# Stable Matching

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#### Lecture Outline

1 Adminstration

2 Stable Matching

#### Admin

- Subscribe to the Mailing List!
- Textbook on reserve
- Office Hours
- Homework 1 released soon

#### **Prom Dates**

- Hank asks Ruth to the school Prom
- Ruth says yes ... but would rather go with Ed
- Since Ruth is taken, Ed asks Crystal (but really, he'd rather go with Ruth)









## Abstract Defintion of Stable Matching

- Input:
  - Two sets, eg. men  $M = \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}$ , and women  $W = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$
  - Preferences: Each man ranks all of the women (and vice versa)
- Desired Output: Perfect, Stable Matching *S*

#### Instabilities

Our first matching was bad because of an instability

## The Gale-Shapley Algorithm

- Initially, nobody is married
- 2 An unmarried man *m* chooses the highest ranked woman *w* that he has not yet proposed to.
  - If w is not engaged, then m and w become engaged
  - If w is engaged to another man m', if w prefers m over m', then m and w become engaged.
  - Otherwise, w rejects m proposal, and is still engaged to m'.
- Repeat 2 until no one is free
- 4 All engagements are final

#### How do we know it works?

- Does it terminate?
- Does it give the right answer?
- How long does it take?

## Termination of Gale-Shapley

■ Useful to have a measure of progress

## Correctness of Gale-Shapley: Everyone married

At any point during the G-S algorith, if a man m is free, then he has not yet proposed to some woman

## Women's engagements improve

#### Lemma

After the first proposal, women are always engaged. The sequence of engagements only gets better(from the women's point of view).

## Correctness of Gale-Shapley: No Instabilities

If G-S algo returns a matching S, then S is stable.

# Correctness of Gale-Shapley: No Instabilities (2)

### General Lessons

## A bad "algorithm"

- Order the men & women
- 2 Each man proposes to highest available women
- If there is an instability, each woman proposes to highest available man
- 4 Keep repeating as long as there is an instability

## No progress

$m_1$	<i>W</i> <sub>3</sub>	$W_2$	$w_1$
$m_2$	$w_1$	$W_2$	$W_3$
$m_3$	$w_1$	$W_2$	<i>W</i> <sub>3</sub>

$w_1$	<i>m</i> <sub>3</sub>	$m_2$	$m_1$
<i>W</i> <sub>2</sub>	$m_3$	$m_2$	$m_1$
<i>W</i> <sub>3</sub>	$m_1$	$m_2$	$m_3$

What happens after the men chose once, and then the women chose once?

#### More Details in the book

- What if women propose? (better for the women!)
- Does order matter?

#### From abstract to concrete

- We started with prom / marriage, went to abstract model ...
- can we go from abstract model to concrete?
  - Scheduling non-conference games (ACC/BigTen challenge)
  - School admissions a little different though (your homework)





#### Homework Advice

- Start early! Think about problems in the back of your brain ...
- Use a study group for brainstorming (but write answers on your own)
- Homework worth a lot in this course

