Virtual Memory Wrap-Up

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Administrivia

- Lab 4 due Monday (11/27)
- Homework 5 due next Friday (12/1)

- "Virtual section" on virtual memory released
  - 3 PDFs: VM cheatsheet, worksheet, and solutions
  - Linked in the code section of today's lecture
  - See Piazza post for links and videos

Quick Review

- What do Page Tables map?
- Where are Page Tables located?
- How many Page Tables are there?
- Can your process tell if a page fault has occurred?
- True / False: Virtual Addresses that are contiguous will always be contiguous in physical memory
- TLB stands for __________________________ and stores _________________

Address Translation

- VM is complicated, but also elegant and effective
  - Level of indirection to provide isolated memory & caching
  - TLB as a cache of page tables avoids two trips to memory for every memory access



Memory Overview

- `movl 0x8043ab, %rdi`



Context Switching Revisited

- What needs to happen when the CPU switches processes?
  - Registers:
    - Save state of old process, load state of new process
    - Including the Page Table Base Register (PTBR)
  - Memory:
    - Nothing to do! Pages for processes already exist in memory/disk and protected from each other
  - TLB:
    - *Invalidate* all entries in TLB – mapping is for old process' VAs
  - Cache:
    - Can leave alone because storing based on PAs – good for shared data

Page Table Reality

- Just one issue… the numbers don't work out for the story so far!

- The problem is the page table for each process:
  - Suppose 64-bit VAs, 8 KiB pages, 8 GiB physical memory
  - How many page table entries is that?
  - About how long is each PTE?
  - **Moral:** Cannot use this naïve implementation of the virtual→physical page mapping – it's *way* too big

A Solution: Multi-level Page Tables

This is extra (non-testable) material

This is called a *page walk*



Multi-level Page Tables

This is extra (non-testable) material

- A tree of depth k where each node at depth i has up to 2^j children if part i of the VPN has j bits
- Hardware for multi-level page tables inherently more complicated
  - But it's a necessary complexity – 1-level does not fit
- Why it works: Most subtrees are not used at all, so they are never created and definitely aren't in physical memory
  - Parts created can be evicted from cache/memory when not being used
  - Each node can have a size of ~1-100KB
- But now for a k-level page table, a TLB miss requires $k+1$ cache/memory accesses
  - Fine so long as TLB misses are rare – motivates larger TLBs

Practice VM Question

- Our system has the following properties
  - 1 MiB of physical address space
  - 4 GiB of virtual address space
  - 32 KiB page size
  - 4-entry fully associative TLB with LRU replacement

a) Fill in the following blanks:

________	Total entries in page table	________	Minimum bit-width of PTBR
________	TLBT bits	________	Max # of valid entries in a page table

Practice VM Question

- One process uses a page-aligned *square* matrix `mat[]` of 32-bit integers in the code shown below:

```
#define MAT_SIZE = 2048
for(int i=0; i<MAT_SIZE; i++)
     mat[i*(MAT_SIZE+1)] = i;
```

b) What is the largest stride (in bytes) between successive memory accesses (in the VA space)?

Practice VM Question

- One process uses a page-aligned *square* matrix `mat[]` of 32-bit integers in the code shown below:

```
#define MAT_SIZE = 2048
for(int i=0; i<MAT_SIZE; i++)
      mat[i*(MAT_SIZE+1)] = i;
```

c) What are the following hit rates for the *first* execution of the for loop?

_________ TLB Hit Rate _________ Page Table Hit Rate

BONUS SLIDES

For Fun: DRAMMER Security Attack

- Why are we talking about this?
  - **Recent:** Announced in October 2016; Google released Android patch on November 8, 2016
  - **Relevant:** Uses your system's memory setup to gain elevated privileges
    - Ties together some of what we've learned about virtual memory and processes
  - **Interesting:** It's a software attack that uses *only hardware vulnerabilities* and requires *no user permissions*

Underlying Vulnerability: Row Hammer

- Dynamic RAM (DRAM) has gotten denser over time
  - DRAM cells physically closer and use smaller charges
  - More susceptible to "*disturbance errors*" (interference)
- DRAM capacitors need to be "refreshed" periodically (~64 ms)
  - Lose data when loss of power
  - Capacitors accessed in rows
- Rapid accesses to one row can flip bits in an adjacent row!
  - ~ 100K to 1M times



Row Hammer Exploit

- Force constant memory access
  - Read then flush the cache
  - `clflush` – flush cache line
    - Invalidates cache line containing the specified address
    - Not available in all machines or environments
  - Want addresses X and Y to fall in activation target row(s)
    - Good to understand how *banks* of DRAM cells are laid out

```
hammertime:
  mov (X), %eax
  mov (Y), %ebx
  clflush (X)
  clflush (Y)
  jmp hammertime
```

- The row hammer effect was discovered in 2014
  - Only works on certain types of DRAM (2010 onwards)
  - These techniques target x86 machines

Consequences of Row Hammer

- Row hammering process can affect another process via memory
  - Circumvents virtual memory protection scheme
  - Memory needs to be in an adjacent row of DRAM
- Worse: privilege escalation
  - Page tables live in memory!
  - Hope to change PPN to access other parts of memory, or change permission bits
  - **Goal:** gain read/write access to a page containing a page table, hence granting process read/write access to *all of physical memory*

Effectiveness?

- Doesn't seem so bad – random bit flip in a row of physical memory
  - Vulnerability affected by system setup and physical condition of memory cells

- **Improvements:**
  - Double-sided row hammering increases speed & chance
  - Do system identification first (e.g. Lab 4)
    - Use timing to infer memory row layout & find "bad" rows
    - Allocate a huge chunk of memory and try many addresses, looking for a reliable/repeatable bit flip
  - Fill up memory with page tables first
    - `fork` extra processes; hope to elevate privileges in any page table

What's DRAMMER?

- No one previously made a huge fuss
  - **Prevention:** error-correcting codes, target row refresh, higher DRAM refresh rates
  - Often relied on special memory management features
  - Often crashed system instead of gaining control
- Research group found a *deterministic* way to induce row hammer exploit in a non-x86 system (ARM)
  - Relies on predictable reuse patterns of standard physical memory allocators
  - Universiteit Amsterdam, Graz University of Technology, and University of California, Santa Barbara

DRAMMER Demo Video

- It’s a shell, so not that sexy-looking, but still interesting
  - Apologies that the text is so small on the video

How did we get here?

- Computing industry demands more and faster storage with lower power consumption
- Ability of user to circumvent the caching system
  - `clflush` is an unprivileged instruction in x86
  - Other commands exist that skip the cache
- Availability of virtual to physical address mapping
  - **Example:** `/proc/self/pagemap` on Linux (not human-readable)
- Google patch for Android (Nov. 8, 2016)
  - Patched the ION memory allocator

More reading for those interested

- DRAMMER paper: https://vvdveen.com/publications/drammer.pdf
- Google Project Zero: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
- First row hammer paper: https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf
- Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer