Web Application Security Development

CSE 403 2013-11-20

Introduction

- Who am I?
 - Zak Dehlawi

- Why am I here?
 - Talk to you about Secure Development Lifecyles (SDL) and WebApp security

Introduction

- PhD Student
 - UW Information School
 - Advising Committee
 - Dr. Barbara Endicott-Popovsky
 - Dr. Jochen Scholl
 - Dr. Yoshi Kohno
- Education
 - Johns Hopkins M.S. Security Informatics
 - UW CSE and PoliSci bachelor degrees



Introduction


- Senior Security Engineer
 - Security Innovation, Inc.
 - Cool place, come work there with me
 - Primary Tasks:
 - Threat Modeling
 - Secure Development Lifecycle
 - Penetration Testing



Outline

- SDL
- OWASP
- A1-Injection
- A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management
- A3-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- A6-Sensitive Data Exposure

- Why a Secure Development Lifecycle?
 - Reduces the total number of vulnerabilities
 - Addresses compliance requirements
 - Reduce the cost of development
 - Fixes later in development cycle are more costly to address



Source: Micrsoft SDL - Benefits, NIST May 2002

Phases

- Training (Regularly scheduled)
- Requirements
- Design
- Implementation
- Verification
- Release
- Response (Post-Release)

Phases

- Training (Regularly scheduled)
 - Developers, Testers, PMs, Architects
- Requirements
 - Establish security requirements (Compliance + regulation
- Design
 - Security architecture review
 - Attack surface analysis
 - Threat modeling

Phases

- Implementation
 - Security code reviews
 - Static code analysis
- Verification
 - Penetration testing
 - Fuzz testing
- Release
 - Incident response plan
 - Black-box penetration testing
- Response (Post-Release)
 - Execute incident response plan

OWASP



- OWASP Top 10-2013 (Select few)
 - A1-Injection
 - A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management
 - A3-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 - A6-Sensitive Data Exposure

OWASP: A1-Injection

- Types:
 - SQL
 - Update, delete, read arbitrarily from database
 - Little Bobby Tables
 - Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;--
 - o OS
 - Execute arbitrary OS or interpreter commands
 - o XML
 - XML Bombs with inline DTD
 - XML External Entity attacks
 - JSON
 - Define arbitrary entities
 - o etc.

OWASP: A1-Injection

- Mitigations
 - SQL
 - Use ORMs and DALs
 - Use parameterized queries
 - o OS
 - Never eval or execute user supplied input
 - XML
 - Disable inline DTD in the XML parser
 - Default in most parsers now
 - JSON
 - Use CSRF tokens
 - o etc.

OWASP: A1-Injection



OWASP: A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management

Types:

- Session Fixation
- Session tokens are weakly generated
- Session tokens are not protected by SSL/TLS

Mitigations

- Issue new sessions upon login
- Use cryptographically secure random number generators
 - Or make sure your framework is using one
- Use HTTPS and mark cookies as Secure

OWASP: A3-Cross-Site Scripting

- Types:
 - Stored
 - Reflected
 - DOM based
 - Includes HTML injection
 - Favorite test is to use ><marquee> tag
- Mitigations
 - Escape untrusted input
 - Frameworks have tools for that

OWASP: A3-Cross-Site Scripting



OWASP: A6-Sensitive Data Exposure

Types:

- Personally Identifiable Information
- Credit Cards
- Passwords

Mitigations


- Encrypt in database
 - Attackers can steal encryption keys
- Use SSL/TLS for transmission
- DON'T STORE IT!
 - Use OpenID
 - Email based authentication

OWASP: A6-Sensitive Data Exposure

- Password Storage
 - o Thou Shalt NOT:
 - Store plaintext passwords
 - Encrypt passwords
 - Use vanilla SHA1, SHA512, MD5, etc.
 - o Thou Shalt:
 - Use password storage mechanism
 - bcrypt, scrypt, PBKDF2
 - Use a unique salt per password

Information Security Careers

- 0% unemployment rate
- Federal government is hiring
- Corporate world is hiring
- Pays pretty well
- Information security is fun
- You get to be a cyberwarrior



Contact Information

- Contact Information
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Questions!?? and Brainstorm!!1