CSE 421 Introduction to Algorithms

Lecture 21: Linear Programming Duality



Max Flow in Standard Form LP



Minimization converted to Maximization

Minimize $c^{\top}x$ subject to $Ax \ge b$ $x \ge 0$



Maximize $(-c)^{\top}x$ subject to $(-A)x \le (-b)$ $x \ge 0$

Shortest Paths

Given: Directed graph G = (V, E)vertices *s*, *t* in *V*

Find: (length of) shortest path from s to t

Claim: Length ℓ of the shortest path is the solution (minimum value) for this program.

Proof sketch: A shortest path yields a solution of cost ℓ . Optimal solution must be a combination of flows on shortest paths also cost ℓ ; otherwise there is a part of the **1** unit of flow that gets counted on more than ℓ edges.



Shortest Paths

Given: Directed graph G = (V, E)vertices *s*, *t* in *V*

Find: shortest path from s to t

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Vertex Cover

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Given: Undirected graph G = (V, E)

Find: smallest set of vertices touching all edges of **G**.

Doesn't work: To define a set we need $x_v = \mathbf{0}$ or $x_v = \mathbf{1}$



Natural Variables for LP:

 x_v for each $v \in V$

Minimize $\sum_{v} x_{v}$ subject to $0 \le x_{v} \le 1$ for each node $v \in V$

 $x_u + x_v \ge 1$ for each edge $\{u, v\} \in E$

This LP optimizes for a different problem: "fractional vertex cover". x_v indicates the fraction of vertex v that is chosen in the cover.

What makes Max Flow different?

For Vertex Cover we only got a fractional optimum but for Max Flow can get integers.

- Why?
 - Ford-Fulkerson analysis tells us this for Max Flow.
 - Is there a reason we can tell just from the LP view?
- **Recall:** Optimum is at some vertex x satisfying A'x = b' for some subset of exactly n constraints.

This means that $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{A}')^{-1}\mathbf{b}'$.

Entries of the matrix inverse are quotients of determinants of sub-matrices of A' so, for integer inputs, optimum is always rational.

Fact: Every full rank submatrix of MaxFlow matrix A has determinant ± 1

 \Rightarrow all denominators are $\pm 1 \Rightarrow$ integers. *A* is "totally unimodular"

Next: How **MaxFlow**=**MinCut** is an example of a general "duality" property of LPs



Want coefficients of weighted sum ≥ all coefficients above

Claim: Optimum ≤ 6 **Proof:** Add the two LHS:

 $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 + (-x_1 + x_2 - x_3) = x_1 + 2x_3.$ Must be \leq sum of RHS = 6. We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added.

Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof:
$$x_1 + 2x_3$$

 $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$
 $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$
 $\leq 1a + 5b.$



dual

Minimize
$$a + 5b$$

subject to
 $2a - b \ge 1$
 $-a + b \ge 0$
 $3a - b \ge 2$
 $a, b \ge 0$

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 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Maximize } x_1 + 2x_3\\ \text{subject to}\\ a & 2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \leq 1\\ b & -x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \leq 5 \\ & x \geq 0 \end{array}$

Minimize a + 5b

subject to

$$2a - b \ge 1$$

 $-a + b \ge 0$ dual
 $3a - b \ge 2$
 $a, b \ge 0$

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added. Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof:
$$x_1 + 2x_3$$

 $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$
 $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$
 $\leq 1a + 5b.$

Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to a $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ b $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \le 5$ primal $x \ge 0$

Maximize
$$-a - 5b$$

subject to
 $-2a + b \le -1$
 $a - b \le 0$ dual
 $-3a + b \le -2$
 $a, b \ge 0$

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added. Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if

> $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof: $x_1 + 2x_3$ $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$ $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$ $\leq 1a + 5b.$

Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ a $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \leq 5$ primal b $x \ge 0$ Maximize -a - 5bsubject to -2a + b < -1**y**₁ dual $y_2 \qquad a-b \leq 0$ $y_3 \quad -3a+b \leq -2$ $a, b \geq 0$

What is the dual of the dual?

Minimize $-1y_1 - 2y_3$ subject to $-2y_1 + y_2 - 3y_3 \ge -1$ $y_1 - y_2 + y_3 \ge -5$ $y \ge 0$

equivalent to

Maximize $y_1 + 2y_3$ subject to $2y_1 - y_2 + 3y_3 < 1$

$$-y_1 + y_2 - y_3 \le 5$$
$$y \ge 0$$

primal **Maximize** $c^{\top}x$ subject to $Ax \le b$ $x \ge 0$

dual Minimize $b^{\top}y$ subject to $A^{\top}y \ge c$ $y \ge 0$ dual Maximize $(-b)^{\top}y$ subject to $(-A)^{\top}y \leq -c$ $y \geq 0$

Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Proof:

dual of dualdual of dualdual of dualdualMinimize $(-c)^T x$ Minimize $-c^T x$ Maximsubject to \equiv subject tosubject $((-A)^T)^T x \ge -b$ $-Ax \ge -b$ $x \ge 0$

dual of dual **Maximize** $c^{\mathsf{T}}x$ subject to $Ax \leq b$ $x \geq 0$

primaldualMaximize $c^T x$ Minimize $b^T y$ subject tosubject to $Ax \leq b$ $A^T y \geq c$ $x \geq 0$ $y \geq 0$

Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Theorem (Weak Duality): Every solution to primal has a value that is at most that of every solution to dual.

Proof: We constructed the dual to give upper bounds on the primal.

primaldualMaximize $c^T x$ Minimize $b^T y$ subject tosubject to $Ax \leq b$ $A^T y \geq c$ $x \geq 0$ $y \geq 0$

Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Theorem (Weak Duality): Every solution to primal has a value that is at most that of every solution to dual.

Theorem (Strong Duality): If primal has a solution of finite value, then that value is equal to optimal solution of dual.

primal	dual	
Maximize $c^{T}x$	Minimize $b^{\top}y$	
subject to	subject to	
$Ax \leq b$	$A^{\top}y \geq c$	
$x \ge 0$	$y \ge 0$	

Theorem (Strong Duality): If primal has a solution of finite value, then that value is equal to optimal solution of dual.



E.g. there are $y_i, y_j \ge 0$ s.t. $y_i A_i + y_j A_j = c^{\top}$. Set y_k for all other rows to 0, get $y^{\top} A = (y')^{\top} A' = c^{\top}$ so $A^{\top} y = c$.

Then

$$b^{\mathsf{T}}y = (b')^{\mathsf{T}}y' = (A'x)^{\mathsf{T}}y' = x^{\mathsf{T}}(A')^{\mathsf{T}}y' = x^{\mathsf{T}}A^{\mathsf{T}}y$$
$$= x^{\mathsf{T}}c = c^{\mathsf{T}}x$$

since $x^{\top}c$ and $c^{\top}x$ are just numbers.

Saving dual variables for equalities



Dual of Max Flow

Use a different names to avoid confusion with capacity vector Maximize $g^T x$ subject to $Ax \le h$ $x \ge 0$

1.
$$g_e = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } e \text{ out of } s \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

 $a_e \ 2. \quad x_e \le c(e)$
 $b_v \ 3. \quad \sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_e = 0$
 $4. \quad x \ge 0$
 $v \in S - \{s, t\}$

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e)a_{e} \equiv c^{T}a$ subject to

 $a_e + b_v \ge 1$ if e = (s, v) $a_e - b_u \ge 0$ if e = (u, t) $a_e - b_u + b_v \ge 0$ if e = (u, v) $a \ge 0$ $u, v \in S - \{s, t\}$

More uniform way to write Max Flow Dual

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to subject to $a_e + b_v \ge 1$ if e = (s, v)Define $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{s} = 1$ $b_t = 0$ $b_t = 0$ $a_e - b_u \geq 0$ if e = (u, t) $a_e - b_u + b_v \geq 0$ $a_e - b_u + b_v \ge 0$ if e = (u, v)for e = (u, v) $u, v \in S - \{s, t\}$ $a \ge 0$ $a \ge 0$

Simpler to read Max Flow Dual

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $a_{e} - b_{u} + b_{v} \ge 0$ for e = (u, v)

All the $c(e) \geq 0$, so we want the a_e as small as possible. Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{e} = 1$

$$b_s = 1$$

 $b_t = 0$

 $a_e = \max(b_u - b_v, 0)$ for e = (u, v)

 $a \ge 0$

 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$

 $a_e = \max(b_u - b_v, 0)$
for e = (u, v)

Claim: Optimum is achieved with $0 \le b_v \le 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:

Move b_v values between 0 and 1Reduces: $a_e = \text{length if } e \text{ is down}$ Doesn't change: $a_e = 0$ if e is up Overall solution improves.



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v) Claim: Optimum is achieved with $0 \le b_v \le 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:

Move b_v values between 0 and 1Reduces: $a_e = \text{length if } e \text{ is down}$ Doesn't change: $a_e = 0$ if e is up Overall solution improves.



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v)



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v) **Claim:** Optimum is achieved with $b_v = 0$ or $b_v = 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:

Choose uniform random $r \in [0, 1]$

Set
$$\boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} = \begin{cases} \boldsymbol{1} & \text{if } \boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} \geq \boldsymbol{r} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & \text{if } \boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} < \boldsymbol{r} \end{cases}$$

Expected value for random r is the same as the original since edge e of length a_e is cut w.p. a_e . So... one of those random choices must be at least as good.



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ MinCut! $b_{v} \in \{0, 1\}$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v)



Duality of Shortest Paths

Minimize $\sum_{e} x_{e}$ subject to $\sum_{e \text{ out of } s} x_{e} = 1$ $\sum_{e \text{ into } t} x_{e} = 1$

 $\sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_e = 0$ for all $v \in V - \{s, t\}$

 $x \ge 0$

Duality of Shortest Paths

Minimize $\sum_{e} x_{e}$

subject to

 $x \ge 0$

$$a_s \sum_{e \text{ into } s} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } s} x_e = -1$$

$$a_t \sum_{e \text{ into } t} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } t} x_e = 1$$

$$a_{v} \sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_{e} - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_{e} = 0$$

for all $v \in V - \{s, t\}$

Maximize $a_s - a_t$ subject to

$$a_u - a_v \le 1$$

if $e = (u, v)$



Duality and Zero-Sum Games

Two player zero-sum game:

An $m \times n$ matrix G

G_{i,j} = payoff to row player assuming:
 row player uses strategy *i*, and
 column player uses strategy *j*.

Column player's payoff for game $= -G_{i,i}$

Example: Chess (idealized)

i specifies how white would move in every possible board configuration.

j specifies how black would move.

 $G_{i,j} = \begin{cases} +1 & \text{White checkmates} \\ -1 & \text{Black checkmates} \\ 0 & \text{Draw on board} \end{cases}$

Randomized Strategy:

Probability distribution on row strategies:

• A column vector x with each $x_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} x_i = 1$

Probability distribution on column strategies:

• A column vector
$$y$$
 with each $y_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} y_{j} = 1$

Expected payoff to row player: $x^{\top}G y$

Zero-Sum Game Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors

G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
Rock	0	-1	1
Paper	1	0	-1
Scissors	-1	1	0

The payoff matrix tells you how much the row player wins (and the column player loses).

Who decides on their strategy first

If row player commits to x:

Row player will get payoff $\min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \min_{j} (x^{\mathsf{T}} G)_{j}$

So if row player plays first they can get payoff

 $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y$

If column player commits to y:

Row player will get payoff

 $\max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

So if column player plays first, row player can get payoff

$$\min_{y} \max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y$$

Randomized Strategy:

Probability distribution on row strategies:

• A column vector x with each $x_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} x_i = 1$

Probability distribution on column strategies:

• A column vector
$$y$$
 with each $y_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} y_{i} = 1$

Expected payoff to row player: $x^{\top}G y$

Zero-Sum Game Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors

	G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
	Rock	0	-1	1
	Paper	1	0	-1
	Scissors	-1	1	0
		0	1	0
	G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
/2	Rock	0	-1	1
/4	Paper	1	0	-1
/4	Scissors	-1	1	0

1

1

1

The payoff matrix tells you how much the row player wins (and the column player loses).

Suppose that a player chose imbalanced probabilities:
 If the row player chose with probabilities 1/2,1/4,1/4
 ... then the column player could always choose Paper and get
 an expected payoff of (-1)*1/2+0*1/4+1*1/4 = -1/4.

Von Neumann's MiniMax Theorem

If row player commits to x:

Row player will get payoff $\min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \min_{j} (x^{\mathsf{T}} G)_{j}$

So if row player plays first they can get payoff

 $\max_{\boldsymbol{x}} \min_{\boldsymbol{y}} \boldsymbol{x}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{y}$

If column player commits to y:

```
Row player will get payoff
```

 $\max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

So if column player plays first, row player can get payoff

 $\min_{\boldsymbol{y}} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}} \boldsymbol{x}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{y}$

It doesn't matter who plays first!

Theorem: $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{\top} G y = \min_{y} \max_{x} x^{\top} G y$

Zero-Sum Game Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors

	G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
	Rock	0	-1	1
	Paper	1	0	-1
	Scissors	-1	1	0
		0	1	0
	G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
1/2	Rock	0	-1	1
1/4	Paper	1	0	-1
1/4	Scissors	-1	1	0

		1/3	1/3	1/3
	G	Rock	Paper	Scissors
1/3	Rock	0	-1	1
1/3	Paper	1	0	-1
1/3	Scissors	-1	1	0

The payoff matrix tells you how much the row player wins (and the column player loses).

Suppose that a player chose imbalanced probabilities:
 If the row player chose with probabilities 1/2,1/4,1/4
 ... then the column player could always choose Paper and get
 an expected payoff of (-1)*1/2+0*1/4+1*1/4 = -1/4.

- The Von Neumann Minimax Theorem is NOT about one player *playing* first (That would be bad for Rock-Paper-Scissors!)
- It is about the order in which players *reveal their probabilities*.
- For Rock-Paper-Scissors, if a player uses **1/3,1/3,1/3** then the payoff is **0** no matter what the other player chooses!
- If they choose anything else, the other player could do better.

Use Strong Duality to prove MiniMax Theorem

Theorem: $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{T} G y = \min_{y} \max_{x} x^{T} G y$ i.e., $\max_{x} \min_{j} (x^{T} G)_{j} = \min_{y} \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

Primal

Maximize z subject to

$$w \qquad \sum_{i} x_{i} = 1$$

$$y_{j} \qquad z - (x^{\top}G)_{j} \le 0^{*}$$
for all j

$$x \ge 0$$

$$x \ge 0$$

*equivalent to $z \leq \min_{j} (x^{T}G)_{j}$

Dual **Minimize w** subject to

 $\sum_{j} y_{j} = 1$ Coefficient of z must be 1 $w - (G \ y)_{i} \ge 0^{*}$ Coefficient of x_{i} must be ≥ 0 for all i $y \ge 0$ *equivalent to $w \ge \max_{i} (G \ y)_{i}$