

## Stable Matching, More Formally

**Perfect matching:**

- Each rider is paired with exactly one horse.
- Each horse is paired with exactly one rider.

**Stability:** no ability to exchange

an unmatched pair  $r-h$  is **blocking** if they both prefer each other to current matches.

**Stable matching:** perfect matching with no blocking pairs.

### Stable Matching Problem


**Given:** the preference lists of  $n$  riders and  $n$  horses.

**Find:** a stable matching.

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## Try it!

Why are these not stable matchings?



Find a stable matching for this instance.

$r_1: h_1, h_2, h_3$        $h_1: r_1, r_2, r_3$

$r_2: h_2, h_1, h_3$        $h_2: r_1, r_2, r_3$

$r_3: h_1, h_2, h_3$        $h_3: r_1, r_2, r_3$

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## Gale-Shapley Algorithm

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Initially all  $r$  in  $R$  and  $h$  in  $H$  are free
while there is a free  $r$ 
  Let  $h$  be highest on  $r$ 's list that  $r$  has not proposed to
  if  $h$  is free
    match ( $r, h$ )
  else //  $h$  is not free
    Let  $r'$  be the current match of  $h$ .
    if  $h$  prefers  $r$  to  $r'$ 
      unmatched ( $r', h$ )
      match ( $r, h$ )

```

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**Claim 1: If  $r$  proposed to the last horse on their list, then all the horses are matched. (2)**

Try to prove this claim, i.e. clearly explain why it is true. You might want some of these observations:

**Observation A:**  $r$ 's proposals get worse (for  $r$ ).

**Observation B:** Once  $h$  is matched,  $h$  never becomes free again.

**Observation C:**  $h$ 's partners cannot get worse (for  $h$ ).

Hint:  $r$  must have been rejected a lot – what does that mean?

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