



# CSE 421 Algorithms


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Winter 2006  
Lecture 2

## Announcements

- It's on the web.
- Homework 1, Due Jan 12
  - It's on the web
- Subscribe to the mailing list
- Anna will have an office hour Monday, Jan 9, 11am-noon. CSE 594

## Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



## Algorithm

```


Initially all m in M and w in W are free
While there is a free m
  w highest on m's list that m has not proposed to
  if w is free, then match (m, w)
  else
    suppose (m2, w) is matched
    if w prefers m to m2
      unmatched (m2, w)
      match (m, w)
  
```

## Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
  - m's proposals get worse
  - Once w is matched, w stays matched
  - w's partners get better

## The resulting matching is stable

- Suppose
  - $m_1$  prefers  $w_2$  to  $w_1$
  - $w_2$  prefers  $m_1$  to  $m_2$
- How could this happen?




## Result

- Simple,  $O(n^2)$  algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
  - A stable matching always exists

## A closer look

- Stable matchings are not necessarily fair



## Algorithm under specified

- Many different ways of picking m's to propose
- Surprising result
  - All orderings of picking free m's give the same result
- Proving this type of result
  - Reordering argument
  - Prove algorithm is computing something more specific
    - Show property of the solution – so it computes a specific stable matching


## Proposal Algorithm finds the best possible solution for M

- And the worst possible for W
- $(m, w)$  is valid if  $(m, w)$  is in some stable matching
- $\text{best}(m)$ : the highest ranked  $w$  for  $m$  such that  $(m, w)$  is valid
- $S^* = \{(m, \text{best}(m))\}$
- Every execution of the proposal algorithm computes  $S^*$

## Proof


- Argument by contradiction
- Suppose the algorithm computes a matching  $S$  different from  $S^*$
- There must be some  $m$  rejected by a valid partner.
- Let  $m$  be the first man rejected by a valid partner  $w$ .  $w$  rejects  $m$  for  $m_1$ .
- $w = \text{best}(m)$

- $S^+$  stable matching including  $(m, w)$
- Suppose  $m_1$  is paired with  $w_1$  in  $S^+$
- $m_1$  prefers  $w$  to  $w_1$
- $w$  prefers  $m_1$  to  $m$
- Hence,  $(m_1, w)$  is an instability in  $S^+$



### The proposal algorithm is worst case for W

- In  $S^*$ , each  $w$  is paired with its worst valid partner
- Suppose  $(m, w)$  in  $S^*$  but not  $m$  is not the worst valid partner of  $w$
- $S^-$  a stable matching containing the worst valid partner of  $w$
- Let  $(m_1, w)$  be in  $S^-$ ,  $w$  prefers  $m$  to  $m_1$
- Let  $(m, w_1)$  be in  $S^-$ ,  $m$  prefers  $w$  to  $w_1$
- $(m, w)$  is an instability in  $S^-$



### Could you do better?

- Is there a fair matching
- Design a configuration for problem of size  $n$ :
  - M proposal algorithm:
    - All  $m$ 's get first choice, all  $w$ 's get last choice
  - W proposal algorithm:
    - All  $w$ 's get first choice, all  $m$ 's get last choice
  - There is a stable matching where everyone gets their second choice

### Key ideas for Stable Matching

- Formalizing real world problem
  - Model: graph and preference lists
  - Mechanism: stability condition
- Specification of algorithm with a natural operation
  - Proposal
- Establishing termination of process through invariants and progress measure
- Underspecification of algorithm
- Establishing uniqueness of solution

### Question

- Goodness of a stable matching:
  - Add up the ranks of all the matched pairs
  - M-rank, W-rank
- Suppose that the preferences are completely random
  - If there are  $n$  M's, and  $n$  W's, what is the expected value of the M-rank and the W-rank

### Expected Ranks

- Expected M rank
- Expected W rank

### Expected M rank

- Expected M rank is the number of steps until all M's are matched
  - (Also is the expected run time of the algorithm)
- Each steps "selects a  $w$  at random"
  - $O(n \log n)$  total steps
  - Average M rank:  $O(\log n)$

### Expected W rank

- If a  $w$  receives  $k$  random proposals, the expected rank for  $w$  is  $n/(k+1)$ .
- On the average, a  $w$  receives  $O(\log n)$  proposals
  - The average  $w$  rank is  $O(n/\log n)$

### What is the run time of the Stable Matching Algorithm?

```
Initially all  $m$  in  $M$  and  $w$  in  $W$  are free
While there is a free  $m$  Executed at most  $n^2$  times
   $w$  highest on  $m$ 's list that  $m$  has not proposed to
  if  $w$  is free, then match ( $m, w$ )
  else
    suppose ( $m_2, w$ ) is matched
    if  $w$  prefers  $m$  to  $m_2$ 
      unmatched ( $m_2, w$ )
      match ( $m, w$ )
```

### $O(1)$ time per iteration

- Find free  $m$
- Find next available  $w$
- If  $w$  is matched, determine  $m_2$
- Test if  $w$  prefer  $m$  to  $m_2$
- Update matching

### What does it mean for an algorithm to be efficient?