Buffer Overflows
CSE 351 Summer 2021

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NO ONE LIKED MY NEW SPORTS SYSTEM, IN WHICH EACH PLAYER IS IN A SEPARATE ARENA SHARING A SINGLE VIRTUAL BALL THAT THEY CAN'T SEE WHILE ONLINE VIEWERS YELL INSTRUCTIONS, BUT IT WAS FUN TO WATCH WHILE IT LASTED.

http://xkcd.com/2291/
Gentle, Loving Reminders

- hw12 due Friday (7/23)
- hw13 due Monday (7/26)
- Lab 2 due tonight! (7/21)
  - Extra Credit portion – make sure you also submit to the Lab 2 Extra Credit assignment on Gradescope
- Lab 3 released!
  - Today’s lecture on buffer overflow.
  - You get to write some buffer overflow exploits!
Learning Objectives

Understanding this lecture means you can:

- Explain what buffers are, and why they can overflow
- Perform buffer overflow exploits on vulnerable code (Lab 3)
- Explain a few mitigations strategies for buffer overflows
- Critically read technologies through the lens of agency, support, & access
- Explain race (and other modes of oppression) as technologies
Review: General Memory Layout

- **Stack**
  - Local variables (procedure context)

- **Heap**
  - Dynamically allocated as needed
  - `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, ...

- **Statically allocated Data**
  - Read/write: global variables (Static Data)
  - Read-only: string literals (Literals)

- **Code/Instructions**
  - Executable machine instructions
  - Read-only
x86-64 Linux Memory Layout

- **Stack**
  - Runtime stack has 8 MiB limit

- **Heap**
  - Dynamically allocated as needed
  - `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, ...

- **Statically allocated data (Data)**
  - Read-only: string literals
  - Read/write: global arrays and variables

- **Code / Shared Libraries**
  - Executable machine instructions
  - Read-only

Hex Address

```
0x00007FFFFFFF
```

```
0x000000
```

```
0x400000
```

```
0x000000
```

This is extra (non-testable) material
Memory Allocation Example

```c
char big_array[1L<<24]; /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /* 2 GB */

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /* 4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}
```

Where does everything go?
## Memory Allocation Example

```c
#include <stdlib.h>

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /* 4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}
```

Where does everything go?

- **Stack**
- **Data**
- **Instructions**
- **Heap**
- **Shared Libraries**

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**L02: Memory & Data I**

**L13: Buffer Overflow**
What Is a Buffer?

- A buffer is an array used to temporarily store data.
- You’ve probably seen “video buffering…”
  - The video is being written into a buffer before being played.
- Buffers can also store user input.
Reminder: x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

- **Caller’s Stack Frame**
  - Arguments (if > 6 args) for this call

- **Current/ Callee Stack Frame**
  - Return address
    - Pushed by `call` instruction
  - Old frame pointer (optional)
  - Caller-saved pushed before setting up arguments for a function call
  - Callee-saved pushed before using long-term registers
  - Local variables (if can’t be kept in registers)
  - “Argument build” area (Need to call a function with >6 arguments? Put them here)
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- C does not check array bounds!
  - Many Unix/Linux/C functions don’t check arg sizes
  - Allows overflowing (writing past the end) of buffers (arrays)

- “Buffer Overflow” = Writing past end of an array

- Linux memory layout provides opportunities for malicious programs
  - Stack grows “backwards” in memory (downwards)
  - Data and instructions both stored in the same memory
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses

- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses

- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

Enter input: hello

No overflow 😊
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

Enter input: helloabcdef
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

Enter input: helloabcdef
Buffer overflow! 😞
How are you feeling so far?
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Buffer overflows on the stack can overwrite “interesting” data
  - Attackers just choose the right inputs

- Simplest form (a.k.a. called “stack smashing”)
  - Unchecked length on string input into bounded array causes overwriting of stack data
  - Change the return address of the current procedure

- Why is this a big deal?
  - It was the #1 technical cause of security vulnerabilities
  - #1 overall cause is social engineering
String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```c
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- What could go wrong in this code?
String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```c
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- No way to specify `limit` on number of characters to read

- Similar problems with other Unix functions:
  - `strcpy`: Copies string of arbitrary length to a dst
  - `scanf`, `fscanf`, `sscanf`, when given `%s` specifier
Vulnerable Buffer Code

```c
/* Echo Line */
void echo() {
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

void call_echo() {
    echo();
}
```

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
123456789012345
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
6
Segmentation Fault
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
67
Illegal instruction
```
Buffer Overflow Assembly (buf-nsp)

**echo:**

```
0000000000400597 <echo>:
  400597: 48 83 ec 18                      sub $0x18,%rsp
  ... calls printf ...
  4005aa: 48 8d 7c 24 08                           lea 0x8(%rsp),%rdi
  4005af: e8 d6 fe ff ff                          callq 400480 <gets@plt>
  4005b4: 48 89 7c 24 08                          lea 0x8(%rsp),%rdi
  4005b9: e8 b2 fe ff ff                          callq 4004a0 <puts@plt>
  4005be: 48 83 c4 18                            add $0x18,%rsp
  4005c2: c3                                      retq
```

**call_echo:**

```
00000000004005c3 <call_echo>:
  4005c3: 48 83 ec 08                      sub $0x8,%rsp
  4005c7: b8 00 00 00 00                    mov $0x0,%eax
  4005cc: e8 c6 ff ff ff                    callq 400597 <echo>
  4005d1: 48 83 c4 08                    add $0x8,%rsp
  4005d5: c3                       retq
```

```
Buffer Overflow Stack

Before call to

Stack frame for call_echo

Return address (8 bytes)

8 bytes unused

buf

8 bytes unused

Note: addresses increasing right-to-left, bottom-to-top

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

echo:
    subq $24, %rsp
    ...
    leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi
    call gets
    ...

buf ← %rsp
Buffer Overflow Example

Before call to

Stack frame for call_echo

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

call_echo:

```
... 4005cc: callq 400597 <echo>
... 4005d1: add $0x8,%rsp
... 8 bytes unused
```

Before call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo

```
00 00 00 00 00 40 05 d1
```

8 bytes unused

```
[3] [2] [1] [0]
```

8 bytes unused

```
buf <- %rsp
```

echo:

```
subq $24, %rsp
...
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi
call gets
... 8 bytes unused
```
Buffer Overflow Ex #1

After call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo

void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    ...
}

echo:
    subq $24,%rsp
    ...
    leaq 8(%rsp),%rdi
    call gets
    ...

call_echo:

    ...
    4005cc: callq 400597 <echo>
    4005d1: add $0x8,%rsp
    ...

unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
123456789012345

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

Note: Digit "N" is just 0x3N in ASCII!
Buffer Overflow Ex #2

After call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo

| 00 00 00 00 | 00 40 05 00 |
| 36 35 34 33 | 32 31 30 39 |
| 38 37 36 35 | 34 33 32 31 |
| 8 bytes unused | %rsp |

void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    ...
}

echo:
    subq $24, %rsp
    ...
    leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi
    call gets
    ...

call_echo:
    ...
    4005cc: callq 400597 <echo>
    4005d1: add $0x8,%rsp
    ...

unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 1234567890123456
Illegal instruction

Overflowed buffer and corrupted return pointer
Buffer Overflow Ex #2 Explained

After return

Stack frame for call_echo

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 bytes unused</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

000000000004004f0 <deregister_tm_clones>:

4004f0: push %rbp
4004f1: mov $0x601040,%eax
4004f6: cmp $0x601040,%rax
4004fc: mov %rsp,%rbp
4004ff: je 400518
400501: mov $0x0,%eax
400506: test %rax,%rax
400509: je 400518
40050b: pop %rbp
40050c: mov $0x601040,%edi
400511: jmpq *%rax
400513: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
400518: pop %rbp
400519: retq

>Returns” to a byte that is not the beginning of an instruction, so program signals SIGILL, Illegal instruction
How do you feel about overwriting return addresses?
Buffer Overflow: Code Injection Attacks

- Input string contains byte representation of executable code
- Overwrite return address A with address of buffer B
- When \texttt{bar()} executes \texttt{ret}, will jump to exploit code

```c
void foo() {
    bar();
    return ...;
}

int bar() {
    char buf[64];
    gets(buf);
    ...
    return ...;
}
```
Checking in!

- **vulnerable** is vulnerable to stack smashing!
- What is the minimum number of characters that `gets` must read in order for us to change the return address to `0x00 00 7f ff CA FE F0 0D`?
  - (This is a stack address)

---

**Previous stack frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>00</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>d1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[0]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows

Buffer overflow bugs can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on victim machines

- Distressingly common in real programs
  - Programmers keep making the same mistakes 😞
  - Recent measures make these attacks more difficult

- Examples across the decades
  - Original “Internet worm” (1988)
  - Heartbleed (2014, affected 17% of servers)
    - Similar issue in Cloudbleed (2017)
  - Hacking embedded devices
    - Cars, Smart homes, Planes
Ex: the original Internet worm (1988)

- Exploited a few vulnerabilities to spread
  - Early versions of the finger server (*fingerd*) used `gets()` to read the argument sent by the client:
    - `finger` droh@cs.cmu.edu
  - Worm attacked *fingerd* server with phony argument:
    - `finger "exploit-code padding new-return-addr"
  - Exploit code: executed a root shell on the victim machine with a direct connection to the attacker
- Scanned for other machines to attack
  - Invaded ~6000 computers in hours (10% of Internet)
    - see [June 1989 article](https://doi.org/10.1145/72425.72426) in *Comm. of the ACM*
  - The author (Robert Morris*) was prosecuted…
Example: Heartbleed

**HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:**

**SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "POTATO" (6 LETTERS).**

User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO.
User da wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking secure records with master key 5130985733435.
User da asks user Meg to send the message: "I want pages about "irl games". Unlocking secure records with master key 5130985733435.

POTATO
Example: Heartbleed

**SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY “BIRD” (4 LETTERS).**

User Olivia from London wants pages about “bees in car why”. Note: Files for IP 375.381.283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 34 connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file elf64.jpg (contents: 834be962c3cb9ef89b334ef8)

**HMM...**

User Olivia from London wants pages about “bees in car why”. Note: Files for IP 375.381.283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 34 connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file elf64.jpg (contents: 834be962c3cb9ef89b334ef8)

BIRD
Example: Heartbleed

User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "C0ckPa$".
Heartbleed (2014)

- Buffer over-read in OpenSSL
  - Open source security library
  - Bug in a small range of versions
- “Heartbeat” packet
  - Specifies length of message
  - Server echoes it back
  - Library just “trusted” this length
  - Allowed attackers to read contents of memory anywhere they wanted
- Est. 17% of Internet affected
  - “Catastrophic”
  - Github, Yahoo, Stack Overflow, Amazon AWS, ...
Hacking Cars

- UW CSE research from 2010 demonstrated wirelessly hacking a car using buffer overflow
- Overwrote the onboard control system’s code
  - Disable brakes
  - Unlock doors
  - Turn engine on/off
How do we feel about exploiting buffers?
Dealing with buffer overflow attacks

1) Employ system-level protections
2) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
3) Have compiler use “stack canaries”
1) System-Level Protections

- Non-executable code segments
  - In traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”
    - Can execute anything readable
  - x86-64 added explicit “execute” permission
  - Stack marked as non-executable
    - Do NOT execute code in Stack, Static Data, or Heap regions
    - Hardware support needed

Stack after call to `gets()`

- B
- pad
- exploit code

Any attempt to execute this code will fail
1) System-Level Protections

- Non-executable code segments
  - Wait, doesn’t this fix everything?
  - Works, but can’t always use it
  - Many embedded devices do not have this protection
    - Cars
    - Smart homes
    - Pacemakers

- Some exploits still work!
  - Return-oriented programming
  - Return to libc attack

Any attempt to execute this code will fail
1) System-Level Protections

- **Randomized stack offsets**
  - At start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
  - Shifts stack addresses for entire program
    - Addresses will vary from one run to another
  - Makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code

- **Example**: Code from Slide 6 executed 5 times; address of variable `local` =
  - 0x7fffd19d3f8ac
  - 0x7ffe8a462c2c
  - 0x7ffe927c905c
  - 0x7ffefd5c27dc
  - 0x7fffa0175afc

- Stack repositioned when program executes
2) Avoid Vulnerabilities in Code

```c
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    fgets(buf, 8, stdin);
    puts(buf);
}
```

- Use library routines that limit string lengths
  - `fgets` instead of `gets` (2nd argument to `fgets` sets limit)
  - `strncpy` instead of `strcpy`
  - Don’t use `scanf` with `%s` conversion specification
    - Use `fgets` to read the string
    - Or use `%ns` where `n` is a suitable integer
2) Stack Canaries

- **Basic Idea:** place special value ("canary") on stack just beyond buffer
  - *Secret* value that is randomized before main()
  - Placed between buffer and return address
  - Check for corruption before exiting function

- **GCC implementation**
  - `-fstack-protector`

```
unix> ./buf
Enter string: 12345678
12345678
unix> ./buf
Enter string: 123456789
*** stack smashing detected ***
```
Protected Buffer (buf)

echo:

```
400607:  sub    $0x18,%rsp
40060b:  mov    %fs:0x28,%rax
400614:  mov    %rax,0x8(%rsp)
400619:  xor    %eax,%eax
  ...  ... call printf ...
400625:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
400628:  callq  400510 <gets@plt>
40062d:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
400630:  callq  4004d0 <puts@plt>
400635:  mov    0x8(%rsp),%rax
40063a:  xor    %fs:0x28,%rax
400643:  jne    40064a <echo+0x43>
400645:  add    $0x18,%rsp
400649:  retq
40064a:  callq  4004f0 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
```

This is extra (non-testable) material
Setting Up Canary

Before call to

Stack frame for call_echo

Return address (8 bytes)

Canary (8 bytes)

[3] [2] [1] [0]

buf ← %rsp

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

Segment register (don’t worry about it)

movq %fs:40, %rax       # Get canary
movq %rax, 8(%rsp)      # Place on stack
xorl %eax, %eax         # Erase canary

This is extra (non-testable) material
Checking Canary

**After call to gets**

```c
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

Input: 1234567
3) Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities

- Alternatively, don’t use C - use a language that does array index bounds check
  - Buffer overflow is impossible in Java
    - `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`
  - Rust language was designed with security in mind
    - Panics on index out of bounds, plus more protections

- C isn’t accessible! Though, neither is programming, but C is particularly bad.
Summary of Prevention Measures

1) Employ system-level protections
   • Code on the Stack is not executable
   • Randomized Stack offsets

2) Have compiler use “stack canaries”

3) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
   • Use library routines that limit string lengths
   • Use a language that makes them impossible
Think this is cool?

- You’ll love Lab 3 😊
  - Check out the buffer overflow simulator!
- Take CSE 484 (Security)
  - Several different kinds of buffer overflow exploits
  - Many ways to counter them
- Nintendo fun!
  - Using glitches to rewrite code: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqK-2jUQBUY
  - Flappy Bird in Mario: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hB6eY73sLV
How do we feel about mitigating buffers?
Now, fun stuff!
(though buffer overflows are interesting)
Last Time
Defining Usability

- If I write C and forget to bounds-check arrays, whose fault is it?
  - Mine? “I should have known better”
  - K&R’s? “They should have known better”

- Blame tends to be an individualistic focus
  - Sometimes helpful, i.e. malicious criminal cases
  - Sometimes less helpful, i.e. racism

- Def: Use, without causing harm, independent of physical or cognitive capabilities
  - Inaccessibility is a structural issue, not a personal one
Accessibility & CS

- CS, programming, in general, is inaccessible
  - Lots of cognitive requirements
- Many consumer technologies aren’t accessible
  - Few designed with accessibility in mind
- CS tech isn’t accessible either!
  - Tendency to over-emphasize individual → ideological foundations of CS
  - Many structures aren’t usable, “just don’t use them” isn’t always an option
  - Also, switches emphasis back to individual, away from structural inequity
Agency, Support, Accessibility
Agency, Support, Accessibility

- **Agency:** Capacity for exploration and self-expression (*fulfilling wants*)
- **Support:** Ability to receive assistance, receive care (*fulfilling needs*)
- **Accessibility:** Usability, based on needed support and desired agency
  - What agency can be expressed? What support is given? Who can use this technology?

- *A lens to view technologies*
- Who’s designing tech? What assumptions are being made in that design?
Agency, Support, Access: Assembly

- **Agency**: Basically, anything that can be computed, limited by ISA definitions
- **Support**: None! Everything from the ground up, the only support is a processor manual

- **Accessibility**: Building everything from the ground up requires a lot of assembly, and a high potential for bugs. Processor manuals are a lot to read and understand (Intel’s is ~8000 pages!).
  - Low support (basically none), high agency
C language (1978)

- Created in 1972, “standardized” in 1978
  - Goal of writing Unix (precursor to Linux/OSX)
- Explicit Goals:
  - Make a faster programming language than B
  - Make a simple, minimalistic language; easy to learn
- Non-Goal: make C accessible for learners
Agency, Support, Access: C

- **Agency**: Matches assembly, anything that can be computed, within ISA limitations
  - Portability means meeting requirements of many ISAs

- **Support**: Basic programming constructs, but nothing more. You’re assumed to not need support beyond loops/branches/functions

- **Access**: There’s library functions, but most things need to be built. The “ground” is higher than assembly, but not by much. No processor manuals, but lots of things can go wrong.
  - Low support, high agency
C: Arrays and Buffers

- Arrays are an opportunity to express agency!
  - Technically available in assembly
  - C gives a high-agency interface, mimicking the assembly level

- There’s no support with arrays!
  - Compared with assembly, a more powerful tool, without more support
  - Lack of support means more opportunities for harm
  - There’s more to keep track of! Higher potential for vulnerabilities, like buffer overflows
At the time

- Computing was still specialized
  - Programming wasn’t considered a “general task”
- C improves accessibility over assembly, and agency over B
  - Generally, programming languages aim to improve on agency/support of prior language
  - C isn’t an exception
Java

- No signed/unsigned distinction!
- Out of bounds exceptions
- No buffer overflows!
- “Write once, run anywhere”

- Aims to improve upon C’s lack of support/OOP, while maintaining agency expected from programming languages
Agency, Support, Access: Java

- **Agency:** You’re further from the hardware, but still turing complete. Generally slower than C
- **Support:** Exceptions, array bounds checks, much more support than C, portability built in, but lots of security vulnerabilities

- **Access:** Lots of libraries, pre-built code, more support than C. Further up from C/Assembly in the house of computing.
  - *Compared with C: Higher support, lower agency*
We’ve been talking about ideologies all quarter, what about those?
“We shape our tools, and thereafter, our tools shape us”

1967

“Reification”, if you want a single word. To make the abstract concrete.

Computing is a tool, but a tool built by a distinctly non-neutral society! We’ve always had values!
Technology:
Knowledge, encoded into artifacts, tools
“Human toolmaking is not limited to the stone instruments of our early ancestors or to the sleek gadgets produced by the modern tech industry. Human cultures also create symbolic devices that structure society.
“Human toolmaking is not limited to the stone instruments of our early ancestors or to the sleek gadgets produced by the modern tech industry. Human cultures also create symbolic devices that structure society. Race, to be sure, is one of our most powerful tools – developed over hundreds of years, varying across time and place, codified in law and refined through custom, and, tragically, still considered by many people to reflect immutable differences between groups.”

Ruha Benjamin
Return to Ideology

- Not every “technology” is “technical”!
- What does it mean to “use” social or symbolic technologies?
ASA: Race

- **Agency**: Varying, based on position/power
- **Support**: Varying, based on position/power
- **Access**: Extremely accessible, access to “race as technology” continues to be guaranteed by law
  - Both as oppressed and oppressors!

- Support for whom? Agency for whom?
Assembly, C, Java:

Support for whom?
Agency for whom?
Access for whom?

This extends to other tech…
Racist Technologies

- We can say a technology is *racist* when agency, support, and access provided by that technology are contingent upon one’s racial status.

- See: every facial recognition system, motion detection that assumes whiteness, software-aided photography, cameras, prison sentencing algorithms, policing in general, healthcare, especially around neurodiversity and cognition, education.
  - *If a system has outcomes that differ by race, we should call that system racist.*
Our path this quarter

- Historical context outside computing to surface ideologies within computing
- Critically reading *texts* for ideologies
- Critically reading *tech* for ideologies
- Comparing ideological priorities
Broad Ideologies

- Neoliberalism
  - Agency’s really important! Access/Support are “implementation details”

- Communism/Marxism
  - “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” - Marx
  - Support’s really important! Access/Agency are “implementation details”
Just one framework!
There are many others, but I like this one.
Critical Reading

- **For texts:**
  - What’s being assumed? What’s being prioritized? What’s emphasized? What’s given space?

- **For tech:**
  - What’s prioritized, between agency, support, and access?
  - What assumptions are made around agency, support, access?
  - ASA for who? For everyone? Or, only for those with privilege? Only for those seen as legitimate?
    - Do you need a “Computer Scientist” card?
Who’s welcome in the house of computing?
Who’s welcome?

- What’s given to newcomers?
- When we hear about agency, for whom?
- When we hear about support, for whom?
- When we hear about access, for whom?
Extra Notes about %rbp

- %rbp is used to store the frame pointer
  - Name comes from “base pointer”
- You can refer to a variable on the stack as %rbp+offset
- The base of the frame will never change, so each variable can be uniquely referred to with its offset
- The top of the stack (%rsp) may change, so referring to a variable as %rsp−offset is less reliable
  - For example, if you need save a variable for a function call, pushing it onto the stack changes %rsp
Hacking DNA Sequencing Tech

- Potential for malicious code to be encoded in DNA!
- Attacker can gain control of DNA sequencing machine when malicious DNA is read
- Ney et al. (2017)
  - [https://dnasec.cs.washington.edu/](https://dnasec.cs.washington.edu/)

There has been rapid improvement in the cost and speed of sequencing technologies, making it possible to sequence human genomes at an incredibly low cost. This has had a profound impact on fields ranging from personalized medicine, ancestry, and biodiversity.
## Where Is It?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Label</th>
<th>Section of Memory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>big_array</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>huge_array</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*p1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>useless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes Diagrams

1) exploit code

2) padding

3) array addr

Start of local array

Saved Registers

stack smashing

Caller's Stack Frame

Return Addr

Old %rbp

Saved Registers

Local Variables

Lower Addresses

Higher Addresses

%rsp

Caller's Stack Frame

Return Addr

Old %rbp

Saved Registers

Local Variables

Lower Addresses

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%rsp

Start of local array

Local Variables

Lower Addresses

Higher Addresses