Buffer Overflows
CSE 351 Autumn 2019

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http://xkcd.com/804/
Administrivia

- Mid-quarter survey due tomorrow (10/31)
  - HW 13 due Nov. 1 (Fri)
  - HW 14 released today due Nov. 4 (Mon)

- Lab 3 released today, due next Friday (11/8)
  - You will have everything you need by the end of this lecture

- Midterm grades (out of 100) to be released by Friday
  - Solutions posted on website soon
  - Rubric and grades will be found on Gradescope
  - Regrade requests will be open for a short time after grade release
  - Don’t freak out about your grade!
    - Midterm clobber policy can help
Buffer Overflows

❖ Address space layout (more details!)
❖ Input buffers on the stack
❖ Overflowing buffers and injecting code
❖ Defenses against buffer overflows
Review: General Memory Layout

- **Stack**
  - Local variables (procedure context)

- **Heap**
  - Dynamically allocated as needed
  - `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, ...

- **Statically allocated Data**
  - Read/write: global variables (Static Data)
  - Read-only: string literals (Literals)

- **Code/Instructions**
  - Executable machine instructions
  - Read-only
x86-64 Linux Memory Layout

❖ Stack
  ▪ Runtime stack has 8 MiB limit

❖ Heap
  ▪ Dynamically allocated as needed
  ▪ `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new`, ...

❖ Statically allocated data (Data)
  ▪ Read-only: string literals
  ▪ Read/write: global arrays and variables

❖ Code / Shared Libraries
  ▪ Executable machine instructions
  ▪ Read-only

Hex Address: 0x400000
0x000000

This is extra (non-testable) material
Memory Allocation Example

char big_array[1L<<24]; /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /* 2 GB */

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /* 4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}

Where does everything go?
Memory Allocation Example

```c
char big_array[1L<<24]; /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /* 2 GB */

int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main()
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    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /* 4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}
```

Where does everything go?
What Is a Buffer?

❖ A buffer is an array used to temporarily store data

❖ You’ve probably seen “video buffering...”
  ▪ The video is being written into a buffer before being played

❖ Buffers can also store user input
Reminder: x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

- **Caller’s Stack Frame**
  - Arguments (if > 6 args) for this call

- **Current/ Callee Stack Frame**
  - Return address
    - Pushed by `call` instruction
  - Old frame pointer (optional)
  - Caller-saved pushed before setting up arguments for a function call
  - Callee-saved pushed before using long-term registers
  - Local variables (if can’t be kept in registers)
  - “Argument build” area (Need to call a function with >6 arguments? Put them here)
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

❖ C does not check array bounds
  ▪ Many Unix/Linux/C functions don’t check argument sizes
  ▪ Allows overflowing (writing past the end) of buffers (arrays)

❖ “Buffer Overflow” = Writing past the end of an array

❖ Characteristics of the traditional Linux memory layout provide opportunities for malicious programs
  ▪ Stack grows “backwards” in memory
  ▪ Data and instructions both stored in the same memory
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows *down* towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows *up* towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

**Enter input: hello**

No overflow 😊
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Stack grows down towards lower addresses
- Buffer grows up towards higher addresses
- If we write past the end of the array, we overwrite data on the stack!

Enter input: helloabcdef

Buffer overflow! 😞
Buffer Overflow in a Nutshell

- Buffer overflows on the stack can overwrite “interesting” data
  - Attackers just choose the right inputs

- Simplest form (sometimes called “stack smashing”)
  - Unchecked length on string input into bounded array causes overwriting of stack data
  - Try to change the return address of the current procedure

- Why is this a big deal?
  - It was the #1 technical cause of security vulnerabilities
    - #1 overall cause is social engineering / user ignorance
String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```c
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- What could go wrong in this code?
String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```c
/* Get string from stdin */
char* gets(char* dest) {
    int c = getchar();
    char* p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- No way to specify **limit** on number of characters to read

- Similar problems with other Unix functions:
  - `strcpy`: Copies string of arbitrary length to a dst
  - `scanf`, `fscanf`, `sscanf`, when given `%s` specifier
Vulnerable Buffer Code

```c
/* Echo Line */
void echo() {
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

void call_echo() {
    echo();
}
```

```
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 12345678901234567
Segmentation Fault
unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 12345678901234567
Illegal instruction
```
Buffer Overflow Disassembly (buf-nsp)

echo:

```
0000000000400597 <echo>:
400597:  48 83 ec 18
...                          ...
4005aa:  48 8d 7c 24 08
4005af:  e8 d6 fe ff ff
4005b4:  48 89 7c 24 08
4005b9:  e8 b2 fe ff ff
4005be:  48 83 c4 18
4005c2:  c3
```

sub $0x18,%rsp
... calls printf ...
lea 0x8(%rsp),%rdi
callq 400480 <gets@plt>
lea 0x8(%rsp),%rdi
callq 4004a0 <puts@plt>
add $0x18,%rsp
retq

call_echo:

```
00000000004005c3 <call_echo>:
4005c3:  48 83 ec 08
4005c7:  b8 00 00 00 00
4005cc:  e8 c6 ff ff ff
4005d1:  48 83 c4 08
4005d5:  c3
```

sub $0x8,%rsp
mov $0x0,%eax
callq 400597 <echo>
add $0x8,%rsp
retq

return address
Buffer Overflow Stack

**Before call to gets**

```c
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

**Note:** addresses increasing right-to-left, bottom-to-top
Buffer Overflow Example

Before call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo

| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 40 | 05 | d1 |

8 bytes unused


[3] [2] [1] [0]

8 bytes unused

void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    ...
}

call_echo:

... 4005cc: callq 400597 <echo>
4005d1: add $0x8,%rsp
...
Buffer Overflow Example #1

**After call to gets**

Stack frame for call_echo

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>d1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 bytes unused

**Note:** Digit “N” is just 0x3N in ASCII!

```c
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    ...
}
```

echo:

```c
callq 400597 <echo>
```

```c
add $0x8,%rsp
```

`buf` ← %rsp

```c
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi
```

call gets

```c
subq $24, %rsp
```

```c
...
```

unix> ./buf-nsp
Enter string: 123456789012345
123456789012345

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state
Buffer Overflow Example #2

After call to `gets`

```c
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    ...
}
```

call_echo:

```assembly
. . .
4005cc: callq 400597 <echo>
4005d1: add $0x8,%rsp
. . .
```

Stack frame for `call_echo`

| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| 00 | 40 | 05 | 00 |
| 36 | 35 | 34 | 33 |
| 32 | 31 | 30 | 39 |
| 38 | 37 | 36 | 35 |
| 34 | 33 | 32 | 31 |

8 bytes unused

unix>
```
```
```
Buffer Overflow Example #2 Explained

After return from echo

Stack frame for call_echo

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 bytes unused

%rsp

buf

000000000004004f0 <deregister_tm_clones>:
4004f0: push %rbp
4004f1: mov $0x601040,%eax
4004f6: cmp $0x601040,%rax
4004fc: mov %rsp,%rbp
4004ff: je 400518
400501: mov $0x0,%eax
400506: test %rax,%rax
400509: je 400518
40050b: pop %rbp
40050c: mov $0x601040,%edi
400511: jmpq *%rax
400513: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
400518: pop %rbp
400519: retq

“Returns” to a byte that is not the beginning of an instruction, so program signals SIGILL, Illegal instruction
Malicious Use of Buffer Overflow: Code Injection Attacks

- **Input string contains byte representation of executable code**
- **Overwrite return address A with address of buffer B**
- **When bar() executes ret, will jump to exploit code**

```c
void foo() {
    bar();
    A: ...
}

int bar() {
    char buf[64];
    gets(buf);
    ...
    return ...;
}

Stack after call to gets():

- High Addresses:
  - foo stack frame
  - bar stack frame

- Low Addresses:
  - pad
  - exploit code

buf starts here

return address A

data written by gets()

A
B
```
Peer Instruction Question

- smash_me is vulnerable to stack smashing!
- What is the minimum number of characters that gets must read in order for us to change the return address to a stack address?
  - For example: (0x00 00 7f ff CA FE F0 0D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous stack frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 40 05 d1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[0]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

smash_me:
- subq $0x40, %rsp
- ...
- leaq 16(%rsp), %rdi
- call gets
- ...

A. 27
B. 30
C. 51
D. 54
E. We’re lost...
Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows

Buffer overflow bugs can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on victim machines

❖ Distressingly common in real programs
  ▪ Programmers keep making the same mistakes 😞
  ▪ Recent measures make these attacks much more difficult

❖ Examples across the decades
  ▪ Original “Internet worm” (1988)
  ▪ Heartbleed (2014, affected 17% of servers)
    • Similar issue in Cloudbleed (2017)
  ▪ Hacking embedded devices
    • Cars, Smart homes, Planes
Example: the original Internet worm (1988)

- Exploited a few vulnerabilities to spread
  - Early versions of the finger server (fingerd) used gets() to read the argument sent by the client:
    - `finger droh@cs.cmu.edu`
  - Worm attacked fingerd server with phony argument:
    - `finger "exploit-code padding new-return-addr"`
    - Exploit code: executed a root shell on the victim machine with a direct connection to the attacker

- Scanned for other machines to attack
  - Invaded ~6000 computers in hours (10% of the Internet)
    - see June 1989 article in Comm. of the ACM
  - The author of the worm (Robert Morris*) was prosecuted...
Example: Heartbleed

HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:

**SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "POTATO" (6 LETTERS).**

*User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO. User da wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking secure records with master key 5130985733435 creates command used to send this message: "Potato."*
Example: Heartbleed

User Olivia from London wants pages about "hae bees in car why". Note: Files for IP 375.381.183.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 348 connections open. User Brendan uploaded the files /tmp/bird (contents: 334ba962ac4eb9ff895e331e4f).

HMM...

SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "BIRD" (4 LETTERS).
Example: Heartbleed

Server, are you still there? If so, reply "HAT" (500 letters).

User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "CafeRat". User Asher requests pages.

HAT. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "CafeRat". User Asher requests pages.
Heartbleed (2014)

- Buffer over-read in OpenSSL
  - Open source security library
  - Bug in a small range of versions
- “Heartbeat” packet
  - Specifies length of message
  - Server echoes it back
  - Library just “trusted” this length
  - Allowed attackers to read contents of memory anywhere they wanted
- Est. 17% of Internet affected
  - “Catastrophic”
  - Github, Yahoo, Stack Overflow, Amazon AWS, ...
Hacking Cars

❖ UW CSE research from 2010 demonstrated wirelessly hacking a car using buffer overflow
❖ Overwrote the onboard control system’s code
  ▪ Disable brakes
  ▪ Unlock doors
  ▪ Turn engine on/off
Hacking DNA Sequencing Tech

- Potential for malicious code to be encoded in DNA!
- Attacker can gain control of DNA sequencing machine when malicious DNA is read

Ney et al. (2017)
- https://dnasec.cs.washington.edu

Computer Security and DNA

Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science

There has been rapid improvement in the cost and throughput of DNA sequencing over the last decade, making it possible to sequence hundreds of millions of DNA strands simultaneously, ranging from personalized medicine, ancestry, and other applications.
Dealing with buffer overflow attacks

1) Employ system-level protections
2) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
3) Have compiler use “stack canaries”
1) System-Level Protections

- Non-executable code segments
  - In traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”
    - Can execute anything readable
  - x86-64 added explicit “execute” permission
    - Stack marked as non-executable
      - Do NOT execute code in Stack, Static Data, or Heap regions
      - Hardware support needed

Stack after call to `gets()`

Any attempt to execute this code will fail
1) System-Level Protections

- **Non-executable code segments**
  - Wait, doesn’t this fix everything?
  - Works well, but can’t always use it
  - Many embedded devices *do not* have this protection
    - Cars
    - Smart homes
    - Pacemakers
  - Some exploits still work!
    - Return-oriented programming
    - Return to libc attack
    - JIT-spray attack

Any attempt to execute this code will fail
1) System-Level Protections

❖ Randomized stack offsets
  ▪ At start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
  ▪ Shifts stack addresses for entire program
    • Addresses will vary from one run to another
  ▪ Makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code

❖ Example: Code from Slide 6 executed 5 times; address of variable local =
  • 0x7fffd19d3f8ac
  • 0x7ffe8a462c2c
  • 0x7ffe927c905c
  • 0x7ffefd5c27dc
  • 0x7fffa0175afc

▪ Stack repositioned each time program executes
2) Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];  /* Way too small! */
    fgets(buf, 8, stdin);
    puts(buf);
}

❖ Use library routines that limit string lengths
  - fgets instead of gets (2nd argument to fgets sets limit)
  - strncpy instead of strcpy
  - Don’t use scanf with %s conversion specification
    - Use fgets to read the string
    - Or use %ns where n is a suitable integer
2) Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code

- Alternatively, don’t use C - use a language that does array index bounds check
  - Buffer overflow is impossible in Java
    - ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
  - Rust language was designed with security in mind
    - Panics on index out of bounds, plus more protections
3) Stack Canaries

- Basic Idea: place special value ("canary") on stack just beyond buffer
  - Secret value that is randomized before main()
  - Placed between buffer and return address
  - Check for corruption before exiting function

- GCC implementation
  - `-fstack-protector`

```
unix> ./buf
Enter string: 12345678
12345678
unix> ./buf
Enter string: 123456789
*** stack smashing detected ***
```
Protected Buffer Disassembly (buf)

echo:

```
400607: sub $0x18,%rsp
40060b: mov %fs:0x28,%rax
400614: mov %rax,0x8(%rsp)
400619: xor %eax,%eax
... ... call printf ...
400625: mov %rsp,%rdi
400628: callq 400510 <gets@plt>
40062d: mov %rsp,%rdi
400630: callq 4004d0 <puts@plt>
400635: mov 0x8(%rsp),%rax
40063a: xor %fs:0x28,%rax
400643: jne 40064a <echo+0x43>
400645: add $0x18,%rsp
400649: retq
40064a: callq 4004f0 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
```
Setting Up Canary

Before call to gets

Stack frame for call_echo

Return address (8 bytes)

Canary (8 bytes)

[3] [2] [1] [0]

buf ← %rsp

/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

movq %fs:40, %rax # Get canary
movq %rax, 8(%rsp) # Place on stack
xorl %eax, %eax # Erase canary

Segment register (don’t worry about it)

This is extra (non-testable) material
Checking Canary

After call to `gets`

```c
void echo()
{
    char buf[8]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

Input: 1234567
Summary of Prevention Measures

1) Employ system-level protections
   ▪ Code on the Stack is not executable
   ▪ Randomized Stack offsets

2) Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
   ▪ Use library routines that limit string lengths
   ▪ Use a language that makes them impossible

3) Have compiler use “stack canaries”
Think this is cool?

- You’ll love Lab 3 😊
  - Released today, due next Friday (11/8)
  - Check out the buffer overflow simulator!

- Take CSE 484 (Security)
  - Several different kinds of buffer overflow exploits
  - Many ways to counter them

- Nintendo fun!
  - Using glitches to rewrite code: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqK-2jUQBUY
  - Flappy Bird in Mario: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hB6eY73sLV
Extra Notes about %rbp

- %rbp is used to store the frame pointer
  - Name comes from “base pointer”
- You can refer to a variable on the stack as %rbp+offset
- The base of the frame will never change, so each variable can be uniquely referred to with its offset
- The top of the stack (%rsp) may change, so referring to a variable as %rsp-offset is less reliable
  - For example, if you need save a variable for a function call, pushing it onto the stack changes %rsp