CSE 421
Algorithms
Richard Anderson
Lecture 1

## All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

## Text book

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
- Read Chapters 1 \& 2

| All of Computer Science is the |
| :---: |
| Study of Algorithms |

## Course Introduction

- Instructor
- Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
- Teaching Assistant
- Yiannis Giotas, giotas@cs.washington.edu


## How to study algorithms

- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
- Where algorithms apply
- What makes an algorithm work
- Algorithmic thinking


## Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
- Assign TAs to Instructors
- Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
- E.g., Prof A. would rather have student $X$ than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof $A$. than his current instructor.


## Examples

- $\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$
- $m_{2}: w_{2} w_{1}$
- $m_{1}: w_{1} w_{2}$
- $w_{1}: m_{1} m_{2}$
$m_{2}: w_{1} w_{2}$
- $w_{2}: m_{2} m_{1}$
- $w_{1}: m_{1} m_{2}$
- $\mathrm{w}_{2}: \mathrm{m}_{1} \mathrm{~m}_{2}$


## Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



## Examples

- $\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$
- $\mathrm{m}_{2}: \mathrm{W}_{2} \mathrm{~W}_{1}$
- $\mathrm{w}_{1}: \mathrm{m}_{2} \mathrm{~m}_{1}$
- $\mathrm{w}_{2}: \mathrm{m}_{1} \mathrm{~m}_{2}$


## Intuitive Idea for an Algorithm

- m proposes to w
- If $w$ is unmatched, $w$ accepts
- If $w$ is matched to $m_{2}$
- If $w$ prefers $m$ to $m_{2}, w$ accepts
- If $w$ prefers $m_{2}$ to $m, w$ rejects
- Unmatched m proposes to highest $w$ on its preference list


## Algorithm

Initially all $m$ in $M$ and $w$ in $W$ are free While there is a free $m$
w highest on m's list that m has not proposed to
if $w$ is free, then match ( $m, w$ )
else
suppose $\left(m_{2}, w\right)$ is matched if $w$ prefers $m$ to $m_{2}$ unmatch $\left(m_{2}, w\right)$ match ( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ )

## Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
- m's proposals get worse
- Once w is matched, w stays matched - w's partners get better

The algorithm terminates with a perfect matching

- Why?
- Suppose
$-\mathrm{m}_{1}$ prefers $\mathrm{w}_{2}$ to $\mathrm{w}_{1}$
$-w_{2}$ prefers $m_{1}$ to $m_{2}$

- How could this happen?

