Virtual Memory II

CSE 351 Summer 2019

Instructor:

Sam Wolfson

Teaching Assistants:


Rehaan Bhimani Daniel Hsu **Corbin Modica**

FIGURING OUT WHY MY HOME SERVER KEEPS RUNNING OUT OF SWAP SPACE AND CRASHING:



1-10 HOURS

PLUGGING IT INTO A LIGHT TIMER SO IT REBOOTS EVERY 24 HOURS:



5 MINUTES

WHY EVERYTHING I HAVE IS BROKEN


https://xkcd.com/1495/

Administrivia

- Lab 4, due Monday (8/12)
 - Do the Canvas quiz before starting on Part III(blocking)
- HW5 released
- Grades for lab 3 released


Page Hit

Page hit: VM reference is in physical memory



Page Fault


Page fault: VM reference is NOT in physical memory



Page Fault Exception

- User writes to memory location
- That portion (page) of user's memory is currently on disk


```
int a[1000];
int main ()
{
    a[500] = 13;
}
```



- Page fault handler must load page into physical memory
- Returns to faulting instruction: mov is executed again!
 - Successful on second try


Handling a Page Fault

Page miss causes page fault (an exception)



Handling a Page Fault


- Page miss causes page fault (an exception)
- Page fault handler selects a victim to be evicted (here VP 4)



W UNIVERSITY of WASHINGTON


Handling a Page Fault

- Page miss causes page fault (an exception)
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
Handling a Page Fault

- Page miss causes page fault (an exception)
- Page fault handler selects a victim to be evicted (here VP 4)
- Offending instruction is restarted: page hit!



Peer Instruction Question

- How many bits wide are the following fields?
 - 16 KiB pages = 2¹⁰ · 2⁴ = 2¹⁴ ⇒ offset = 14 bits
 - 48-bit virtual addresses
 - 16 GiB physical memory = $2^{32} \cdot 2^2 = 2^{34} \Rightarrow PA$ with = 34 bits
 - Vote at: <u>http://pollev.com/wolfson</u>




Virtual Memory (VM)

- Overview and motivation
- VM as a tool for caching
- Address translation
- ***** VM as a tool for memory management
- ***** VM as a tool for memory protection

VM for Managing Multiple Processes

- Key abstraction: each process has its own virtual address space
 - It can view memory as a simple linear array
- With virtual memory, this simple linear virtual address space need not be contiguous in physical memory
 - Process needs to store data in another VP? Just map it to any PP!




Simplifying Linking and Loading

Linking *

- Each program has similar virtual address space
- Code, Data, and Heap always start at the same addresses


Loading *

- execve allocates virtual pages for .text and .data sections & creates PTEs marked as invalid
- The .text and .data sections are copied, page by page, on demand by the virtual memory system




VM for Protection and Sharing


- The mapping of VPs to PPs provides a simple mechanism to protect memory and to share memory between processes
 - Sharing: map virtual pages in separate address spaces to the same physical page (here: PP 6)
 - Protection: process can't access physical pages to which none of its virtual pages are mapped (here: Process 2 can't access PP 2)



Memory Protection Within Process

- VM implements read/write/execute permissions
 - Extend page table entries with permission bits
 - MMU checks these permission bits on every memory access
 - If violated, raises exception and OS sends SIGSEGV signal to process (segmentation fault)






- 1) Processor sends virtual address to MMU (memory management unit)
- 2-3) MMU fetches PTE from page table in cache/memory (Uses PTBR to find beginning of page table for current process)
- 4) MMU sends *physical* address to cache/memory requesting data
- 5) Cache/memory sends data to processor

VA = Virtual AddressPTEA = Page Table Entry AddressPTE= Page Table EntryPA = Physical AddressData = Contents of memory stored at VA originally requested by CPU

Address Translation: Page Fault




- 1) Processor sends virtual address to MMU
- **2-3)** MMU fetches PTE from page table in cache/memory
- 4) Valid bit is zero, so MMU triggers page fault exception
- 5) Handler identifies victim (and, if dirty, pages it out to disk)
- 6) Handler pages in new page and updates PTE in memory
- 7) Handler returns to original process, restarting faulting instruction


Hmm... Translation Sounds Slow


- The MMU accesses memory *twice*: once to get the PTE for translation, and then again for the actual memory request
 - The PTEs may be cached in L1 like any other memory word
 - But they may be evicted by other data references
 - And a hit in the L1 cache still requires 1-3 cycles
- What can we do to make this faster?
 - "Any problem in computer science can be solved by adding another level of indirection." – David Wheeler, inventor of the subroutine
 - "And all of the new problems that creates can be solved by adding another cache." - Sam Wolfson, inventor of this quote

Speeding up Translation with a TLB

- Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB):
 - Small hardware cache in MMU
 - Maps virtual page numbers to physical page numbers
 - Contains complete page table entries for small number of pages
 - Modern Intel processors have 128 or 256 entries in TLB
 - Much faster than a page table lookup in cache/memory







- ✤ A TLB miss incurs an additional memory access (the PTE)
 - Fortunately, TLB misses are rare

Fetching Data on a Memory Read Move ('.rsi), /.(ax

1) Check TLB

- Input: VPN, Output: PPN
- TLB Hit: Fetch translation, return PPN
- TLB Miss: Check page table (in memory)
 - *Page Table Hit:* Load page table entry into TLB
 - *Page Fault:* Fetch page from disk to memory, update corresponding page table entry, then load entry into TLB


2) Check cache

- Input: physical address, <u>Output</u>: data
- Cache Hit: Return data value to processor
- Cache Miss: Fetch data value from memory, store it in cache, return it to processor

irfual address V Physical address


Address Translation

- VM is complicated, but also elegant and effective
 - Level of indirection to provide isolated memory & caching
 - TLB as a cache of page tables avoids two trips to memory for every memory access
 <u>TLB Miss</u>
 <u>TLB Hit</u>



Simple Memory System Example (small)

- Addressing
 - 14-bit virtual addresses n = 19
 - 12-bit physical address m = 12
 - Page size = 64 bytes $\log_2 64 = 6 \Rightarrow 6$ offset b:ts




Simple Memory System: Page Table

- * Only showing first 16 entries (out of $2^{n-p} \neq 2^{n-c}$
 - **Note:** showing 2 hex digits for PPN even though only 6 bits
 - Note: other management bits not shown, but part of PTE

VPN	PPN	Valid
0	28	1
1	—	0
2	33	1
3	02	1
4	_	0
5	16	1
6	_	0
7	_	0

VPN	PPN	Valid
8	13	1
9	17	1
Α	09	1
В	_	0
С	-	0
D	2D	1
Ε	_	0
F	0D	1

Simple Memory System: TLB




Set	Тад	PPN	Valid	Tag	PPN	Valid	Tag	PPN	Valid	Tag	PPN	Valid
0	03	_	0	09	0D	1	00	_	0	07	02	1
1	03	2D	1	02	_	0	04	_	0	0A	_	0
2	02	—	0	08	—	0	06	—	0	03	—	0
3	07	—	0	03	0D	1	0A	34	1	02	_	0

Simple Memory System: Cache

Note: It is just coincidence that the PPN is the same width as the cache Tag

- ✤ Direct-mapped with K = 4 B, C/K = 16
- Addressed using *physical addresses*



Index	Tag	Valid	B0	B1	B2	B3	Index	Tag	Valid	B0	B1	B2	B3
0	19	1	99	11	23	11	8	24	1	3A	00	51	89
1	15	0	-	_	_	-	9	2D	0	—	_	_	-
2	1B	1	00	02	04	08	Α	2D	1	93	15	DA	3B
3	36	0	-	_	_	-	В	OB	0	—	_	_	-
4	32	1	43	6D	8F	09	С	12	0	—	_	_	—
5	0D	1	36	72	FO	1D	D	16	1	04	96	34	15
6	31	0	_	_	_	_	Е	13	1	83	77	1B	D3
7	16	1	11	C2	DF	03	F	14	0	_	_	_	_

Current State of Memory System

TLB:

Set	Tag	PPN	V									
0	03	—	0	09	0D	1	00	—	0	07	02	1
1	03	2D	1	02	—	0	04	-	0	0A	-	0
2	02	—	0	08	—	0	06	—	0	03	—	0
3	07	—	0	03	0D	1	0A	34	1	02	—	0

Page table (partial):


VPN	PPN	V	VPN	PPN	V
0	28	1	8	13	1
1	_	0	9	17	1
2	33	1	Α	09	1
3	02	1	В	-	0
4	-	0	С	-	0
5	16	1	D	2D	1
6	_	0	E	-	0
7	_	0	F	0D	1

Cache:

Index	Tag	V	BO	B1	B2	B3	Index	Tag	V	BO	B1	B2	B3
0	19	1	99	11	23	11	8	24	1	3A	00	51	89
1	15	0	-	_	_	_	9	2D	0	_	_	_	_
2	1B	1	00	02	04	08	Α	2D	1	93	15	DA	3B
3	36	0	-	_	—	—	В	OB	0	-	—	_	_
4	32	1	43	6D	8F	09	С	12	0	-	_	-	_
5	0D	1	36	72	FO	1D	D	16	1	04	96	34	15
6	31	0	_	_	_	_	E	13	1	83	77	1B	D3
7	16	1	11	C2	DF	03	F	14	0	_	_	_	_


Note: It is just coincidence that the PPN is the same width as the cache Tag






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


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


Physical Address:




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
Memory Overview



Page Table Reality



- Sust one issue... the numbers don't work out for the story so far!
- 2¹ B
 The problem is the page table for each process:
 - Suppose 64-bit VAs, 8 KiB pages, 8 Gig physical memory
 - How many page table entries is that? 2^{33} R $2^{64}/2^{13} = 2^{51}$
 - About how long is each PTE? $2^{33}/2^{13} = 2^{20} \Rightarrow 20 \text{ br} PPN + 3 \text{ mgnt. bits} \approx 38$
 - Moral: Cannot use this naïve implementation of the virtual → physical page mapping it's way too big



Multi-level Page Tables



- A tree of depth k where each node at depth i has up to 2^j children if part i of the VPN has j bits
- Hardware for multi-level page tables inherently more complicated
 - But it's a necessary complexity 1-level does not fit
- Why it works: Most subtrees are not used at all, so they are never created and definitely aren't in physical memory
 - Parts created can be evicted from cache/memory when not being used
 - Each node can have a size of ~1-100KB
- But now for a k-level page table, a TLB miss requires k + 1 cache/memory accesses
 - Fine so long as TLB misses are rare motivates larger TLBs


BONUS SLIDES

For Fun: DRAMMER Security Attack

- Why are we talking about this?
 - Recent(ish): Announced in October 2016; Google released Android patch on November 8, 2016
 - Relevant: Uses your system's memory setup to gain elevated privileges
 - Ties together some of what we've learned about virtual memory and processes
 - Interesting: It's a software attack that uses only hardware vulnerabilities and requires no user permissions

Underlying Vulnerability: Row Hammer

- Dynamic RAM (DRAM) has gotten denser over time
 - DRAM cells physically closer and use smaller charges
 - More susceptible to "disturbance errors" (interference)
- DRAM capacitors need to be "refreshed" periodically (~64 ms)
 - Lose data when loss of power
 - Capacitors accessed in rows
- Rapid accesses to one row can flip bits in an adjacent row!
 - ~ 100K to 1M times



By Dsimic (modified), CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w /index.php?curid=38868341

Victim row

Row Hammer Exploit

- Force constant memory access
 - Read then flush the cache
 - clflush flush cache line
 - Invalidates cache line containing the specified address
 - Not available in all machines or environments

```
hammertime:
mov (X), %eax
mov (Y), %ebx
clflush (X)
clflush (Y)
jmp hammertime
```

- Want addresses X and Y to fall in activation target row(s)
 - Good to understand how *banks* of DRAM cells are laid out
- The row hammer effect was discovered in 2014
 - Only works on certain types of DRAM (2010 onwards)
 - These techniques target x86 machines

Consequences of Row Hammer

- Row hammering process can affect another process via memory
 - Circumvents virtual memory protection scheme
 - Memory needs to be in an adjacent row of DRAM
- Worse: privilege escalation
 - Page tables live in memory!
 - Hope to change PPN to access other parts of memory, or change permission bits
 - Goal: gain read/write access to a page containing a page table, hence granting process read/write access to all of physical memory

Effectiveness?

- Doesn't seem so bad random bit flip in a row of physical memory
 - Vulnerability affected by system setup and physical condition of memory cells

Improvements:

- Double-sided row hammering increases speed & chance
- Do system identification first (e.g. Lab 4)
 - Use timing to infer memory row layout & find "bad" rows
 - Allocate a huge chunk of memory and try many addresses, looking for a reliable/repeatable bit flip
- Fill up memory with page tables first
 - fork extra processes; hope to elevate privileges in any page table

What's DRAMMER?

- No one previously made a huge fuss
 - Prevention: error-correcting codes, target row refresh, higher DRAM refresh rates
 - Often relied on special memory management features
 - Often crashed system instead of gaining control
- Research group found a *deterministic* way to induce row hammer exploit in a non-x86 system (ARM)
 - Relies on predictable reuse patterns of standard physical memory allocators
 - Universiteit Amsterdam, Graz University of Technology, and University of California, Santa Barbara

DRAMMER Demo Video

- It's a shell, so not that sexy-looking, but still interesting
 - Apologies that the text is so small on the video

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How did we get here?

- Computing industry demands more and faster storage with lower power consumption
- Ability of user to circumvent the caching system
 - clflush is an unprivileged instruction in x86
 - Other commands exist that skip the cache
- Availability of virtual to physical address mapping
 - Example: /proc/self/pagemap on Linux (not human-readable)
- Google patch for Android (Nov. 8, 2016)
 - Patched the ION memory allocator

More reading for those interested

- DRAMMER paper: <u>https://vvdveen.com/publications/drammer.pdf</u>
- Google Project Zero: <u>https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exp</u> <u>loiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html</u>
- First row hammer paper: <u>https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf</u>
- Wikipedia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer