

CSE 421 Introduction to Algorithms

Lecture 21: Linear Programming Duality



Max Flow in Standard Form LP



Minimization or Maximization

Minimize $c^{\top}x$ subject to $Ax \ge b$ $x \ge 0$



Maximize $(-c)^{\top}x$ subject to $(-A)x \le (-b)$ $x \ge 0$


Shortest Paths

Given: Directed graph G = (V, E)vertices *s*, *t* in *V*

Find: shortest path from s to t

Claim: Length ℓ of the shortest path is the solution to this program.

Proof sketch: A shortest path yields a solution of cost ℓ . Optimal solution must be a combination of flows on shortest paths also cost ℓ ; otherwise there is a part of the **1** unit of flow that gets counted on more than ℓ edges.



Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to a $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ b $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \le 5$ $x \ge 0$


> Claim: Optimum ≤ 6 Proof: Add the two LHS: $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3$ $+ (-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$ $= x_1 + 2x_3$. Must be \leq sum of RHS = 6.

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added. Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof:
$$x_1 + 2x_3$$

 $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$
 $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$
 $\leq 1a + 5b.$

7



Minimize
$$a + 5b$$

subject to
 $2a - b \ge 1$
 $-a + b \ge 0$
 $3a - b \ge 2$
 $a, b \ge 0$

dual

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added.

Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof: $x_1 + 2x_3$ $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$ $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$ $\leq 1a + 5b.$

Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to a $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ b $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \le 5$ primal $x \ge 0$

Minimize a + 5b

subject to

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added. Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof:	<i>x</i> ₁ +	$2x_3$
	$\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 +$	$3x_3)$
	$+b(-x_1+x_2-$	- x ₃)
	$\leq 1a + 5b$	

Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to a $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ b $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \le 5$ primal $x \ge 0$

Maximize
$$-a - 5b$$

subject to
 $-2a + b \le -1$
 $a - b \le 0$ dual
 $-3a + b \le -2$
 $a, b \ge 0$

We multiplied the 1st inequality by a = 1, the 2nd by b = 1 and added. Claim: For all $a, b \ge 0$ if

 $2a - b \ge 1$ $-a + b \ge 0$ $3a - b \ge 2$ then Optimum $\le a + 5b$

Proof: $x_1 + 2x_3$ $\leq a(2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3)$ $+b(-x_1 + x_2 - x_3)$ $\leq 1a + 5b.$

Maximize $x_1 + 2x_3$ subject to $2x_1 - x_2 + 3x_3 \le 1$ a $-x_1 + x_2 - x_3 \leq 5$ primal b $x \ge 0$ Maximize -a - 5bsubject to -2a + b < -1**y**₁ dual $y_2 \qquad a-b \leq 0$ $y_3 \quad -3a+b \leq -2$ $a, b \geq 0$

What is the dual of the dual?

Minimize $-1y_1 - 2y_3$ subject to $-2y_1 + y_2 - 3y_3 \ge -1$ $y_1 - y_2 + y_3 \ge -5$ $y \ge 0$

equivalent to

Maximize $y_1 + 2y_3$ subject to $2y_1 - y_2 + 3y_3 < 1$

$$\begin{array}{l}
 -y_1 + y_2 + y_3 \leq 1 \\
 -y_1 + y_2 - y_3 \leq 5 \\
 y \geq 0
 \end{array}$$

primal **Maximize** $c^{\mathsf{T}}x$ subject to $Ax \leq b$ $x \geq 0$

dual Minimize $b^{\top}y$ subject to $A^{\top}y \ge c$ $y \ge 0$ dual Maximize $(-b)^{\top}y$ subject to $(-A)^{\top}y \leq -c$ $y \geq 0$

Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Proof:

dual of dualdual of dualdual of dualdual of dualMinimize $(-c)^T x$ Minimize $-c^T x$ Maximize $c^T x$ subject to \equiv subject tosubject to $((-A)^T)^T x \ge (-b)^T$ $-Ax \ge -b^T$ $Ax \le b^T$ $x \ge 0$ $x \ge 0$ $x \ge 0$

primaldualMaximize $c^T x$ Minimize $b^T y$ subject tosubject to $Ax \leq b$ $A^T y \geq c$ $x \geq 0$ $y \geq 0$

Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Theorem (Weak Duality): Every solution to primal has a value that is at most that of every solution to dual.

Proof: We constructed the dual to give upper bounds on the primal.

primaldualMaximize $c^T x$ Minimize $b^T y$ subject tosubject to $Ax \leq b$ $A^T y \geq c$ $x \geq 0$ $y \geq 0$


Theorem: The dual of the dual is the primal.

Theorem (Weak Duality): Every solution to primal has a value that is at most that of every solution to dual.

Theorem (Strong Duality): If primal has a solution of finite value, then that value is equal to optimal solution of dual.

primal	dual	
Maximize $c^{T}x$	Minimize $\mathbf{b}^{T}\mathbf{y}$	
subject to	subject to	
$Ax \leq b$	$A^{\top}y \geq c$	
$x \ge 0$	$y \ge 0$	

Theorem (Strong Duality): If primal has a solution of finite value, then that value is equal to optimal solution of dual.




E.g. there are $y_i, y_j \ge 0$ s.t. $y_i A_i + y_j A_j = c^{\top}$. Set y_k for all other rows to 0, get $y A = y'A' = c^{\top}$ so $A^{\top}y = c$.

Then

$$b^{\mathsf{T}}y = (b')^{\mathsf{T}}y' = (A'x)^{\mathsf{T}}y' = x^{\mathsf{T}}(A')^{\mathsf{T}}y' = x^{\mathsf{T}}A^{\mathsf{T}}y$$
$$= x^{\mathsf{T}}c = c^{\mathsf{T}}x$$

since $x^{\top}c$ and $c^{\top}x$ are just numbers.

Saving dual variables for equalities



Dual of Max Flow

Use a different names to avoid confusion with capacity vector Maximize $g^T x$ subject to $Ax \le h$ $x \ge 0$

1.
$$g_e = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } e \text{ out of } s \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

 $a_e \ 2. \quad x_e \le c(e)$
 $b_v \ 3. \quad \sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_e = 0$
 $4. \quad x \ge 0$
 $v \in S - \{s, t\}$

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{T} a$ subject to

 $a_e + b_v \ge 1$ if e = (s, v) $a_e - b_u \ge 0$ if e = (u, t) $a_e - b_u + b_v \ge 0$ if e = (u, v) $a \ge 0$ $u, v \in S - \{s, t\}$

More uniform way to write Max Flow Dual

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to subject to $a_e + b_v \ge 1$ if e = (s, v)Define $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{s} = 1$ $b_t = 0$ $b_t = 0$ $a_e - b_u \geq 0$ if e = (u, t) $a_e - b_u + b_v \geq 0$ $a_e - b_u + b_v \ge 0$ if e = (u, v)for e = (u, v) $u, v \in S - \{s, t\}$ $a \ge 0$ $a \ge 0$

Simpler to read Max Flow Dual

Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $a_{e} - b_{u} + b_{v} \ge 0$ for e = (u, v)

All the $c(e) \ge 0$, so we want the a_e as small as possible. Minimize $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{e} = 1$

$$b_s = 1$$

 $b_t = 0$

 $a_e = \max(b_u - b_v, 0)$ for e = (u, v)


 $a \ge 0$

 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$

 $a_e = \max(b_u - b_v, 0)$ for e = (u, v) Claim: Optimum is achieved with $0 \le b_v \le 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:


Move b_v values between 0 and 1Reduces: $a_e = \text{length if } e \text{ is down}$ Doesn't change: $a_e = 0$ if e is up Overall solution improves.




 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v) Claim: Optimum is achieved with $0 \le b_v \le 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:

Move b_v values between 0 and 1Reduces: $a_e = \text{length if } e \text{ is down}$ Doesn't change: $a_e = 0$ if e is up Overall solution improves.



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v)




 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ $0 \leq b_{v} \leq 1$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v) **Claim:** Optimum is achieved with $b_v = 0$ or $b_v = 1$ for every vertex v.

Proof:


Choose uniform random $r \in [0, 1]$

Set
$$\boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} = \begin{cases} \boldsymbol{1} & \text{if } \boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} \geq \boldsymbol{r} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & \text{if } \boldsymbol{b}_{\boldsymbol{v}} < \boldsymbol{r} \end{cases}$$

Expected value for random r is the same as the original since edge e of length a_e is cut w.p. a_e . So... one of those random choices must be at least as good.



 $\sum_{e} c(e) a_{e} \equiv c^{\top} a$ subject to $b_{s} = 1$ $b_{t} = 0$ MinCut! $b_{v} \in \{0, 1\}$ $a_{e} = \max(b_{u} - b_{v}, 0)$ for e = (u, v)



Duality of Shortest Paths

Minimize $\sum_{e} x_{e}$ subject to $\sum_{e \text{ out of } s} x_{e} = 1$ $\sum_{e \text{ into } t} x_{e} = 1$

 $\sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_e = 0$ for all $v \in V - \{s, t\}$

 $x \ge 0$

Duality of Shortest Paths

Minimize $\sum_{e} x_{e}$

subject to

 $x \ge 0$

$$a_s \sum_{e \text{ into } s} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } s} x_e = -1$$

$$a_t \sum_{e \text{ into } t} x_e - \sum_{e \text{ out of } t} x_e = 1$$


$$a_{v} \sum_{e \text{ into } v} x_{e} - \sum_{e \text{ out of } v} x_{e} = 0$$

for all $v \in V - \{s, t\}$

Maximize $a_s - a_t$ subject to

$$a_u - a_v \le 1$$

if $e = (u, v)$



Duality and Zero-Sum Games

Two player zero-sum game:

An $m \times n$ matrix G

G_{i,j} = payoff to row player assuming:
 row player uses strategy *i*, and
 column player uses strategy *j*.

Column player's payoff for game $= -G_{i,i}$

Example: Chess (idealized)

i specifies how white would move in every possible board configuration.

j specifies how black would move.

 $G_{i,j} = \begin{cases} +1 & \text{White checkmates} \\ -1 & \text{Black checkmates} \\ 0 & \text{Draw on board} \end{cases}$

Randomized Strategy:

Probability distribution on row strategies:

• A column vector x with each $x_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} x_i = 1$

Probability distribution on column strategies:

• A column vector
$$y$$
 with each $y_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} y_{i} = 1$

Expected payoff to row player: $x^{\top}G y$

Who decides on their strategy first

If row player commits to x:

Row player will get payoff $\min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \min_{j} (x^{\mathsf{T}} G)_{j}$

So if row player plays first they can get payoff

 $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y$

If column player commits to y:

Row player will get payoff

 $\max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

So if column player plays first, row player can get payoff

$$\min_{y} \max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y$$

Randomized Strategy:

Probability distribution on row strategies:

• A column vector x with each $x_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{i} x_i = 1$

Probability distribution on column strategies:

• A column vector
$$y$$
 with each $y_i \ge 0$

 $\sum_{j} y_{j} = 1$

Expected payoff to row player: $x^{\top}G y$

Von Neumann's MiniMax Theorem

If row player commits to x:

Row player will get payoff $\min_{y} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \min_{j} (x^{\mathsf{T}} G)_{j}$

So if row player plays first they can get payoff

 $\max_{\boldsymbol{x}} \min_{\boldsymbol{y}} \boldsymbol{x}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{y}$

If column player commits to y:

```
Row player will get payoff
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 $\max_{x} x^{\mathsf{T}} G y = \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

So if column player plays first, row player can get payoff

 $\min_{\boldsymbol{y}} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}} \boldsymbol{x}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{y}$

It doesn't matter who plays first!

Theorem: $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{\top} G y = \min_{y} \max_{x} x^{\top} G y$

Use Strong Duality to prove MiniMax Theorem

Theorem: $\max_{x} \min_{y} x^{T} G y = \min_{y} \max_{x} x^{T} G y$ i.e., $\max_{x} \min_{j} (x^{T} G)_{j} = \min_{y} \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$

Primal

Maximize z subject to

$$w \qquad \sum_{i} x_{i} = 1$$

$$y_{j} \qquad z - (x^{\top}G)_{j} \le 0^{*}$$
for all j

$$x \ge 0$$
equivalent to $z \le \min(x^{\top}G)$

*equivalent to $z \leq \min_{j} (x^{T}G)_{j}$

Dual **Minimize w** subject to

 $\sum_{j} y_{j} = 1$ Coefficient of z must be 1 $w - (G y)_{i} \ge 0^{*}$ Coefficient of x_{i} must be ≥ 0 for all i $y \ge 0$ *equivalent to $w \ge \max_{i} (G y)_{i}$