election verifiers
- Download applications from sources of their choice to verify the mathematical proof of the tally.
- Believe verifications done by their political parties, LWV, ACLU, etc.
- Accept the results without question.

Some systems producing verifiable elections ...

### Prêt à Voter Ballot

|       |          |
|-------|----------|
| Bob   |          |
| Eve   |          |
| Carol |          |
| Alice |          |
| David |          |
|       | 17320508 |

### Prêt à Voter Ballot

|       |          |
|-------|----------|
| Bob   |          |
| Eve   |          |
| Carol |          |
| Alice | X        |
| David |          |
|       | 17320508 |

### Prêt à Voter Ballot

|          |
|----------|
|          |
|          |
| X        |
|          |
| 17320508 |

### Scantegrity

### VeriScan

**OFFICIAL BALLOT**  
CONSOLIDATED GENERAL ELECTION  
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA  
NOVEMBER 6, 2012

### Helios

Helios Voting Booth

**Help Select a Book Title**

I'd be grateful for your help selecting a title for my new book. Here's 18 minutes touching the general theme: <http://blip.tv/file/4322877>

(1) Select (2) Encrypt (3) Submit

Please select the title you find most compelling:

- The Republic, Lost: The Corruption that is our Congress and the Campaign to End It
- Striving at the Root: The Corruption that is our Congress and the Campaign to End It
- In Plain Sight: The Corruption that is Our Democracy and the Campaign to End It
- The Tyranny of Tiny Minds: How Ideals Get Crushed by Souls Without Ideals

Proceed



## Helios

Helios Voting Booth

**Help Select a Book Title**

I'd be grateful for your help selecting a title for my new book. Here's 18 minutes touching the general theme: <http://bit.ly/184322877>

(1) Select (2) Encrypt (3) Submit

Your ballot was successfully encrypted

Please <http://url> of your smart ballot tracker [url]

`Eq1.dab42G-tj3hwf0bbk+6F/E3Ln/Rw+owj680yba1a5o`

To protect your privacy:

- Helios has not yet asked for your identity
- Once you click "Proceed", Helios will remember only your encrypted vote
- Thus, only you know your vote

Proceed to Cast

Electron Fingerprint: `10a487817a1981110a4e4e4a000442000401e1e3040a`

## STAR-Vote

- Voters use electronic ballot marking devices to indicate their preferences.
- When a voter's selections are completed, the device provides the voter with a paper ballot summary and an encrypted receipt. It also records the encrypted ballot.
- The voter can review the paper ballot summary, and optionally deposit it in a ballot box.
- All encrypted ballots are posted, but the only votes counted are those for which a corresponding paper ballot has been deposited. The remaining ballots are decrypted.

## Benefits of E2E-Verifiability

- Strong public assurance of election integrity
- Elimination of trust requirements
- Certification relief

# Questions???

March 5, 2013