## CSE 444

Lecture 28: Provenance

## Announcements

- Quiz section on Thursday: canceled
- Lecture on Friday: canceled
- Lab 4 / Lab 6: due on Friday night
- Final writeup: on on Saturday night
- UW Course Evaluations:
   Online <u>https://uw.iasystem.org/survey/130405</u>
   Until June 12, 2014

### Data Provenance

# Data Provenance

- Provenance inside the DBMS

   Will discuss today
- Provenance outside of the DBMS
  - In workflows: keep track of which dataset was produced by what program, which version, on what date, and using what input data
  - Much more messy; there is a standard, OPM (Open Provenance Model)

# **Provenance Annotations**


- Some query produces an output table T(A,B,C)
- We store it over some period of time
- Later we ask: "where did this tuple come from?"
- The "provenance annotation" answers this.

| Α  | В  | С  |
|----|----|----|
| a1 | b1 | c1 |
| a2 | b1 | c1 |
| a2 | b2 | c2 |
| a2 | b2 | c3 |


provenance1 provenance2 provenance3 provenance4

# **Provenance Annotations**


- Start by annotating each tuple in the original database with a unique identifier; can be the Tuple Id (TID)
- Next, compute the provenance expression inductively, based on the query plan




# Join Operator



## **Projection Operator**




## **Union Operator**



| Α  | В  |       |
|----|----|-------|
| a1 | b1 | X1    |
| a2 | b2 | X2+Y1 |
| a3 | b3 | X3    |


## **Selection Operator**



| Α  | В  |    |
|----|----|----|
| a1 | b1 | X1 |
| a1 | b2 | X2 |


We could simply remove the tuples filtered out. But it's better to keep them around (we'll see why). What is their annotation?


## **Selection Operator**





| Α  | В  |        |
|----|----|--------|
| a1 | b1 | X1 · 1 |
| a1 | b2 | X2 · 1 |
| a2 | b1 | X3·0   |
| a2 | b2 | X4 · 0 |
| a2 | b3 | X5·0   |

We could simply remove the tuples filtered out. But it's better to keep them around (we'll see why). What is their annotation?










| Α | В | С |             |
|---|---|---|-------------|
| а | b | С | $X \cdot X$ |
| d | b | е | Y·Y         |
| d | g | е | Υ·Ζ         |
| f | b | е | Ζ·Υ         |
| f | g | е | Z·Z         |

 $\sigma_{C=e}(R) =$ 

R



| Α | В | С |                          |
|---|---|---|--------------------------|
| а | b | С | $0 = \mathbf{X} \cdot 0$ |
| d | b | е | $Y = Y \cdot 1$          |
| f | g | е | Z = Z · 1                |

# **Complex Example**

## $\sigma_{\mathsf{C=e}} \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\ \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R}) \cup \Pi_{\mathsf{AB}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R})) =$


R

| Α | В | С |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| а | b | С | Х |
| d | b | е | Y |
| f | g | е | Ζ |


| Α | С |   |
|---|---|---|
| а | С | $(X \cdot X + X \cdot X) \cdot 0 = 0 \cdot 2 \cdot \mathbf{X}^2 = 0$    |
| а | е | $X \cdot Y \cdot 1 = X \cdot Y$   |
| d | С | $Y \cdot X \cdot 0 = 0$   |
| d | е | $(Y \cdot Y + Y \cdot Z + Y \cdot Y) \cdot 1 = 2 \cdot Y^2 + Y \cdot Z$ |
| f | е | $(Z \cdot Z + Z \cdot Y + Z \cdot Z) \cdot 1 = 2 \cdot Z^2 + Y \cdot Z$ |

Discuss in class what these annotations mean

# Independence of Plan





## Independence of Plan




Do these two plans compute the same provenance expression for the output (a)?

V(x) := S(x)V(x) := T(x)q(x) := R(x), V(x)












## Identities on Provenance Expressions




## Identities on Provenance Expressions



Fact: if we compute annotations in a commutative semiring, then the final result is the same for all plans that are equivalent under set semantics




### $\sigma_{\mathsf{C=e}} \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\ \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R}) \cup \Pi_{\mathsf{AB}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R})) =$



$$\begin{array}{c|cc} A & C \\ \hline a & c \\ a & e \\ \hline d & e \\ f & e \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} X \cdot Y \\ 2 \cdot Y^2 + Y \cdot Z \\ 2 \cdot Z^2 + Y \cdot Z \end{array}$$

**Q**: Suppose we delete the tuple (d,b,e) from R. Which tuple(s) disappear from the result?


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**Q**: Suppose we delete the tuple (d,b,e) from R. Which tuple(s) disappear from the result?

**A**: Set **Y**=0


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$$\begin{array}{c|c} A & C \\ \hline a & c \\ 0 \\ \hline a & e \\ \hline d & e \\ f & e \\ 2 \cdot Y^2 + Y \cdot Z \\ \hline \end{array}$$


**Q**: Suppose each tuple in R occurs **3 times** (bag semantics). How many times occurs each tuple in the answer?

### $\sigma_{\mathsf{C=e}} \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\ \Pi_{\mathsf{AC}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R}) \cup \Pi_{\mathsf{AB}}(\mathsf{R}) \bowtie \Pi_{\mathsf{BC}}(\mathsf{R})) =$



**Q**: Suppose each tuple in R occurs **3 times** (bag semantics). How many times occurs each tuple in the answer?

# Application: A Simpler Provenance of Sets of Contributing Tuples $\sigma_{C=e} \prod_{AC} (\prod_{AC}(R) \bowtie \prod_{BC}(R) \cup \prod_{AB}(R) \bowtie \prod_{BC}(R)) =$



Trace only the set of input tuples that contributed to an output tuple

This is also a semi-ring! Which one?

CSE444 - Spring 2014

#### **Discretionary Access Control** [LaPadula]

- Public = P
- Confidential = C
- Secret = S
- Top Secret = T
- No Such Thing... = 0



| Α | В | С |     |
|---|---|---|-----|
| а | b | С | X=C |
| d | b | е | Y=P |
| f | g | е | Z=T |

| Α | С |                               |
|---|---|-------------------------------|
| а | С | $2 \cdot X^2 = ?$             |
| а | е | X·Y = ?                       |
| d | е | $2 \cdot Y^2 + Y \cdot Z = ?$ |
| f | е | $2 \cdot Z^2 + Y \cdot Z = ?$ |

#### Discretionary Access Control [LaPadula]

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- Confidential = C
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- Top Secret = T
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Alice has clearance S:

- Alice can read C data
- Alice cannot read T data
- Alice can write T data
- Alice cannot read C data




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Q: Join record A labeled C with record B labeled S. What is the label of (A,B)?

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Why??

Q: Join record A labeled C with record B labeled S. What is the label of (A,B)? A: S

Q: Eliminate duplicates {A, A, A,A} labeled T, C, C, S. What is the label of A?

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
Alice has clearance S:

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- Alice cannot read T data
- Alice can write T data
- Alice cannot read C data

Why??

Q: Join record A labeled C with record B labeled S. What is the label of (A,B)? A: S


Q: Eliminate duplicates {A, A, A,A} labeled T, C, C, S. What is the label of A? A: C



(A, min, max, 0, P), where A = P < C < S < T < 0

#### **Discretionary Access Control** [LaPadula]

- Public = P
- Confidential = C
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| Α | С |                               |
|---|---|-------------------------------|
| а | С | $2 \cdot X^2 = C$             |
| а | е | $X \cdot Y = C$               |
| d | е | $2 \cdot Y^2 + Y \cdot Z = C$ |
| f | е | $2 \cdot Z^2 + Y \cdot Z = T$ |

(A, min, max, 0, P), where A = P < C < S < T < 0

# Summary

- In many applications it is critical to record the provenance of the data
- Fine grained provenance:
  - Inside the database system
  - Clear semantics that aligns to relational queries
  - This is what we discussed today
- Coarse grained provenance:
  - Lossy, by necessity
  - Trade off accuracy for size