Problem 1 (10 points):
Let $I = (M, W)$ be an instance of the stable matching problem. Suppose that the preference lists of all $m \in M$ are identical, so without loss of generality, $m_i$ has the preference list $[w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n]$. Prove that there is a unique solution to this instance. Describe what the solution looks like, and why it is the only stable solution. (Note: showing that the solution is the one found by the Gale-Shapely algorithm is not sufficient, as there could be other solutions.)

Problem 2 (10 points):
(Adapted from text, page 28, exercise 8.) For this problem, we explore the issue of truthfulness in the Gale-Shapley algorithm for Stable Matching. Show that a participant can improve its outcome by lying about its preferences. Consider $w \in W$. Suppose $w$ prefers $m$ to $m'$, but $m$ and $m'$ are low on $w$’s preference list. Show that it is possible that by switching the order of $m$ and $m'$ on $w$’s preference list, $w$ achieves a better outcome, e.g., is matched with an $m''$ higher on the preference list than the one if the actual order was used.

Problem 3 (10 points):
(Adapted from text, page 23, exercise 4.) One of the famous applications of the Stable-Matching algorithm is for assigning medical residents to hospitals. For resident matching, each potential resident submits a ranked list of hospitals they want to work at, and each hospital creates a ranked list of potential residents. There are a few differences between this scenario and the Stable-Matching scenario. We will assume there are $n$ residents and $m$ hospitals. First, hospitals can request more than one resident: we will let $k_i$ be the number of residents $h_i$ requests. We will assume that the number of potential residents is greater than the total number of hospital requests, so some potential residents will not be assigned to a hospital. The resident matching needs to find an assignment of residents to hospitals with no instabilities. To account for residents not being assigned, we have two types of instabilities:

- Type one: There are students $s$ and $s'$, and a hospital $h$, such that: $s$ is assigned to $h$, $s'$ is assigned to no hospital, and $h$ prefers $s'$ to $s$.

- Type two: There are students $s$ and $s'$ and hospitals $h$ and $h'$ such that $s$ is assigned to $h$, $s'$ is assigned to $h'$, $h$ prefers $s'$ to $s$, and $s'$ prefers $h$ to $h'$.
a) Show how to adapted the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm to this case. In particular, show how to adapt the algorithm when hospitals request multiple residents, and there is a surplus of residents so that some of them will be unmatched.

b) How would you adapt the algorithm so that hospitals can specify some residents as being unacceptable (so that they will never be assigned to the hospital, possibly not giving a full assignment to the hospital.

**Programming Problem 4 (10 points):**
Implement the stable matching algorithm.

You are free to write in any programming language you like (but Java is recommended). The quality of your algorithm may be graded (but you can use the one in the book), but the actual quality of the code will not be graded. The expectation is that you write the algorithmic code yourself - but you can use other code or libraries for supporting operations. You may use a library to generate random permutations (although this can be done as a four-line algorithm.) Submit your code as a PDF.

Make sure that you test your algorithm on small instance sizes, where you are able to check results by hand. A collection of sample instances are provided.

Run your algorithm on the following instance of size $n = 4$. (You can just hard code this as an input into your program.) The preferences for $M$’s are given by the following matrix (where the $i$-th row in the ordered list of preferences for $m_i$.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
2 & 1 & 3 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 3 & 2 \\
0 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
0 & 1 & 2 & 3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

and the preferences for the $W$’s are given by the matrix:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 2 & 1 & 3 \\
2 & 0 & 3 & 1 \\
3 & 2 & 1 & 0 \\
2 & 3 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Give the resulting matching that is found, along with the list of proposals performed by the algorithm.

**Programming Problem 5 (10 points) :**
Write an input generator which creates completely random preference lists, so that each $M$ has a random permutation of the $W$’s for preference, and vice-versa. The purpose of this problem is to explore how “good” the algorithm is with respect to $M$ and $W$. (There is an interesting meta-point relating to algorithm fairness that can be made with this problem.)
We define “goodness” of a match as the position in the preference list. We will number positions from one (not zero as is standard for array indexing.) Note that lower numbers are good. To be precise, suppose $m$ is matched with $w$. The $m\text{Rank}$ of $m$ (written $m\text{Rank}(m)$) is the position of $w$ in $m$’s preference list, and the $w\text{Rank}$ of $w$ is the position of $m$ in $w$’s preference list. We define the $M\text{Rank}$ of a matching to be the sum of all of the $m\text{Rank}(m)$ and the $W\text{Rank}$ of $w$ to be the sum of all of the $w\text{Rank}(w)$. If there are $n$ M’s (and $n$ W’s), we define the $M\text{Goodness}$ to be $M\text{Rank}/n$ and the $W\text{Goodness}$ to be $W\text{Rank}/n$.

As the size of the problem increases - how does the goodness change for $M$ and $W$? Submit a short write up about how the goodness varies with the input size based on your experiments. Is the result better for the $M$’s or $W$’s? You will probably need to run your algorithm on inputs with $n$ at least 1,000 to get interesting results.