

CSE 417 Algorithms and Computational Complexity

Richard Anderson
Autumn 2020
Lecture 1

CSE 417 Course Introduction

- CSE 417, Algorithms and Computational Complexity
 - MWF 1:30-2:20 pm
 - Zoomistan
- Instructor
 - Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
 - Office hours:
 - Zoom
 - Office hours: TBD
- Teaching Assistants
 - Josh Curtis, Anny Kong, Alon Milchgrub, Ivy Wang

Announcements

- It's on the course website
- Homework weekly
 - Usually due Wednesdays
 - HW 1, Due Wednesday October 7, 2020
 - It's on the website (or will be soon)
- Homework is to be submitted electronically
 - Due at 1:30 PM. No late days.
- You should be on the course mailing list
 - But it will probably go to your uw.edu account

Teaching on Zoom

- This is my first time teaching Algorithms on Zoom
- My concerns
 - How do I interact with the class
 - To get cues on how the material is coming across
 - To support my teaching style of quick questions
 - To allow questions and clarifications
 - I encourage questions
 - Chat is available, and will be moderated by TAs
 - Will try to use classroom activities and breakout rooms

Textbook

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
 - Only one edition
- Read Chapters 1 & 2
- Expected coverage:
 - Chapter 1 through 7
- Book available at:
 - UW Bookstore (\$171.25/\$128.45)
 - Ebay (\$12.96 to \$307.10)
 - Amazon (\$19.18 and up)
 - Electronic (\$59.99 / \$39.99)
 - PDF



Course Mechanics

- Homework
 - Due Wednesdays
 - Mix of written problems and programming
 - Target: 1-week turnaround on grading
- Exams
 - Midterm, Tentatively, Monday, November 2
 - Final, Monday, December 14, 2:30-4:20 pm
 - Approximate grade weighting:
 - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
 - Slides, Handouts, Piazza Discussion Board

All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

How to study algorithms


- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
 - Where algorithms apply
 - What makes an algorithm work
 - Algorithmic thinking
- Algorithm practice

Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
 - Assign TAs to Instructors
 - Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
 - E.g., Prof A. would rather have student X than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.

Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



Example (1 of 3)

$m_1: w_1 w_2$ $m_1 \circ$ $\circ w_1$
 $m_2: w_2 w_1$
 $w_1: m_1 m_2$
 $w_2: m_2 m_1$ $m_2 \circ$ $\circ w_2$

Example (2 of 3)

$m_1: w_1 w_2$ $m_1 \circ$ $\circ w_1$
 $m_2: w_1 w_2$
 $w_1: m_1 m_2$
 $w_2: m_1 m_2$ $m_2 \circ$ $\circ w_2$

Example (3 of 3)

m_1 : $w_1 w_2$ $m_1 \circ$ $\circ w_1$
 m_2 : $w_2 w_1$
 w_1 : $m_2 m_1$
 w_2 : $m_1 m_2$ $m_2 \circ$ $\circ w_2$

Formal Problem

- Input
 - Preference lists for m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n
 - Preference lists for w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n
- Output
 - Perfect matching M satisfying stability property:

If $(m', w') \in M$ and $(m'', w'') \in M$ then
 (m' prefers w' to w'') or (w'' prefers m'' to m')

Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w

If w is unmatched, w accepts

If w is matched to m_2

If w prefers m to m_2 , w accepts m , dumping m_2

If w prefers m_2 to m , w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list **that it has not already proposed to**

Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m

w highest on m 's list that m has not proposed to
if w is free, then match (m, w)

else

suppose (m_2, w) is matched

if w prefers m to m_2

unmatch (m_2, w)

match (m, w)

Example

m_1 : $w_1 w_2 w_3$ $m_1 \circ$ $\circ w_1$
 m_2 : $w_1 w_3 w_2$
 m_3 : $w_1 w_2 w_3$

 w_1 : $m_2 m_3 m_1$ $m_2 \circ$ $\circ w_2$
 w_2 : $m_3 m_1 m_2$
 w_3 : $m_3 m_1 m_2$ $m_3 \circ$ $\circ w_3$

Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?

- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
 - m 's proposals get worse (have higher m -rank)
 - Once w is matched, w stays matched
 - w 's partners get better (have lower w -rank)

Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w 's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n^2 steps

When the algorithm halts, every w is matched


Why?

Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

$(m_1, w_1) \in M, (m_2, w_2) \in M$
 m_1 prefers w_2 to w_1



How could this happen?

Result

- Simple, $O(n^2)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
 - A stable matching always exists