Buffer Overflows

CSE 351 Summer 2020

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

NO ONE LIKED MY NEW SPORTS SYSTEM, IN WHICH EACH PLAYER IS IN A SEPARATE ARENA SHARING A SINGLE VIRTUAL BALL THAT THEY CAN'T SEE WHILE ONLINE VIEWERS YELL INSTRUCTIONS, BUT IT WAS FUN TO WATCH WHILE IT LASTED.

http://xkcd.com/2291/

Administrivia

- Questions doc: https://tinyurl.com/CSE351-7-22

- No hw due Friday!
- hw13 due Monday (7/27) – 10:30am
- Lab 2 due tonight (7/22)
  - Extra Credit portion – make sure you also submit to the Lab 2 Extra Credit assignment on Gradescope
- Lab 3 released later this afternoon
  - Today's lecture on buffer overflow.
  - You get to write some buffer overflow exploits!

Nested Array Example

```
int sea[4][5] =
  {{ 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 3 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 1, 5 }};
```

Remember, **T** A[N] is an array with elements of type **T**, with length N

`sea[3][2];`



- "Row-major" ordering of all elements
- Elements in the same row are contiguous
- Guaranteed (in C)

Nested Array Row Access Code

returning address

```
int* get_sea_zip(int index)
{
  return sea[index];
}
```

```
int sea[4][5] =
  {{ 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 3 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 1, 5 }};
```

```
  # %rdi = index
  leaq (%rdi,%rdi,4),%rax  # 5 * index
  leaq sea(,%rax,4),%rax   # sea + (20 * index)
```

Just calculates start address of row (no dereference!)

- Row Vector
  - `sea[index]` is array of 5 `int`s
  - Starting address = `sea+20*index`
- Assembly Code
  - Computes and returns address
  - Compute as: `sea+4*(index+4*index)= sea+20*index`

Nested Array Element Access Code

returning value

```
int get_sea_digit
   (int index, int digit)
{
  return sea[index][digit];
}
```

```
int sea[4][5] =
  {{ 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 5 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 0, 3 },
   { 9, 8, 1, 1, 5 }};
```

```
leaq   (%rdi,%rdi,4), %rax   # 5*index
addl   %rax, %rsi            # 5*index+digit
movl   sea(,%rsi,4),  %eax   # *(sea + 4*(5*index+digit))
```

one dereference to get value at address

- Array Elements
  - `sea[index][digit]` is an **`int`** (**`sizeof`**(**`int`**)=4)
  - Address = `sea + 5*4*index + 4*digit`
- Assembly Code
  - Computes address as: `sea + ((index+4*index) + digit)*4`
  - `movl` performs memory reference *Only one!*

Multidimensional Referencing Examples

`int sea[4][5];`

sizeof(row) sizeof(int)

sea+20*R+4*C

row offset, col offset



Reference	Address	Value	Guaranteed?
sea[3][3]	76+20*3+4*3 = 148	1	yes
sea[2][5]	76+20*2+4*5 = 136	9	yes
sea[2][-1]	76+20*2+4*-1 = 112	5	yes
sea[4][-1]	76+20*4+4*-1 = 152	5	yes
sea[0][19]	76+20*0+4*19 = 152	5	yes
sea[0][-1]	76+20*0+4*-1 = 72	??	no

- Code does not do any bounds checking
- Ordering of elements within array guaranteed

Polling Question [Arrays - a]

- Which of the following statements is FALSE?
  - Answer posted on inked slides after class!

`int sea[4][5];`



A. `sea[4][-2]` is a *valid* array reference — True! layout guaranteed

B. `sea[1][1]` makes *two* memory accesses — False!

C. `sea[2][1]` will *always* be a higher address than `sea[1][2]` — True! row-major ordering guaranteed!

D. `sea[2]` is calculated using *only* `lea` — True, returns address so only need address computation

E. We're lost…

Data Structures in Assembly

- **Arrays**
  - One-dimensional
  - Multidimensional (nested)
  - **Multilevel**
    - **We will go fast through this, more in section tomorrow!**
- Structs
  - Alignment
- ~~Unions~~

Multilevel Array Example

Multilevel Array Declaration(s):

```
int cmu[5] = { 1, 5, 2, 1, 3 };
int  uw[5] = { 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 };
int ucb[5] = { 9, 4, 7, 2, 0 };
```

```
int* univ[3] = {uw, cmu, ucb};
```

4 separate contiguous arrays

Is a multilevel array the same thing as a 2D array?

NO

2D Array Declaration:

```
int univ2D[3][5] = {
  { 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 },
  { 1, 5, 2, 1, 3 },
  { 9, 4, 7, 2, 0 }
};
```

one contiguous array

One array declaration = one contiguous block of memory

Multilevel Array Example

```
int cmu[5] = { 1, 5, 2, 1, 3 };
int  uw[5] = { 9, 8, 1, 9, 5 };
int ucb[5] = { 9, 4, 7, 2, 0 };
```

```
int* univ[3] = {uw, cmu, ucb};
```

- Variable `univ` denotes array of 3 elements
- Each element is a pointer
  - 8 bytes each
- Each pointer points to array of `int`s



Note: this is how Java represents multidimensional arrays

Element Access in Multilevel Array

```c
int get_univ_digit
  (int index, int digit)
{
  return univ[index][digit];
}
```




```
salq    $2, %rsi              # rsi = 4*digit
addq    univ(,%rdi,8), %rsi   # p = univ[index] + 4*digit
movl    (%rsi), %eax          # return *p
ret
```

one dereference!

a second dereference

- Computation
  - Element access Mem[Mem[univ+8*index]+4*digit]
  - Must do **two memory reads**
    - First get pointer to row array
    - Then access element within array
  - But allows inner arrays to be different lengths (not in this example)

Array Element Accesses

Multidimensional array

```
int get_sea_digit
  (int index, int digit)
{
  return sea[index][digit];
}
```



Multilevel array

```
int get_univ_digit
  (int index, int digit)
{
  return univ[index][digit];
}
```



one dereference

Access *looks* the same, but it isn't:

Mem[sea+20*index+4*digit]

1

Mem[Mem[univ+8*index]+4*digit]

2 1

two dereferences!

Multilevel Referencing Examples



Reference	Address	Value	Guaranteed?
univ[2][3]	Mem[176]+3*4 = 60+12 = 72	2	yes
univ[1][5]	Mem[168]+5*4 = 16+20 = 36	9	no
univ[2][-2]	Mem[176]+-2*4 = 60-8 = 52	5	no
univ[3][-1]	Mem[184]+-1*4 = ??-4 = ??	??	no
univ[1][12]	Mem[168]+12*4 = 16+48 = 64	4	no

- C code does not do any bounds checking
- Location of each lower-level array in memory is *not* guaranteed

Summary

- Contiguous allocations of memory
- No bounds checking (and no default initialization)
- Can usually be treated like a pointer to first element
- `int a[4][5];` → array of arrays
  - all levels in one contiguous block of memory
- `int* b[4];` → array of pointers to arrays
  - First level in one contiguous block of memory
  - Each element in the first level points to another “sub” array
  - Parts anywhere in memory

Buffer Overflows

- Address space layout (more details!)
- Input buffers on the stack
- Overflowing buffers and injecting code
- Defenses against buffer overflows

not drawn to scale

Review: General Memory Layout

- Stack
  - Local variables (procedure context)
- Heap
  - Dynamically allocated as needed
  - `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, …
- Statically allocated Data
  - Read/write: global variables (Static Data)
  - Read-only: string literals (Literals)
- Code/Instructions
  - Executable machine instructions
  - Read-only



This is extra (non-testable) material

x86-64 Linux Memory Layout

- Stack
  - Runtime stack has 8 MiB limit
- Heap
  - Dynamically allocated as needed
  - `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, …
- Statically allocated data (Data)
  - Read-only: string literals
  - Read/write: global arrays and variables
- Code / Shared Libraries
  - Executable machine instructions
  - Read-only



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Memory Allocation Example

```
char big_array[1L<<24];  /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /*  2 GB */

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8);  /* 256  B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /*   4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8);  /* 256  B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}
```



Where does everything go?

p1 = stack address
*p1 = heap address

not drawn to scale

Memory Allocation Example

```
char big_array[1L<<24];  /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /*  2 GB */

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8);  /* 256  B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /*   4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8);  /* 256  B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}
```



Where does everything go?

What Is a Buffer?

- A buffer is an array used to temporarily store data
- You've probably seen "video buffering…"
  - The video is being written into a buffer before being played
- Buffers can also store user input

Reminder: x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

- Caller's Stack Frame
  - Arguments (if > 6 args) for this call
- Current/ Callee Stack Frame
  - Return address
    - Pushed by `call` instruction
  - Old frame pointer (optional)
  - Caller-saved pushed before setting up arguments for a function call
  - Callee-saved pushed before using long-term registers
  - Local variables (if can't be kept in registers)
  - "Argument build" area (Need to call a function with >6 arguments? Put them here)



Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- C does not check array bounds
  - Many Unix/Linux/C functions don't check argument sizes
  - Allows overflowing (writing past the end) of buffers (arrays)
- "Buffer Overflow" = Writing past the end of an array
- Characteristics of the traditional Linux memory layout provide opportunities for malicious programs
  - Stack grows "backwards" in memory
  - Data and instructions both stored in the same memory

Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

imagine local variable char buf[8];

- Stack grows *down* towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows *up* towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack! 5 chars + end of string = 6 chars needed < buf size (8)

```
Enter input: hello
```

No overflow ☺



Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

```
Enter input: helloabcdef
```



Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

imagine local variable char buf[8];

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack! 11 chars + end of string = 12 chars needed > size of buf (8)

```
Enter input: helloabcdef
```

Buffer overflow! ☹



Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Buffer overflows on the stack can overwrite "interesting" data
  - Attackers just choose the right inputs
- Simplest form (sometimes called "stack smashing")
  - Unchecked length on string input into bounded array causes overwriting of stack data
  - Try to change the return address of the current procedure
- Why is this a big deal?
  - It was the #1 *technical* cause of security vulnerabilities
    - #1 *overall* cause is social engineering / user ignorance

String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

pointer to start of an array (don't know size)

same as:

```
*p = c;
p++;
```

end of file

newline

read char from stdin

  - What could go wrong in this code?

String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

no bounds check!

  - No way to specify **limit** on number of characters to read
- Similar problems with other Unix functions:
  - `strcpy`: Copies string of arbitrary length to a dst
  - `scanf`, `fscanf`, `sscanf`, when given `%s` specifier

Vulnerable Buffer Code

```
/* Echo Line */
void echo() {
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

input buffer

read input into buffer

print output from buffer

```
void call_echo() {
    echo();
}
```

works ok for some overflow

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
123456789012345
```

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 1234567890123456
Illegal instruction
```

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 12345678901234567
Segmentation Fault
```

errors for more overflow

Buffer Overflow Disassembly (buf-nsp)

echo:

```
0000000000400597 <echo>:
  400597:  48 83 ec 18         sub    $0x18,%rsp
    ...                          ... calls printf ...
  4005aa:  48 8d 7c 24 08      lea    0x8(%rsp),%rdi
  4005af:  e8 d6 fe ff ff      callq  400480 <gets@plt>
  4005b4:  48 89 7c 24 08      lea    0x8(%rsp),%rdi
  4005b9:  e8 b2 fe ff ff      callq  4004a0 <puts@plt>
  4005be:  48 83 c4 18         add    $0x18,%rsp
  4005c2:  c3                  retq
```

24 bytes allocated for local vars

compiler choice

buf starts at rsp+8

call_echo:

```
00000000004005c3 <call_echo>:
  4005c3:  48 83 ec 08         sub    $0x8,%rsp
  4005c7:  b8 00 00 00 00      mov    $0x0,%eax
  4005cc:  e8 c6 ff ff ff      callq  400597 <echo>
  4005d1:  48 83 c4 08         add    $0x8,%rsp
  4005d5:  c3                  retq
```

return address placed on stack

Buffer Overflow Stack

Before call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
echo:
  subq  $24, %rsp
   ...
  leaq  8(%rsp), %rdi
  call  gets
   ...
```

Note: addresses increasing right-to-left, bottom-to-top

Buffer Overflow Example

Before call to gets




```
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

```
echo:
  subq  $24, %rsp
  ...
  leaq  8(%rsp), %rdi
  call  gets
  ...
```

call_echo:

```
  . . .
  4005cc:  callq  400597 <echo>
  4005d1:  add    $0x8,%rsp
  . . .
```

Buffer Overflow Example #1

After call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	05	d1
00	35	34	33
32	31	30	39
38	37	36	35
34	33	32	31
8 bytes unused			

buf

← %rsp

null terminator

only overflowed into unused space (no corruption)

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

```
echo:
  subq   $24, %rsp
   ...
  leaq   8(%rsp), %rdi
  call   gets
   ...
```

call_echo:

```
  . . .
  4005cc:  callq   400597 <echo>
  4005d1:  add     $0x8,%rsp
  . . .
```

Note: Digit "*N*" is just 0x3*N* in ASCII!

0x31 = '1'
0x37 = '7'

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
123456789012345
```

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

Buffer Overflow Example #2

After call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	05	**00**
36	35	34	33
32	31	30	39
38	37	36	35
34	33	32	31
8 bytes unused			

buf ← %rsp

now we overflowed into ret addr

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

```
echo:
   subq   $24, %rsp
    ...
   leaq   8(%rsp), %rdi
   call   gets
    ...
```

call_echo:

```
   . . .
   4005cc:  callq   400597 <echo>
   4005d1:  add     $0x8,%rsp
   . . .
```

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 1234567890123456
Illegal instruction
```

Overflowed buffer and corrupted return pointer

Buffer Overflow Example #2 Explained

After return from echo




```
00000000004004f0 <deregister_tm_clones>:
  4004f0:  push   %rbp
  4004f1:  mov    $0x601040,%eax
  4004f6:  cmp    $0x601040,%rax
  4004fc:  mov    %rsp,%rbp
  4004ff:  je     400518
  400501:  mov    $0x0,%eax
  400506:  test   %rax,%rax
  400509:  je     400518
  40050b:  pop    %rbp
  40050c:  mov    $0x601040,%edi
  400511:  jmpq   *%rax
  400513:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
  400518:  pop    %rbp
  400519:  retq
```

Corrupted ret addr returns to junk instruction

"Returns" to a byte that is not the beginning of an instruction, so program signals `SIGILL`, `Illegal instruction`

Malicious Use of Buffer Overflow: Code Injection Attacks

Stack after call to `gets()`

```
void foo(){
  bar();
A:...
}
```

← return address A

```
int bar() {
  char buf[64];
  gets(buf);
  ...
  return ...;
}
```



- Input string contains byte representation of executable code
- Overwrite return address A with address of buffer B
- When `bar()` executes `ret`, will jump to exploit code

Peer Instruction Question [Buf]

- `vulnerable` is vulnerable to stack smashing!
- What is the minimum number of characters that `gets` must read in order for us to change the return address to a stack address? (need to overwrite at least 6 bytes of return address).
- Vote at http://PollEv.com/pbjones
  - For example: (0x00 00 7f ff CA FE F0 0D)




```
vulnerable:
  subq  $0x40, %rsp
   ...
  leaq  16(%rsp), %rdi
  call  gets
   ...
```

① rsp 64 bytes below saved ret addr

① buf starts 16 bytes above rsp

① buf is 64−16 = 48 bytes below return address.

② Need to pad 48 bytes, then write at least 6 bytes, 48+6 = 54)

A. 27
B. 30
C. 51
D. 54
E. We're lost…

Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows

Buffer overflow bugs can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on victim machines

- Distressingly common in real programs
  - Programmers keep making the same mistakes ☹
  - Recent measures make these attacks much more difficult
- Examples across the decades
  - Original "Internet worm" (1988)
  - Heartbleed (2014, affected 17% of servers)
    - Similar issue in Cloudbleed (2017)
  - Hacking embedded devices
    - Cars, Smart homes, Planes

Example: the original Internet worm (1988)

- Exploited a few vulnerabilities to spread
  - Early versions of the finger server (`fingerd`) used `gets()` to read the argument sent by the client:
    - `finger droh@cs.cmu.edu`
  - Worm attacked `fingerd` server with phony argument:
    - `finger "`*`exploit-code padding new-return-addr`*`"`
    - Exploit code: executed a root shell on the victim machine with a direct connection to the attacker
- Scanned for other machines to attack
  - Invaded ~6000 computers in hours (10% of the Internet)
    - see June 1989 article in *Comm. of the ACM*
  - The author of the worm (Robert Morris*) was prosecuted…

Example: Heartbleed



Example: Heartbleed



Example: Heartbleed



Heartbleed (2014)

- Buffer over-read in OpenSSL
  - Open source security library
  - Bug in a small range of versions
- "Heartbeat" packet
  - Specifies length of message
  - Server echoes it back
  - Library just "trusted" this length
  - Allowed attackers to read contents of memory anywhere they wanted
- Est. 17% of Internet affected
  - "Catastrophic"
  - Github, Yahoo, Stack Overflow, Amazon AWS, ...



Hacking Cars

- UW CSE research from 2010 demonstrated wirelessly hacking a car using buffer overflow
- Overwrote the onboard control system's code
  - Disable brakes
  - Unlock doors
  - Turn engine on/off

Dealing with buffer overflow attacks

1) Employ system-level protections
2) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
3) Have compiler use "stack canaries"

1) System-Level Protections

- **Non-executable code segments**
- In traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either "read-only" or "writeable"
  - Can execute anything readable
- x86-64 added explicit "execute" permission
- Stack marked as non-executable
  - Do *NOT* execute code in Stack, Static Data, or Heap regions
  - Hardware support needed



1) System-Level Protections

- **Non-executable code segments**
  - Wait, doesn't this fix everything?
- Works well, but can't always use it
- Many embedded devices *do not* have this protection
  - Cars
  - Smart homes
  - Pacemakers
- Some exploits still work!
  - Return-oriented programming
  - Return to libc attack
  - JIT-spray attack



1) System-Level Protections

- **Randomized stack offsets**
  - At start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
  - Shifts stack addresses for entire program
    - Addresses will vary from one run to another
  - Makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code
- Example: Code from Slide 6 executed 5 times; address of variable `local` =
    - `0x7ffd19d3f8ac`
    - `0x7ffe8a462c2c`
    - `0x7ffe927c905c`
    - `0x7ffefd5c27dc`
    - `0x7fffa0175afc`
  - Stack repositioned each time program executes



2) Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code

```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    fgets(buf, 8, stdin);
    puts(buf);
}
```

character read limit

- Use library routines that limit string lengths
  - `fgets` instead of `gets` (2nd argument to `fgets` sets limit)
  - `strncpy` instead of `strcpy`
  - Don't use `scanf` with `%s` conversion specification
    - Use `fgets` to read the string
    - Or use `%ns` where `n` is a suitable integer

2) Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code

- Alternatively, don't use C - use a language that does array index bounds check
  - Buffer overflow is impossible in Java
    - ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
  - Rust language was designed with security in mind
    - Panics on index out of bounds, plus more protections

3) Stack Canaries

- Basic Idea: place special value ("canary") on stack just beyond buffer
  - *Secret* value that is randomized before main()
  - Placed between buffer and return address
  - Check for corruption before exiting function
- GCC implementation
  - `-fstack-protector`

```
unix>./buf
Enter string: 12345678
12345678
```

```
unix> ./buf
Enter string: 123456789
*** stack smashing detected ***
```

Protected Buffer Disassembly (buf)

This is extra (non-testable) material

echo:

```
400607:  sub    $0x18,%rsp
40060b:  mov    %fs:0x28,%rax      # read canary value
400614:  mov    %rax,0x8(%rsp)     # store canary on stack
400619:  xor    %eax,%eax          # erase canary from register
 ...     ... call printf ...
400625:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
400628:  callq  400510 <gets@plt>
40062d:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
400630:  callq  4004d0 <puts@plt>
400635:  mov    0x8(%rsp),%rax     # read current canary on stack
40063a:  xor    %fs:0x28,%rax      # compare against original value
400643:  jne    40064a <echo+0x43> # if unchanged, then return
400645:  add    $0x18,%rsp
400649:  retq
40064a:  callq  4004f0 <__stack_chk_fail@plt> # stack smashing detected
```

try: diff buf-nsp.s buf.s

Setting Up Canary

This is extra (non-testable) material

Before call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

Segment register *(don't worry about it)*

```
echo:
    . . .
    movq    %fs:40, %rax     # Get canary
    movq    %rax, 8(%rsp)    # Place on stack
    xorl    %eax, %eax       # Erase canary
    . . .
```

Checking Canary

This is extra (non-testable) material

After call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
echo:
    . . .
    movq   8(%rsp), %rax     # retrieve from Stack
    xorq   %fs:40, %rax      # compare to canary
    jne    .L4               # if not same, FAIL
    . . .
.L4: call  __stack_chk_fail
```

Input: *1234567*

Summary of Prevention Measures

1) Employ system-level protections
   - Code on the Stack is not executable
   - Randomized Stack offsets

2) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
   - Use library routines that limit string lengths
   - Use a language that makes them impossible

3) Have compiler use "stack canaries"

Think this is cool?

- You'll love Lab 3 😉
  - Check out the buffer overflow simulator!
- Take CSE 484 (Security) or another security course you have access to!
  - Several different kinds of buffer overflow exploits
  - Many ways to counter them
- Nintendo fun!
  - Using glitches to rewrite code: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqK-2jUQBUY
  - Flappy Bird in Mario: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hB6eY73sLV

Extra Notes about %rbp

This is extra (non-testable) material

- `%rbp` is used to store the frame pointer
  - Name comes from "base pointer"
- You can refer to a variable on the stack as `%rbp+offset`
- The base of the frame will never change, so each variable can be uniquely referred to with its offset
- The top of the stack (`%rsp`) may change, so referring to a variable as `%rsp-offset` is less reliable
  - For example, if you need save a variable for a function call, pushing it onto the stack changes `%rsp`

Hacking DNA Sequencing Tech

- Potential for malicious code to be encoded in DNA!
- Attacker can gain control of DNA sequencing machine when malicious DNA is read
- Ney et al. (2017)
  - https://dnasec.cs.washi

Computer Security and

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There has been rapid improvement in the cost an
decade, the cost to sequence a human genome ha
was made possible by faster, massively parallel pr
hundreds of millions of DNA strands simultaneou
ranging from personalized medicine, ancestry, an



Figure 1: Our synthesized DNA exploit

Where Is It?

Variable/Label	Section of Memory
`big_array`	
`global`	
`huge_array`	
`local`	
`main`	
`p1`	
`*p1`	
`useless`	

Notes Diagrams