




CSE 421 Algorithms

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Winter 2019

Lecture 2



Announcements

- Homework due Wednesdays
 - HW 1, Due January 16
 - It's on the web
 - Submit solutions on canvas
 - pay attention to making explanations clear and understandable
- Instructor Office hours (CSE 582):
 - Monday 2:30-3:20, Wednesday 2:30-3:20
- TA Office hours:
 - TBD

Course Mechanics

- Homework
 - Due Wednesdays
 - About 5 problems, sometimes programming
 - Target: 1 week turnaround on grading
- Exams (In class)
 - Midterm, Wednesday, February 13
 - Final, Monday, March 18, 2:30-4:20 pm
- **Approximate** grade weighting
 - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
 - Slides, Handouts
 - Lecture schedule is fairly accurate

Stable Matching: Formal Problem

- Input
 - Preference lists for m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n
 - Preference lists for w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n
- Output
 - Perfect matching M satisfying stability property (e.g., no instabilities) :

For all m', m'', w', w''

If $(m', w') \in M$ and $(m'', w'') \in M$ then

$(m'$ prefers w' to w'') or $(w''$ prefers m'' to $m')$

Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w

If w is unmatched, w accepts

If w is matched to m_2

If w prefers m to m_2 w accepts m, dumping m_2

If w prefers m_2 to m, w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list **that it has not already proposed to**

Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m

w highest on m 's list that m has not proposed to

 if w is free, then match (m, w)

 else

 suppose (m_2, w) is matched

 if w prefers m to m_2

 unmatch (m_2, w)

 match (m, w)

Example

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$


$m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2$

$m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2$



Order: $m_1, m_2, m_3, m_1, m_3, m_1$

Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
 - m 's proposals get worse (have higher m -rank)
 - Once w is matched, w stays matched
 - w 's partners get better (have lower w -rank)

Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w 's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n^2 steps

When the algorithm halts, every w
is matched


Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect
matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

$(m_1, w_1) \in M, (m_2, w_2) \in M$

m_1 prefers w_2 to w_1



How could this happen?

Result

- Simple, $O(n^2)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
 - A stable matching always exists

A closer look

Stable matchings are not necessarily fair

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$



$m_2: w_2 w_3 w_1$

$m_3: w_3 w_1 w_2$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_1 m_2 m_3$



How many stable matchings can you find?

Algorithm under specified

- Many different ways of picking m's to propose
- Surprising result
 - All orderings of picking free m's give the same result
- Proving this type of result
 - Reordering argument
 - Prove algorithm is computing something more specific
 - Show property of the solution – so it computes a specific stable matching

M-rank and W-rank of matching

- m-rank: position of matching w in preference list
- M-rank: sum of m-ranks
- w-rank: position of matching m in preference list
- W-rank: sum of w-ranks

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$


$m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2$

$m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2$



What is the M-rank?

What is the W-rank?

Suppose there are n m 's, and n w 's

- What is the minimum possible M-rank?
- What is the maximum possible M-rank?
- Suppose each m is matched with a random w , what is the expected M-rank?

Random Preferences

Suppose that the preferences are completely random

$m_1: w_8 w_3 w_1 w_5 w_9 w_2 w_4 w_6 w_7 w_{10}$

$m_2: w_7 w_{10} w_1 w_9 w_3 w_4 w_8 w_2 w_5 w_6$

...

$w_1: m_1 m_4 m_9 m_5 m_{10} m_3 m_2 m_6 m_8 m_7$

$w_2: m_5 m_8 m_1 m_3 m_2 m_7 m_9 m_{10} m_4 m_6$

...

If there are n m 's and n w 's, what is the expected value of the M -rank and the W -rank when the proposal algorithm computes a stable matching?

Stable Matching Algorithms

- M Proposal Algorithm
 - Iterate over all m 's until all are matched
- W Proposal Algorithm
 - Change the role of m 's and w 's
 - Iterate over all w 's until all are matched

Best choices for one side may be bad for the other

Design a configuration for problem of size 4:

M proposal algorithm:

All m's get first choice, all w's get last choice

W proposal algorithm:

All w's get first choice, all m's get last choice

m_1 :

m_2 :

m_3 :

m_4 :

w_1 :

w_2 :

w_3 :

w_4 :

But there is a stable second choice

Design a configuration for
problem of size 4:

M proposal algorithm:

All m's get first choice, all w's
get last choice

W proposal algorithm:

All w's get first choice, all m's
get last choice

There is a stable matching
where everyone gets their
second choice

m_1 :

m_2 :

m_3 :

m_4 :

w_1 :

w_2 :

w_3 :

w_4 :

What is the run time of the Stable Matching Algorithm?

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m **Executed at most n^2 times**

w highest on m 's list that m has not proposed to
 if w is free, then match (m, w)

 else

 suppose (m_2, w) is matched

 if w prefers m to m_2

 unmatch (m_2, w)

 match (m, w)

$O(1)$ time per iteration

- Find free m
- Find next available w
- If w is matched, determine m_2
- Test if w prefer m to m_2
- Update matching

What does it mean for an algorithm
to be efficient?

Key ideas

- Formalizing real world problem
 - Model: graph and preference lists
 - Mechanism: stability condition
- Specification of algorithm with a natural operation
 - Proposal
- Establishing termination of process through invariants and progress measure
- Under specification of algorithm
- Establishing uniqueness of solution