In this lab you will implement the basic kernel facilities required to get a protected user-mode environment (i.e., “process”) running. You will enhance the JOS kernel to set up the data structures to keep track of user environments, create a single user environment, load a program image into it, and start it running. You will also make the JOS kernel capable of handling any system calls the user environment makes and handling any other exceptions it causes.
Note: In this lab, the terms environment and process are interchangeable - both refer to an abstraction that allows you to run a program. We introduce the term “environment” instead of the traditional term “process” in order to stress the point that JOS environments and Unix processes provide different interfaces, and do not provide the same semantics.
Use Git to commit your changes after your Lab 2 submission (if any), fetch the latest version of the course repository, and then create a local branch called lab3 based on our lab3 branch, origin/lab3:
Lab 3 contains a number of new source files, which you should browse:
inc/
env.h
: public definitions for user-mode environmentstrap.h
: public definitions for trap handlingsyscall.h
: public definitions for system calls from user environments to the kernellib.h
: public definitions for the user-mode support librarykern/
env.h
: kernel-private definitions for user-mode environmentsenv.c
: kernel code implementing user-mode environmentstrap.h
: kernel-private trap handling definitionstrap.c
: trap handling codetrapentry.S
: assembly-language trap handler entry-pointssyscall.h
: kernel-private definitions for system call handlingsyscall.c
: system call implementation codelib/
Makefrag
: makefile fragment to build user-mode library, obj/lib/libuser.a
entry.S
: assembly-language entry-point for user environmentslibmain.c
: user-mode library setup code called from entry.S
syscall.c
: user-mode system call stub functionsconsole.c
: user-mode implementations of putchar
and getchar
, providing console I/Oexit.c
: user-mode implementation of exit
panic.c
: user-mode implementation of panic
user/*
: Various test programs to check kernel lab 3 codeIn addition, a number of the source files we handed out for lab2 are modified in lab3. To see the differences, you can type:
You may also want to take another look at the tools page, as it includes information on debugging user code that becomes relevant in this lab.
This lab is divided into two parts, A and B. Part A is due a week after this lab was assigned; you should commit your changes and make handin your lab before the Part A deadline, even though your code may not yet pass all of the grade script tests. (If it does, great!) You only need to have all the grade script tests passing by the Part B deadline at the end of the second week.
As in lab 2, you will need to do all of the regular exercises
described in the lab. Write up brief answers to the questions posed
in the lab in a file called answers-lab3.txt
in the top level of
your lab
directory. Do not forget to include the answer file in
your submission with git add answers-lab3.txt.
In this lab you may find GCC’s inline assembly language feature
useful, although it is also possible to complete the lab without
using it. At the very least, you will need to be able to understand
the fragments of inline assembly language (asm
statements) that
already exist in the source code we gave you. You can find several
sources of information on GCC inline assembly language on the class
readings page.
The new include file inc/env.h
contains basic definitions for user
environments in JOS. Read it now. The kernel uses the Env
data
structure to keep track of each user environment. In this lab you
will initially create just one environment, but you will need to
design the JOS kernel to support multiple environments; lab 4 will
take advantage of this feature by allowing a user environment to
fork other environments.
As you can see in kern/env.c
, the kernel maintains three main global
variables pertaining to environments:
Once JOS gets up and running, the envs
pointer points to an array
of Env
structures representing all the environments in the system.
In our design, the JOS kernel will support a maximum of NENV
simultaneously active environments, although there will typically
be far fewer running environments at any given time (NENV
is a
constant defined in inc/env.h
). Once it is allocated, the envs
array will contain a single instance of the Env
data structure for
each of the NENV
possible environments.
The JOS kernel keeps all of the inactive Env
structures on the
env_free_list
. This design allows easy allocation and deallocation
of environments, as they merely have to be added to or removed from
the free list.
The kernel uses the curenv
symbol to keep track of the currently
executing environment at any given time. During boot up, before the
first environment is run, curenv
is initially set to NULL
.
The Env
structure is defined in inc/env.h
as follows (although
more fields will be added in future labs):
Here’s what the Env
fields are for:
env_tf
:
This structure (defined in inc/trap.h
) holds the saved register
values for the environment while that environment is not running
(i.e., when the kernel or a different environment is running). The
kernel saves these when switching from user to kernel mode, so that
the environment can later be resumed where it left off.env_link
:
This is a link to the next Env
on the env_free_list
; env_free_list
points to the first free environment on the list.env_id
:
The kernel stores here a value that uniquely identifiers the
environment currently using this Env
structure (i.e., using this
particular slot in the envs
array). After a user environment
terminates, the kernel may re-allocate the same Env
structure to a
different environment - but the new environment will have a different
env_id
from the old one even though the new environment is re-using
the same slot in the envs
array.env_parent_id
:
The kernel stores here the env_id
of the environment that created
this environment. In this way the environments can form a “family
tree,” which will be useful for making security decisions about
which environments are allowed to do what to whom.env_type
:
This is used to distinguish special environments. For most environments,
it will be ENV_TYPE_USER
. We’ll introduce a few more types for
special system service environments in later labs.env_status
: This variable holds one of the following values:
ENV_FREE
:
Indicates that the Env
structure is inactive, and therefore
on the env_free_list
.ENV_RUNNABLE
:
Indicates that the Env
structure represents an environment
that is waiting to run on the processor.ENV_RUNNING
:
Indicates that the Env
structure represents the currently
running environment.ENV_NOT_RUNNABLE
:
Indicates that the Env
structure represents a currently active
environment, but it is not currently ready to run: for example,
because it is waiting for an interprocess communication (IPC)
from another environment.ENV_DYING
:
Indicates that the Env
structure represents a zombie environment.
A zombie environment will be freed the next time it traps to
the kernel. We will not use this flag until Lab 4.env_pgdir
:
This variable holds the kernel virtual address of this environment’s
page directory.Like a Unix process, a JOS environment couples the concepts of
“thread” and “address space.” The thread is defined primarily by
the saved registers (the env_tf
field), and the address space is
defined by the page directory and page tables pointed to by env_pgdir
.
To run an environment, the kernel must set up the CPU with both the
saved registers and the appropriate address space.
Our struct Env
holds the environment’s (i.e., process’s) user-mode
register state in a Trapframe
structure. In JOS, individual
environments do not have their own kernel stacks. There can be only
one JOS environment active in the kernel at a time, so JOS needs
only a single kernel stack.
In lab 2, you allocated memory in mem_init()
for the pages[]
array,
which is a table the kernel uses to keep track of which pages are
free and which are not. You will now need to modify mem_init()
further to allocate a similar array of Env
structures, called envs
.
Modify mem_init()
in kern/pmap.c
to allocate and map the envs
array.
This array consists of exactly NENV
instances of the Env
structure
allocated much like how you allocated the pages array. Also like
the pages
array, the memory backing envs
should also be mapped user
read-only at UENVS
(defined in inc/memlayout.h
) so user processes
can read from this array.
You should run your code and make sure check_kern_pgdir()
succeeds.
You will now write the code in kern/env.c
necessary to run a user
environment. Because we do not yet have a filesystem, we will set
up the kernel to load a static binary image that is embedded within
the kernel itself. JOS embeds this binary in the kernel as a ELF
executable image.
The Lab 3 GNUmakefile
generates a number of binary images in the
obj/user/
directory. If you look at kern/Makefrag
, you will notice
some magic that “links” these binaries directly into the kernel
executable as if they were .o
files. The -b binary
option on the
linker command line causes these files to be linked in as “raw”
uninterpreted binary files rather than as regular .o
files produced
by the compiler. (As far as the linker is concerned, these files
do not have to be ELF images at all - they could be anything, such
as text files or pictures!) If you look at obj/kern/kernel.sym
after
building the kernel, you will notice that the linker has “magically”
produced a number of funny symbols with obscure names like
_binary_obj_user_hello_start
, _binary_obj_user_hello_end
, and
_binary_obj_user_hello_size
. The linker generates these symbol names
by mangling the file names of the binary files; the symbols provide
the regular kernel code with a way to reference the embedded binary
files.
In i386_init()
in kern/init.c
you’ll see code to run one of these
binary images in an environment. However, the critical functions
to set up user environments are not complete; you will need to fill
them in.
In the file kern/env.c
, finish coding the following functions:
env_init()
:
initialize all of the Env
structures in the envs
array and add them
to the env_free_list
. It also calls env_init_percpu
, which configures
the segmentation hardware with separate segments for privilege level
0 (kernel) and privilege level 3 (user).env_setup_vm()
:
allocate a page directory for a new environment and initialize
the kernel portion of the new environment’s address space.region_alloc()
:
allocates and maps physical memory for an environmentload_icode()
:
you will need to parse an ELF binary image, much like the boot
loader already does, and load its contents into the user address
space of a new environment.env_create()
:
allocate an environment with env_alloc
and call load_icode
load
an ELF binary into it.env_run()
:
start a given environment running in user mode.As you write these functions, you might find the new cprintf
verb
%e
useful—it prints a description corresponding to an error code.
For example,
will panic with the message “env_alloc: out of memory
”.
Below is a call graph of the code up to the point where the user code is invoked. Make sure you understand the purpose of each step.
start
(kern/entry.S
)i386_init
(kern/init.c
)
cons_init
mem_init
env_init
trap_init
(still incomplete at this point)env_create
env_run
env_pop_tf
Once you are done you should compile your kernel and run it under
QEMU. If all goes well, your system should enter user space and
execute the hello
binary until it makes a system call with the int
instruction. At that point there will be trouble, since JOS has not
set up the hardware to allow any kind of transition from user space
into the kernel. When the CPU discovers that it is not set up to
handle this system call interrupt, it will generate a general
protection exception, find that it can’t handle that, generate a
double fault exception, find that it can’t handle that either, and
finally give up with what’s known as a “triple fault.” Usually, you
would then see the CPU reset and the system reboot. While this is
important for legacy applications (see
this blog post
for an explanation of why), it’s a pain for kernel development, so
with our patched QEMU you’ll instead see a register dump and a
“Triple fault.
” message.
We’ll address this problem shortly, but for now we can use the
debugger to check that we’re entering user mode. Use
make qemu-gdb
and set a GDB breakpoint at env_pop_tf
, which should be the last
function you hit before actually entering user mode. Single step
through this function using si; the processor should enter user
mode after the iret
instruction. You should then see the first
instruction in the user environment’s executable, which is the cmpl
instruction at the label start in lib/entry.S
. Now use b *0x...
to set a breakpoint at the int $0x30
in sys_cputs()
in hello
(see
obj/user/hello.asm
for the user-space address). This int
is the
system call to display a character to the console. If you cannot
execute as far as the int
, then something is wrong with your address
space setup or program loading code; go back and fix it before
continuing.
At this point, the first int $0x30
system call instruction in
user space is a dead end: once the processor gets into user mode,
there is no way to get back out. You will now need to implement
basic exception and system call handling, so that it is possible
for the kernel to recover control of the processor from user-mode
code. The first thing you should do is thoroughly familiarize
yourself with the x86 interrupt and exception mechanism.
Read Chapter 9, Exceptions and Interrupts in the 80386 Programmer’s Manual (or Chapter 6, “Interrupt and Exception Handling” in the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manuals), if you haven’t already.
In this lab we generally follow Intel’s terminology for interrupts, exceptions, and the like. However, terms such as exception, trap, interrupt, fault, and abort have no standard meaning across architectures or operating systems, and are often used without regard to the subtle distinctions between them on a particular architecture such as the x86. When you see these terms outside of this lab, the meanings might be slightly different.
Exceptions and interrupts are both “protected control transfers,” which cause the processor to switch from user to kernel mode (CPL=0) without giving the user-mode code any opportunity to interfere with the functioning of the kernel or other environments. In Intel’s terminology, an interrupt is a protected control transfer that is caused by an asynchronous event usually external to the processor, such as notification of external device I/O activity. An exception, in contrast, is a protected control transfer caused synchronously by the currently running code, for example due to a divide by zero or an invalid memory access.
In order to ensure that these protected control transfers are actually protected, the processor’s interrupt/exception mechanism is designed so that the code currently running when the interrupt or exception occurs does not get to choose arbitrarily where the kernel is entered or how. Instead, the processor ensures that the kernel can be entered only under carefully controlled conditions. On the x86, two mechanisms work together to provide this protection:
The Interrupt Descriptor Table. The processor ensures that interrupts and exceptions can only cause the kernel to be entered at a few specific, well-defined entry-points determined by the kernel itself, and not by the code running when the interrupt or exception is taken.
The x86 allows up to 256 different interrupt or exception entry points into the kernel, each with a different interrupt vector. A vector is a number between 0 and 255. An interrupt’s vector is determined by the source of the interrupt: different devices, error conditions, and application requests to the kernel generate interrupts with different vectors. The CPU uses the vector as an index into the processor’s interrupt descriptor table (IDT), which the kernel sets up in kernel-private memory, much like the GDT. From the appropriate entry in this table the processor loads:
the value to load into the instruction pointer (EIP
) register,
pointing to the kernel code designated to handle that type of
exception.
the value to load into the code segment (CS
) register, which
includes in bits 0-1 the privilege level at which the exception
handler is to run. (In JOS, all exceptions are handled in kernel
mode, privilege level 0.)
The Task State Segment.
The processor needs a place to save the old processor state before
the interrupt or exception occurred, such as the original values
of EIP
and CS
before the processor invoked the exception handler,
so that the exception handler can later restore that old state
and resume the interrupted code from where it left off. But this
save area for the old processor state must in turn be protected
from unprivileged user-mode code; otherwise buggy or malicious
user code could compromise the kernel.
For this reason, when an x86 processor takes an interrupt or trap
that causes a privilege level change from user to kernel mode,
it also switches to a stack in the kernel’s memory. A structure
called the task state segment (TSS) specifies the segment selector
and address where this stack lives. The processor pushes (on this
new stack) SS
, ESP
, EFLAGS
, CS
, EIP
, and an optional error code.
Then it loads the CS
and EIP
from the interrupt descriptor, and
sets the ESP
and SS
to refer to the new stack.
Although the TSS is large and can potentially serve a variety of
purposes, JOS only uses it to define the kernel stack that the
processor should switch to when it transfers from user to kernel
mode. Since “kernel mode” in JOS is privilege level 0 on the x86,
the processor uses the ESP0
and SS0
fields of the TSS to define
the kernel stack when entering kernel mode. JOS doesn’t use any
other TSS fields.
All of the synchronous exceptions that the x86 processor can generate
internally use interrupt vectors between 0 and 31, and therefore
map to IDT entries 0–31. For example, a page fault always causes
an exception through vector 14. Interrupt vectors greater than 31
are only used by software interrupts, which can be generated by the
int
instruction, or asynchronous hardware interrupts, caused by
external devices when they need attention.
In this part we will extend JOS to handle the internally generated x86 exceptions in vectors 0–31. In the next part we will make JOS handle software interrupt vector 48 (0x30), which JOS (fairly arbitrarily) uses as its system call interrupt vector. In Lab 4 we will extend JOS to handle externally generated hardware interrupts such as the clock interrupt.
Let’s put these pieces together and trace through an example. Let’s say the processor is executing code in a user environment and encounters a divide instruction that attempts to divide by zero.
The processor switches to the stack defined by the SS0
and ESP0
fields of the TSS
, which in JOS will hold the values GD_KD
and
KSTACKTOP
, respectively.
The processor pushes the exception parameters on the kernel
stack, starting at address KSTACKTOP
:
+--------------------+ KSTACKTOP
| 0x00000 | old SS | " - 4
| old ESP | " - 8
| old EFLAGS | " - 12
| 0x00000 | old CS | " - 16
| old EIP | " - 20 <---- ESP
+--------------------+
Because we’re handling a divide error, which is interrupt vector
0 on the x86, the processor reads IDT entry 0 and sets CS:EIP
to
point to the handler function described by the entry.
The handler function takes control and handles the exception, for example by terminating the user environment.
For certain types of x86 exceptions, in addition to the “standard” five words above, the processor pushes onto the stack another word containing an error code. The page fault exception, number 14, is an important example. See the 80386 manual to determine for which exception numbers the processor pushes an error code, and what the error code means in that case. When the processor pushes an error code, the stack would look as follows at the beginning of the exception handler when coming in from user mode:
+--------------------+ KSTACKTOP
| 0x00000 | old SS | " - 4
| old ESP | " - 8
| old EFLAGS | " - 12
| 0x00000 | old CS | " - 16
| old EIP | " - 20
| error code | " - 24 <---- ESP
+--------------------+
The processor can take exceptions and interrupts both from kernel and user mode. It is only when entering the kernel from user mode, however, that the x86 processor automatically switches stacks before pushing its old register state onto the stack and invoking the appropriate exception handler through the IDT. If the processor is already in kernel mode when the interrupt or exception occurs (the low 2 bits of the CS register are already zero), then the CPU just pushes more values on the same kernel stack. In this way, the kernel can gracefully handle nested exceptions caused by code within the kernel itself. This capability is an important tool in implementing protection, as we will see later in the section on system calls.
If the processor is already in kernel mode and takes a nested
exception, since it does not need to switch stacks, it does not
save the old SS
or ESP
registers. For exception types that do not
push an error code, the kernel stack therefore looks like the
following on entry to the exception handler:
+--------------------+ <---- old ESP
| old EFLAGS | " - 4
| 0x00000 | old CS | " - 8
| old EIP | " - 12
+--------------------+
For exception types that push an error code, the processor pushes
the error code immediately after the old EIP
, as before.
There is one important caveat to the processor’s nested exception capability. If the processor takes an exception while already in kernel mode, and cannot push its old state onto the kernel stack for any reason such as lack of stack space, then there is nothing the processor can do to recover, so it simply resets itself. Needless to say, the kernel should be designed so that this can’t happen.
You should now have the basic information you need in order to set up the IDT and handle exceptions in JOS. For now, you will set up the IDT to handle interrupt vectors 0–31 (the processor exceptions). We’ll handle system call interrupts later in this lab and add interrupts 32–47 (the device IRQs) in a later lab.
The header files inc/trap.h
and kern/trap.h
contain important
definitions related to interrupts and exceptions that you will need
to become familiar with. The file kern/trap.h
contains definitions
that are strictly private to the kernel, while inc/trap.h
contains
definitions that may also be useful to user-level programs and
libraries.
Some of the exceptions in the range 0–31 are defined by Intel to be reserved. Since they will never be generated by the processor, it doesn’t really matter how you handle them. Do whatever you think is cleanest.
The overall flow of control that you should achieve is depicted below:
IDT trapentry.S trap.c
+----------------+
| &handler1 |---------> handler1: trap (struct Trapframe *tf)
| | // do stuff {
| | call trap // handle the exception/interrupt
| | // ... }
+----------------+
| &handler2 |--------> handler2:
| | // do stuff
| | call trap
| | // ...
+----------------+
.
.
.
+----------------+
| &handlerX |--------> handlerX:
| | // do stuff
| | call trap
| | // ...
+----------------+
Each exception or interrupt should have its own handler in trapentry.S
and trap_init()
should initialize the IDT with the addresses of
these handlers. Each of the handlers should build a struct Trapframe
(see inc/trap.h
) on the stack and call trap()
(in trap.c
) with a
pointer to the Trapframe
; trap()
then handles the exception/interrupt
or dispatches to a specific handler function.
Edit kern/trapentry.S
and kern/trap.c
and implement the features
described above. The macros TRAPHANDLER
and TRAPHANDLER_NOEC
in
trapentry.S
should help you, as well as the T_*
defines in inc/trap.h
.
You will need to add an entry point in trapentry.S
(using those
macros) for each trap defined in inc/trap.h
, and you’ll have to
provide _alltraps
which the TRAPHANDLER
macros refer to. You will
also need to modify trap_init()
to initialize the idt
to point to
each of these entry points defined in trapentry.S
; the SETGATE
macro
will be helpful here.
Your _alltraps
should:
struct Trapframe
GD_KD
into %ds
and %es
pushl %esp
to pass a pointer to the Trapframe
as an argument to trap()
call trap
(can trap
ever return?)Consider using the pushal
instruction; it fits nicely with the
layout of the struct Trapframe
.
Test your trap handling code using some of the test programs in the
user
directory that cause exceptions before making any system calls,
such as user/divzero
. You should be able to get make grade to succeed
on the divzero
, softint
, and badsegment
tests at this point.
You probably have a lot of very similar code right now, between the
lists of TRAPHANDLER
in trapentry.S
and their installations in
trap.c
. Clean this up. Change the macros in trapentry.S
to automatically
generate a table for trap.c
to use. Note that you can switch between
laying down code and data in the assembler by using the directives
.text
and .data
.
What is the purpose of having an individual handler function for each exception/interrupt? (i.e., if all exceptions/interrupts were delivered to the same handler, what feature that exists in the current implementation could not be provided?)
Did you have to do anything to make the user/softint
program behave
correctly? The grade script expects it to produce a general protection
fault (trap 13), but softint
’s code says int $14
. Why should this
produce interrupt vector 13? What happens if the kernel actually
allows softint
’s int $14
instruction to invoke the kernel’s page
fault handler (which is interrupt vector 14)?
This concludes part A of the lab.
Don’t forget to add answers-lab3.txt
, commit your changes,
run make handin, and submit the tarball
before the part A deadline.
Now that your kernel has basic exception handling capabilities, you will refine it to provide important operating system primitives that depend on exception handling.
The page fault exception, interrupt vector 14 (T_PGFLT
), is a
particularly important one that we will exercise heavily throughout
this lab and the next. When the processor takes a page fault, it
stores the linear (i.e., virtual) address that caused the fault in
a special processor control register, CR2
. In trap.c
we have provided
the beginnings of a special function, page_fault_handler()
, to
handle page fault exceptions.
Modify trap_dispatch()
to dispatch page fault exceptions to
page_fault_handler()
. You should now be able to get make grade to
succeed on the faultread
, faultreadkernel
, faultwrite
, and
faultwritekernel
tests. If any of them don’t work, figure out why
and fix them. Remember that you can boot JOS into a particular user
program using make run-x or
make run-x-nox.
You will further refine the kernel’s page fault handling below, as you implement system calls.
The breakpoint exception, interrupt vector 3 (T_BRKPT
), is normally
used to allow debuggers to insert breakpoints in a program’s code
by temporarily replacing the relevant program instruction with the
special 1-byte int3
software interrupt instruction. In JOS we will
abuse this exception slightly by turning it into a primitive
pseudo-system call that any user environment can use to invoke the
JOS kernel monitor. This usage is actually somewhat appropriate if
we think of the JOS kernel monitor as a primitive debugger. The
user-mode implementation of panic()
in lib/panic.c
, for example,
performs an int3
after displaying its panic message.
Modify trap_dispatch()
to make breakpoint exceptions invoke the
kernel monitor. You should now be able to get make grade
to succeed on the breakpoint
test.
Modify the JOS kernel monitor so that you can ‘continue’ execution
from the current location (e.g., after the int3
, if the kernel
monitor was invoked via the breakpoint exception), and so that you
can single-step one instruction at a time. You will need to understand
certain bits of the EFLAGS
register in order to implement
single-stepping.
If you’re feeling really adventurous, find some x86 disassembler source code (e.g., by ripping it out of QEMU, or out of GNU binutils, or just write it yourself) and extend the JOS kernel monitor to be able to disassemble and display instructions as you are stepping through them. Combined with the symbol table loading from lab 2, this is the stuff of which real kernel debuggers are made.
The breakpoint
test case will either generate a break point exception
or a general protection fault depending on how you initialized the
break point entry in the IDT (i.e., your call to SETGATE
from
trap_init
). Why? How do you need to set it up in order to get the
breakpoint exception to work as specified above and what incorrect
setup would cause it to trigger a general protection fault?
What do you think is the point of these mechanisms, particularly
in light of what the user/softint
test program does?
User processes ask the kernel to do things for them by invoking system calls. When the user process invokes a system call, the processor enters kernel mode, the processor and the kernel cooperate to save the user process’s state, the kernel executes appropriate code in order to carry out the system call, and then resumes the user process. The exact details of how the user process gets the kernel’s attention and how it specifies which call it wants to execute vary from system to system.
In the JOS kernel, we will use the int
instruction, which causes a
processor interrupt. In particular, we will use int $0x30
as the
system call interrupt. We have defined the constant T_SYSCALL
to
48 (0x30) for you. You will have to set up the interrupt descriptor
to allow user processes to cause that interrupt. Note that interrupt
0x30 cannot be generated by hardware, so there is no ambiguity
caused by allowing user code to generate it.
The application will pass the system call number and the system
call arguments in registers. This way, the kernel won’t need to
grub around in the user environment’s stack or instruction stream.
The system call number will go in %eax
, and the arguments (up to
five of them) will go in %edx
, %ecx
, %ebx
, %edi
, and %esi
, respectively.
The kernel passes the return value back in %eax
. The assembly code
to invoke a system call has been written for you, in syscall()
in
lib/syscall.c
. You should read through it and make sure you understand
what is going on.
Add a handler in the kernel for interrupt vector T_SYSCALL
. You
will have to edit kern/trapentry.S
and kern/trap.c
’s trap_init()
.
You also need to change trap_dispatch()
to handle the system call
interrupt by calling syscall()
(defined in kern/syscall.c
) with the
appropriate arguments, and then arranging for the return value to
be passed back to the user process in %eax
. Finally, you need to
implement syscall()
in kern/syscall.c
. Make sure syscall()
returns
-E_INVAL
if the system call number is invalid. You should read and
understand lib/syscall.c
(especially the inline assembly routine)
in order to confirm your understanding of the system call interface.
Handle all the systems calls listed in inc/syscall.h
by invoking
the corresponding kernel function for each call.
Run the user/hello
program under your kernel (make run-hello).
It should print “hello, world
” on the console
and then cause a page fault in user mode. If this does not happen,
it probably means your system call handler isn’t quite right. You
should also now be able to get make grade to succeed on
the testbss
test.
Implement system calls using the sysenter
/sysexit
instructions
instead of using int 0x30
/iret
.
The sysenter
/sysexit
instructions were designed by Intel to be
faster than int
/iret
. They do this by using registers instead of
the stack and by making assumptions about how the segmentation
registers are used. The exact details of these instructions can be
found in Volume 2B of the Intel reference manuals.
The easiest way to add support for these instructions in JOS is to
add a sysenter_handler
in kern/trapentry.S
that saves enough
information about the user environment to return to it, sets up the
kernel environment, pushes the arguments to syscall()
and calls
syscall()
directly. Once syscall()
returns, set everything up for
and execute the sysexit
instruction. You will also need to add code
to kern/init.c
to set up the necessary model specific registers
(MSRs). Section 6.1.2 in Volume 2 of the AMD Architecture Programmer’s
Manual and the reference on SYSENTER
in Volume 2B of the Intel
reference manuals give good descriptions of the relevant MSRs. You
can find an implementation of wrmsr
to add to inc/x86.h
for writing
to these MSRs here.
Finally, lib/syscall.c
must be changed to support making a system
call with sysenter
. Here is a possible register layout for the
sysenter
instruction:
eax
: syscall numberedx
, ecx
, ebx
, edi
: arg 1, 2, 3, 4esi
: return pc
ebp
: return esp
esp
: trashed by sysenter
GCC’s inline assembler will automatically save registers that you
tell it to load values directly into. Don’t forget to either save
(push) and restore (pop) other registers that you clobber, or tell
the inline assembler that you’re clobbering them. The inline assembler
doesn’t support saving %ebp
, so you will need to add code to save
and restore it yourself. The return address can be put into %esi
by using an instruction like leal after_sysenter_label, %%esi
.
Note that this only supports 4 arguments, so you will need to leave the old method of doing system calls around to support 5 argument system calls. Furthermore, because this fast path doesn’t update the current environment’s trap frame, it won’t be suitable for some of the system calls we add in later labs.
You may have to revisit your code once we enable asynchronous
interrupts in the next lab. Specifically, you’ll need to enable
interrupts when returning to the user process, which sysexit
doesn’t do for you.
A user program starts running at the top of lib/entry.S
. After some
setup, this code calls libmain()
, in lib/libmain.c
. You should
modify libmain()
to initialize the global pointer thisenv
to point
at this environment’s struct Env
in the envs[]
array. (Note that
lib/entry.S
has already defined envs
to point at the UENVS
mapping
you set up in Part A.) Hint: look in inc/env.h
and use sys_getenvid
.
libmain()
then calls umain
, which, in the case of the hello
program,
is in user/hello.c
. Note that after printing “hello, world
”, it
tries to access thisenv->env_id
. This is why it faulted earlier.
Now that you’ve initialized thisenv
properly, it should not fault.
If it still faults, you probably haven’t mapped the UENVS
area
user-readable (back in Part A in pmap.c
; this is the first time
we’ve actually used the UENVS
area).
Add the required code to the user library, then boot your kernel.
You should see user/hello
print “hello, world
” and then print
“i am environment 00001000
”. user/hello
then attempts to “exit” by
calling sys_env_destroy()
(see lib/libmain.c
and lib/exit.c
). Since
the kernel currently only supports one user environment, it should
report that it has destroyed the only environment and then drop
into the kernel monitor. You should be able to get make grade to
succeed on the hello
test.
Memory protection is a crucial feature of an operating system, ensuring that bugs in one program cannot corrupt other programs or corrupt the operating system itself.
Operating systems usually rely on hardware support to implement memory protection. The OS keeps the hardware informed about which virtual addresses are valid and which are not. When a program tries to access an invalid address or one for which it has no permissions, the processor stops the program at the instruction causing the fault and then traps into the kernel with information about the attempted operation. If the fault is fixable, the kernel can fix it and let the program continue running. If the fault is not fixable, then the program cannot continue, since it will never get past the instruction causing the fault.
As an example of a fixable fault, consider an automatically extended stack. In many systems the kernel initially allocates a single stack page, and then if a program faults accessing pages further down the stack, the kernel will allocate those pages automatically and let the program continue. By doing this, the kernel only allocates as much stack memory as the program needs, but the program can work under the illusion that it has an arbitrarily large stack.
System calls present an interesting problem for memory protection. Most system call interfaces let user programs pass pointers to the kernel. These pointers point at user buffers to be read or written. The kernel then dereferences these pointers while carrying out the system call. There are two problems with this:
A page fault in the kernel is potentially a lot more serious than a page fault in a user program. If the kernel page-faults while manipulating its own data structures, that’s a kernel bug, and the fault handler should panic the kernel (and hence the whole system). But when the kernel is dereferencing pointers given to it by the user program, it needs a way to remember that any page faults these dereferences cause are actually on behalf of the user program.
The kernel typically has more memory permissions than the user program. The user program might pass a pointer to a system call that points to memory that the kernel can read or write but that the program cannot. The kernel must be careful not to be tricked into dereferencing such a pointer, since that might reveal private information or destroy the integrity of the kernel.
For both of these reasons the kernel must be extremely careful when handling pointers presented by user programs.
You will now solve these two problems with a single mechanism that scrutinizes all pointers passed from userspace into the kernel. When a program passes the kernel a pointer, the kernel will check that the address is in the user part of the address space, and that the page table would allow the memory operation.
Thus, the kernel will never suffer a page fault due to dereferencing a user-supplied pointer. If the kernel does page fault, it should panic and terminate.
Change kern/trap.c
to panic if a page fault happens in kernel mode.
Hint: to determine whether a fault happened in user mode or in
kernel mode, check the low bits of the tf_cs
.
Read user_mem_assert
in kern/pmap.c
and implement user_mem_check
in that same file.
Change kern/syscall.c
to sanity check arguments to system calls.
Boot your kernel, running user/buggyhello
. The environment should
be destroyed, and the kernel should not panic. You should see:
[00001000] user_mem_check assertion failure for va 00000001
[00001000] free env 00001000
Destroyed the only environment - nothing more to do!
Finally, change debuginfo_eip
in kern/kdebug.c
to call user_mem_check
on usd
, stabs
, and stabstr
. If you now run user/breakpoint
, you
should be able to run backtrace from the kernel monitor and see the
backtrace traverse into lib/libmain.c
before the kernel panics with
a page fault.
What causes this page fault? You don’t need to fix it, but consider how you might and explain why it happens.
Note that the same mechanism you just implemented also works for
malicious user applications (such as user/evilhello
).
Boot your kernel, running user/evilhello
. The environment should
be destroyed, and the kernel should not panic. You should see:
[00000000] new env 00001000
[00001000] user_mem_check assertion failure for va f010000c
[00001000] free env 00001000
This completes the lab.
Make sure you pass all of the make grade tests.
In answers-lab3.txt
,
write up your answers to the questions,
how much time you spend on this lab, and
the names of your team members if you work in pairs.
Before handing in, use git status and git diff
to examine your changes .
Commit your changes, type make handin,
and upload the tarball through the course dropbox.