CSE 403 Lecture C

Security Testing for Mobile and Web Apps

slides created by Marty Stepp http://www.cs.washington.edu/403/

Outline

- Designing for security
- Web security
- Thinking like an attacker: finding vulnerabilities
- Android security risks

Designing for security

Methods of security

- Security through obscurity: Relying on the fact that attackers don't know something needed to harm you.
 - Example: "If an attacker pointed their browser to <u>http://foo.com/</u> <u>passwords.txt</u>, they'd get our passwords. But nobody knows that file is there, so we are safe."
 - Example: "Our app saves its sensitive user data using SQLite which ends up as a file on the local file system."
 - Example: "Our authentication database goes down for 2 minutes every night at 4am. During that time any user can log in without restrictions. But no one knows this, and the odds of a login at that time are miniscule."

Secure authentication

Force users to log in to your system before performing sensitive operations



- Use secure protocols (https, etc.) to prevent sniffing
 - Some sites use HTTPS only for login page, then switch back to regular HTTP for future page views. Is this bad?
- Force users to use strong passwords
 - not "password", or "abc", or same as their user name, etc.

| Authentication Required | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 3 | Enter username and password for "" at https://pascal.cs.washington.edu User Name: | | | | | |
| Password: | | | | | | |
| | ✓ Use Password Manager to remember this password. | | | | | |
| | OK Cancel | | | | | |

Principle of least privilege

• principle of least privilege:


Granting just enough authority to get the job done (no more!).

- Examples:
 - Code should not "run as root" or as a highly privileged user unless absolutely necessary.
 - A web server should only be given access to the set of HTML files that the web server is supposed to serve.
- Turn off unnecessary services on your server
 - disable SSH, VNC, sendmail, etc.
 - close all ports except 80, and any others needed for web traffic



Sanitizing inputs

- **sanitizing inputs**: Encoding and filtering untrusted user input before accepting it into a trusted system.
 - Ensure that accepted data is the right type, format, length...
 - Disallow entry of bad data into a graphical form.
 - Remove any SQL code from submitted user names.
 - Encode/sanitize input text that is displayed back to the user.



| Untitled Document - Mozilla Firefox | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|-------|------|-----------|-------------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|------|
| File | Edit | ⊻iew | History | Bookm | arks | Tools | Help | | | | | |
| (| - 📫 | > - 🤇 | 9 📀 | | P | http://lo | calhost/fil | tering, | (filterir | ngexan | nple1.H | ıtml |
| Wh | at is y | our na | me? | | | | | | | | | |
| Evil | User | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | . · · · | 0 | 17 | | | | | | | | | |
| Wh | at 15 y | our fav | vorite co | lor? | | | | | | | | |
| _ | | it BLA | | lor? | | | | | | | | |
| MIC | NIGH | IT BLA | | | den | swallo | v? | | | | | |

Verifying that code is secure

- Before code is written:
 - considering security in the design process
- As code is being written:
 - code reviews
 - code security audits
 - pair programming
- After code has been written:
 - walkthroughs
 - system security audits
 - system/functional security testing
 - penetration tests



Security audits

- security audit: A series of checks and questions to assess the security of your system.
 - can be done by an internal or external auditor
 - best if done as a process, not an individual event
- **penetration test**: Targeted white-hat attempt to compromise your system's security.
- **risk analysis**: Assessment of relative risks of what can go wrong when security is compromised.

Security audit questions

- Does your system require secure authentication with passwords?
- Are passwords difficult to crack?
- Are there access control lists (ACLs) in place on network devices?
- Are there audit logs to record who accesses data?
- Are the audit logs reviewed?
- Are your OS security settings up to accepted industry levels?
- Have all unnecessary applications and services been eliminated?
- Are all operating systems and applications patched to current levels?
- How is backup media stored? Who has access to it? Is it up-to-date?
- Is there a disaster recovery plan? Has it ever been rehearsed?
- Are there good cryptographic tools in place to govern data encryption?
- Have custom-built applications been written with security in mind?
- How have these custom applications been tested for security flaws?
- How are configuration and code changes documented at every level? How are these records reviewed and who conducts the review?

Data classification

- **data classification table**: For each kind of data your app saves/uses, ask yourself:
 - Is this information personal or sensitive in nature?
 - What does my app do with this information?
 - Where and in what format is it saved?
 - Is it sent over the network?
 - (for all above) Does it need to be? Can I reduce my use?

| Data Type | Personal? | Sensitive? | Create | Store | Send | Receive |
|----------------|-----------|------------|--------|-------|------|---------|
| Name | Yes | No | Х | Х | х | |
| E-mail Address | Yes | Yes | Х | Х | х | |
| Phone No. | Yes | Yes | Х | Х | | |
| Address | Yes | Yes | Х | Х | | |

Data storage location

• Where is your app storing its data, and why? Is it secure?

| Storage Method | Description | Data Privacy |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Shared preferences | Allows you to store primitive data types (e.g., int, Boolean, float, long, and String) that will persist across the device session. Even if your application is not running, your data will persist until the device is restarted. | Can set four modes of privacy: MODE_PRIVATE, MODE_WORLD_ READABLE, MODE_WORLD_WRITABLE, and MODE_MULTI_PROCESS. |
| | | Default mode is MODE_PRIVATE |
| Internal storage | Allows you to store your data in the device's internal memory. Generally, this data is not accessible by other applications or even the end user. This is a private data storage area. Data stored here will persist even after a device | Can set three modes of privacy: MODE_PRIVATE, MODE_WORLD_ READABLE, and MODE_WORLD_ WRITABLE. |
| | restarts. When the end user removes your application, Android will also delete your data. | Default mode is MODE_PRIVATE. |
| External storage | Data stored here is world-readable. The device user and other applications can read, modify, and delete this data. The external storage is associated with SD Cards or device internal storage (which is nonremovable). | Data is world readable by default. |
| SQLite databases | If you need to create a database for your application to take advantage of SQLite's searching and data management capabilities, use the SQLite database storage mechanism. | Databases that you create are accessible by any class within your application. Outside applications have no access to this database. |
| Network connection | You can store and retrieve data remotely through web services. You can read more | Based on your web service settings. |

Encryption

• You can easily **encrypt** data in Android just before/after saving it to the device's SD card or local database.

```
private static byte[] encrypt(byte[] key, byte[] data) {
    SecretKeySpec sKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES");
    Cipher cipher;
    byte[] ciphertext = null;
    try {
        cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
        cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT MODE, sKeySpec);
        ciphertext = cipher.doFinal(data);
    } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
        Loq.e(TAG, "NoSuchAlgorithmException");
    } catch (InvalidKeyException e) {
        Log.e(TAG, "InvalidKeyException");
    } catch (Exception e) {
        Loq.e(TAG, "Exception");
    return ciphertext;
                                SheranlGunasekeral||sheran@zenconsult.net|12120031337|
                                "µ≥d÷áf‡∉¢●ånîåGË∈5Ωë∂lê∫0© f, íç ÅÅót™±l`:"ga œøÉ?o Ωk ∨ ?QîÍQ∞
```

Mobile+web apps

• OWASP Top 10 issues for mobile apps that talk to web apps:





- Identify and protect sensitive data on the mobile device.
- Handle **password credentials** securely on the device.
- Ensure that sensitive data is protected in transit.
- Implement user **authentication** and session management correctly.
- Keep the **back-end APIs** (services) and the platform (server) secure.
- Perform data integration with **third party** services/apps securely.
- Pay specific attention to the collection and storage of **consent** for the collection and use of the user's data.
- Implement controls to prevent unauthorized access to **paid-for** resources (e.g., wallet, SMS, and phone calls).
- Ensure secure **distribution**/provisioning of mobile applications.
- Carefully check any runtime interpretation of code for errors.

Secure web (HTTPS)

• man-in-the-middle attack:

- unauthorized third party can hear web traffic on its hops between client and server
- For security, all web traffic in your app should use HTTPS secure protocol.
 - built on Secure Socket Layer (SSL)







Web security

Denial-of-Service (DoS)

- **Denial of Service (DoS)** attack: Attacker causes web server to be unavailable.
- How attack is performed:
 - Attacker frequently requests many pages from your web site.
 - distributed DoS (DDoS): DoS using lots of computers
 - Your server cannot handle this many requests at a time, so it turns into a smoldering pile of goo (or just becomes very slow).
- Problems that this attack can cause:
 - Users cannot get to your site.
 - Online store's server crashes -> store loses potential revenue.
 - Server may crash and lose or corrupt important data.
 - All the bandwidth used by the DoSers may cost you \$\$\$.

Packet sniffing

- **packet sniffing**: Listening to traffic sent on a network.
 - Many internet protocols (http, aim, email) are unsecure.
 - If an attacker is on the same local network (LAN) as you, he can:
 - read your email/IMs as you send them
 - see what web sites you are viewing
 - grab your password as it's being sent to the server
- solutions:
 - Use secure protocols (ssh, https)
 - Encryption
 - Don't let creeps on your LAN/wifi

| 09:51:02:531 192:168.1.3:1146 09:51:02:546 192:168.1.3:1145 09:51:03:859 192:168.1.3:1147 | 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.1 | | 1 | 0 | D.E1.0 | | 72 | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|--|--|---|--|---|---|---|--|
| 09:51:03.859 192.168.1.3:1147 | 192.168.1.1 | 00 | | | | | | 10 C I | 669 | HT | TP/1 | |
| | | 80 | | 1 × 1 | | 03.875 | | | 000 | | neres | |
| | 192.168.1.1 | | 2 | | |)3.875 | | - | 0 | - | | |
| 09:51:06.906 192.168.1.3:137 | 192.168.1.2 | | 9 | | | | | | - | 0.5 | T 11 | |
| 09:51:07.921 192.168.1.3:1148 | 192.168.1.1 | | j ja | | | 03.875 | | | 344 | | T /ha | |
| 09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 | 192.168.1.2 | 55:138 | -118 | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | HT | TP/1 | |
| | | | - 14 | 0 🕐 | 9:51:0 | 03.875 | 54 | | 0 | | | |
| | | | ٦Ľ | 0 🕦 | 9:51:0 |)3.875 | 54 | | 0 | | | |
| | | | - La | 0 🕥 | 9:52:0 | 9.609 | 54 | | 0 | | | - |
| | | • | | 4 | | | | | | | Þ | |
| • | 0030 0030 0040 0050 0060 0070 0080 0090 0040 | FD 6D 48 3A 68 2E 0D 65 2D | 7A 61 54 20 74 31 31 3A 3A 45 | 4A BB 67 65 54 50 2A 2F 74 70 2F 4D 41 63 20 7A 6E 63 | 00 73 2F 2A 3A 61 63 68 6F | 00 4 2F 6 31 2 0D 0 2F 2 69 6 65 7 2D 6 64 6 | 7 45 3 72 E 31 A 52 F 31 E 50 0 74 3 6E 9 6E | 54 6F 0D 65 39 61 2D 0D 67 | 20 73 0A 66 32 67 4C 0A 3A | 2F 68 73 2E 41 63 65 72 2E 31 65 3F 61 6E 41 63 20 67 | 61 67 63 65 65 69 67 67 63 7A | |
| TTL: 128 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F | 39351:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 93404::398 bytes 9 Ethernet Header 9 Str Mac Address: 00.07.5 9 Str Mac Address: 00.40.bit 9 Type: 2048 19 IP Header 9 Str Mac Address: 00.40.bit 9 Total length: 3 9 Str Total length: 384 9 Total length: 3612 10 | 09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.2 20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:20:2 | 09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255:138 Packet: 398 bytes Ethernet Header Type: 2048 0000 00 0010 01 0020 01 0030 FD 0040 6D 0050 48 0060 3A 0070 68 28 rv Kac Address: 00.40.850 0040 60 0050 48 0050 48 0050 48 0050 48 0050 48 0050 02 0080 2E 0090 00 00A0 65 0080 2E 0090 00 00A0 65 0080 2E | 09:51:17.000 192:168.1.3:138 192:168.1.255:138 09:51:17.000 192:168.1.3:138 192:168.1.255:138 00:00 10:000 0000 10:000 00:00 0000 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 10:000 00:00 00:00 | 09351:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 000 00 00 000 00 00 000 00 07 20 55.7 Mac Address: 00.07.53.02 95 55.7 Mac Address: 00.40.b8.50 10 104 000 10 104 79 9030 FD 7A 10 104 66 10 104 79 9030 FD 7A 9040 6D 61 9050 48 54 9050 48 54 9050 20 20 9050 20 20 9050 20 20 9050 20 20 9050 20 21 9050 20 21 9050 20 21 9050 20 20 | 09351:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 | 09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:03.875 09:51:03.875 00:05:04:05:02 00:07 00:05:04:05:02 00:07 00:05:04:05:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:05:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:05:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 00:07:06:05:04:02 00:07 | 03:51:17.000 192:168.1.3:138 192:168.1.255:138 192:00:51:03.875 393 00:51:03.875 00:51:03.875 54 00:51:03.875 54 00:05:03.875 00:51:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 54 00:05:03.875 00:51:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 54 00:05:03.875 00:51:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 54 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:05:00 00:00 < | 03:51:17.000 192:168.1.3:138 192:168.1.255:138 192:03:51:03.875 398 00:51:03.875 03:51:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 03:55:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 03:55:03.875 54 00:55:03.875 03:55:03.875 54 00:00 07 53:02 07 00:01 01:00 01:00 01:00 01:00 00:01 01:00 00:00 07 53:02 00:01 01:00 01:00 01:00 01:00 01:00 01:00 00:01 01:00 </td <td>09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255:138 009:51:03.875 398 344 09:51:03.875 981 92.168.1.255:138 009:51:03.875 981 92.168 09:51:03.875 54 0 009:51:03.875 54 0 09:51:03.875 54 0 009:51:03.875 54 0 00:00 00 753 02.17 10 00 48 50 Ethermet Header 00:00 00 753 02.17 10 00 48 50 Src Mac Address: 00.07.53.02 010 10 02 70 57 73 26 73 26 73 26 73 26 73 05 04 85 0000 04 85 54 0 0000 00 70 93 50 0010 10 80 80 00 74 54 20 0030 16 73 26 73 26 73 26 7</td> <td>09351:17.000 192 168.1.3:138 192 168.1.255:138 192 168.1.255:138 193 09551:03.875 398 344 GE 09351:17.000 192 168.1.3:138 192 168.1.255:138 193 09551:03.875 54 0 00051:03.875 54 0 193 0951:03.875 54 0 0001 01 0001 01 0952:03.807 54 0 0010 01 000 07 53 02 17 10 04 08 50 A5 2040et: 398 bytes 0010 01 00 00 00 00 00 70 53 02 10 04 88 50 A5 AC 2050 505 Mac Address: 00.07.53.02 00 01 04 79 00 50 70 99 35 02 76 2050 48 54 50 27 51 31 39 32 22 31 39 32 23 31 39 32 23 31 39 32 32 31 39</td> <td>09351:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 192.168.1</td> | 09:51:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255:138 009:51:03.875 398 344 09:51:03.875 981 92.168.1.255:138 009:51:03.875 981 92.168 09:51:03.875 54 0 009:51:03.875 54 0 09:51:03.875 54 0 009:51:03.875 54 0 00:00 00 753 02.17 10 00 48 50 Ethermet Header 00:00 00 753 02.17 10 00 48 50 Src Mac Address: 00.07.53.02 010 10 02 70 57 73 26 73 26 73 26 73 26 73 05 04 85 0000 04 85 54 0 0000 00 70 93 50 0010 10 80 80 00 74 54 20 0030 16 73 26 73 26 73 26 7 | 09351:17.000 192 168.1.3:138 192 168.1.255:138 192 168.1.255:138 193 09551:03.875 398 344 GE 09351:17.000 192 168.1.3:138 192 168.1.255:138 193 09551:03.875 54 0 00051:03.875 54 0 193 0951:03.875 54 0 0001 01 0001 01 0952:03.807 54 0 0010 01 000 07 53 02 17 10 04 08 50 A5 2040et: 398 bytes 0010 01 00 00 00 00 00 70 53 02 10 04 88 50 A5 AC 2050 505 Mac Address: 00.07.53.02 00 01 04 79 00 50 70 99 35 02 76 2050 48 54 50 27 51 31 39 32 22 31 39 32 23 31 39 32 23 31 39 32 32 31 39 | 09351:17.000 192.168.1.3:138 192.168.1.255.138 192.168.1 |

Password cracking

• password cracking:

Guessing the passwords of privileged users of your system.

- How attack is performed:
 - brute force attack: Attacker uses software that sequentially tries every possible password.
 - dictionary attack: Attacker uses <u>software</u> that sequentially tries passwords based on words in a dictionary.
 - every word in the dictionary
 - combinations of words, numbers, etc.
- What you can do about it:
 - Force users to have secure passwords.
 - Block an IP address from logging in after N failed attempts.

Phishing/social engineering

- phishing: Masqueraded mails or web sites.
 - social engineering: Attempts to manipulate users, such as fraudulently acquiring passwords or credit card numbers.
- Problems:
 - If trusted users of your system are tricked into giving out their personal information, attackers can use this to log in as those users and compromise your system.




Security Center Advisory! Make sure you never provide your We recently noticed one or more attempts to log in to your password to fraudulent persons. PayPal account from a foreign IP address and we have reasons to belive that your account was hijacked by a third PayPal automatically encrypts your party without your authorization. If you recently accessed confidential information using the your account while traveling, the unusual log in attempts Secure Sockets Laver protocol may have been initiated by you. (SSL) with an encryption key length of 128-bits (the highest level If you are the rightful holder of the account you must **click** commercially available). the link below and then complete all steps from the following page as we try to verify your identity. PayPal will never ask you to enter your password in an email. Click here to verify your account For more information on protecting yourself from fraud, please review http://211.248.156.177/.PayPal/cgi-bin/webscrcmd_login.php our Security Tips at If you choose to ignore our request, you leave us no choise http://www.paypal.com/securitytips but to temporaly suspend your account.

Protect Your Account Info

Privilege escalation

- **privilege escalation**: Attacker becomes able to run code on your server as a privileged user.
 - Example: Perhaps normal users aren't able to directly query your database. But an attacker may find a flaw in your security letting him run as an administrator and perform the query.
 - Once you're running as root,
 You own the server.
 You can do anything you want!



Cross-site scripting (XSS)

- cross-site scripting: Causing one person's script code to be executed when a user browses to another site.
 - Example: Visit google.com, but evil.com's JavaScript runs.
- How attack is performed:
 - Attacker finds unsecure code on target site.
 - Attacker uses hole to inject JavaScript into the page.
 - User visits page, sees malicious script code.




SQL Injection

SQL injection:

Causing undesired SQL queries to be run on your database.

- Often caused when untrusted input is pasted into a SQL query PHP: "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name='\$name';";
- specify a user name of: x' OR 'a'='a

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name='x' OR 'a'='a';



Thinking like an attacker: finding vulnerabilities

Panning for gold

- View Source, and look for:
 - HTML comments
 - script code
 - other sensitive information in code:
 IP/email addresses, SQL queries, hidden fields,...
 - watch HTTP requests/responses
 - look for hidden pages, files, parameters to target
 - error messages sent to your browser by app
 - 200: OK 400: Invalid request
 - 403: Forbidden 404: File not found
 - 500: Internal server error

| \varTheta 🔿 🔿 📄 huan_ying. | ht |
|---|-----|
| J 🖬 🖬 🚔 💊 📀 | à |
| <html conte<="" th="" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/</th><th></th></tr><tr><th><head><meta http-equiv="><th>nt</th></html> | nt |
| | |
| <meta cont<="" name="Generator" th=""/> <th></th> | |
| <meta con<="" name="iWeb-Build" th=""/> <th></th> | |
| <meta <title="" conte="" http-equiv="X-UA-Comp</th><th></th></tr><tr><th><pre><meta name=" viewport"=""/> | |
| link rel="stylesheet" type | |
| files/huan_ying.css" /> | |
| [if lt IE 8] <link rel="</th"/> <th>151</th> | 151 |
| href='huan_ying_files/huan_yin | |
| [if gte IE 8] <link rel<="" th=""/> <th>1</th> | 1 |
| <pre>' href='Media/IE8.css'/><!--[endi</pre--></pre> | f]. |
| <script javascri<="" text="" th="" type="text/javascri</th><th>pt'</th></tr><tr><th><script type="><th>pt'</th></tr><tr><th>mmon.js"></script> | |
| <script javascri<="" text="" th="" type="text/javascri</th><th>pt'</th></tr><tr><th>pt></th><th></th></tr><tr><th><script type="><th></th></tr><tr><th><pre><script type="text/javascri </head></pre></th><th>Dt.</th></tr><tr><th><pre></pre>dockground: rgb()</pre></th><th>251</th></tr><tr><th><pre>();" onunload="onPageUnload();"</pre></th><th></th></tr><tr><th><pre><div style="text-align: cen</pre></th><th></th></tr><tr><th><div style="margin-bottom</th><th></th></tr><tr><th>gin-top: 0px; overflow: hidden;</th><th></th></tr><tr><th>ground: rgb(255, 255, 255); tex</th><th>t-a</th></tr><tr><th><div style="margin-left</th><th>: (</th></tr><tr><th>θ; " id="nav_layer"></th><th></th></tr><tr><th><div style="height: 0</th><th>px;</th></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table></script> | |


Input forms

- Forms let users pass parameters to the web server.
- Parameters are passed using GET or POST requests.
 - GET: parameters are contained in the request URL. http://www.google.com?q=Stephen+Colbert&lang=en
 - **POST**: parameters are contained in the HTTP packet header.
 - harder for the user to see, but no more secure than GET
- Forms provide a rich attack ground...



Form validation

- validation: Examining form parameters to make sure they are acceptable before/as they are submitted.
 - nonempty, alphabetical, numeric, length, ...
 - client-side: HTML/JS checks values before request is sent.
 - **server-side**: JSP/Ruby/PHP/etc. checks values received.
- Some validation is performed by restricting the user's choices.
 - select **boxes**
 - input text boxes with
 maxlength attribute
 - key event listeners that erase certain key presses



User input attacks

- Bypassing client-side input restrictions and validation
 - maxlength limits on an input text field
 - choices not listed in a select box
 - hidden input fields
 - modifying or disabling client-side JavaScript validation code


| Building Java Programs | : | Practice-It! |
|------------------------|---|--------------|
|------------------------|---|--------------|

| 🧕 guest | |
|--|--|
| Log in | Choose a category and problem: |
| Create User | BJP Chapter Exercises |
| school: | Chapter 1: Introduction to Java Programming (29) |
| username: | Chapter 2: Primitive Data and Definite Loops (39) |
| | Chapter 3: Parameters and Objects (26) |
| your name: | Chapter 3G Supplement: Graphics (9) Chapter 4: Conditional Execution (17) |
| 😤 💷 Console HTML 🕶 CSS Script DOM Net | |
| Edit 🗉 span#allschools | |
| <pre><div <="" id="createschoolcompleter" pre=""></div></pre> | <pre>style="display: none;"/></pre> |
| | |
| □ <div></div> | |
| <labelm class="columnname" for="columnna</th><th>createusername">username:</labelm> | |
| | ="text" maxlength="10" size="12" name="username"/> |
| | |
| □ <div></div> | |
| <label <="" class="columnname" for="columnname" th=""><td><pre>createname">your name:</pre></td></label> xt" maxlength="30" size="30" name="name"/> | <pre>createname">your name:</pre> |
| | |

Guessing files/directories

- **security through obscurity**: Many reachable files/resources are hidden only by the fact that there is no link to them.
- Try common file/folder/commands to see what happens:
 - /etc/passwd,/etc/shadow,cat,ls,grep
 - guess file names based on others
 - page11.php
 - loginfailure.jsp
 - accounts/fred.html
 - brute force / web spiders
 - port scanners

- --> page12.php
- --> loginsuccess.jsp
- --> accounts/sue.html





University of Washington Computer Science & Engineering

Other attacks

- Attacking GET parameters
- Attacking hidden input fields
- Attacking cookies
- Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

Android security risks

Android security risks

- What are some security risks you can think of that can affect an Android phone?
 - What are actions a malicious app could take?




• Examples:

- uses a bug or security vulnerability to gain ungranted permissions
- shows the user unsolicited messages (especially commercial)
- resists (or attempts to resist) the user's effort to uninstall it
- attempts to automatically spread itself to other devices
- hides its files and/or processes
- discloses the user's private information to a third party w/o consent
- destroys the user's data (or the device itself) without w/o consent
- impersonates the user (such as by sending email or buying things)
- drains the phone's battery, data bytes/minutes, SMS/MMS remaining
- otherwise degrades the user's experience with the device

Android OS security

- The Android operating system provides security:
 - Unix-based file/directory permission model
 - process memory isolation and memory protection
 - filesystem encryption
 - per-app access to hardware devices
 - per-app restrictions on memory/CPU usage, other resources
 - network/data connection
 - camera
 - location (GPS) data
 - bluetooth
 - SMS/MMS
 - ...
 - DRM framework





Mobile app permissions

- Apps must declare which **permissions** they need
 - e.g. use internet; write to local files; look at contacts; use Bluetooth; access GPS location; send SMS
 - user must manually give permission for actions
- Fine-grained access control in Manifest XML file
 - File/URL-specific permissions

```
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.android.app.myapp" >
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS" />
...
</manifest>
```



```
Ý 🛎
 Do you want to install this
 application?
    Services that cost you money
     directly call phone numbers
     Your location
      coarse (network-based) location, fine
     (GPS) location
    Network communication
      full Internet access
     Your accounts
      Google Maps, manage the accounts list,
     use the authentication credentials of an
     account
     Storage
     modify/delete USB storage contents
      Install
                            Cancel
```

Signed apps/stores


- **signed apps**: Coded with a private developer key
 - On Android / iPhone, apps must be signed in market
 - manual approval reduces chance of rogue apps
 - any app bought in official App Store / Market is generally thought of as having being audited
 - Is this true for Apple store apps?
 - Is this true for Google Play Market apps?
 - App store users can **rate** the apps and **comment**
 - Do you feel that an app is more likely to be secure:
 - If it is from a publisher/company you already know?
 - If a friend of yours has it installed?
 - If it costs money?






Problems with Android

- Apps can ask for too many permissions.
 - Users don't really understand permissions.
 - Users are overwhelmed and just click "Yes"
 - Now the app can do almost anything.
- Updates to an app can change its permissions.
 - example: recent Facebook app update
 - Users often click "Yes" if they already trust the app.
 - "privilege escalation"
- Spammy apps
 - resist attempts to uninstall
 - show ads that are like system/OS UI
 - disclose or damage the user's personal information data
 - impersonates the user



Example attack

- Android 2.2 / 2.3 had vulnerabilities.
 - Browser could download a HTML page.
 - The page contains JS code.
 - The JS code can self-execute later in a "local" context.
 - This has higher permissions and can modify the local file system.



- App ABC stores sensitive data on the local file system.
 - The data is financially important.
 - It is saved as a file in plain-text.
 - The above malicious browser JS code can read and access it.