#### **Guest Lecture**

### Secure Android Application Development

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### Roadmap

- Part 1: What can go wrong?
- Part 2: How are mobile platforms (Android) designed for security?
- Part 3: Best practices for mobile (Android) app developers

**SECURITY** 

## What can go wrong?

"Threat Model" 1: Malicious applications

Over 60% of Android malware steals your money via premium SMS, hides in fake forms of popular apps

By Emil Protalinski, Friday, 5 Oct '12, 05:50pm

# Android flashlight app tracks users via GPS, FTC says hold on

By Michael Kassner in IT Security, December 11, 2013, 9:49 PM PST

# What can go wrong?

"Threat Model" 1: Malicious applications

### Example attacks:

- Premium SMS messages
- Track location
- Record phone calls
- Log SMS
- Steal data
- Phishing





# What can go wrong?

"Threat Model" 2: Vulnerable applications

### Example concerns:

- User data is leaked or stolen
  - (on phone, on network, on server)
- Application is hijacked by an attacker



### **Mobile Platform Security Features**

**Goal:** Limit how much harm developers of malicious or buggy applications can do!

A key feature: Application isolation


#### Also:

- Secure hardware
- Full disk encryption
- Modern memory protections (e.g., ASLR)
- Application signing
- App store review

### **Applications are Isolated**

#### From each other

- Run in separate processes
- With separate UIDs



#### And from the system

- No shared accessible file system
- No default access to devices









### **Permissions**

#### **Prompts** (time-of-use)






#### Manifests (install-time)



### **Android 6.0: Prompts!**



- First-use prompts for sensitive permission (like iOS).
- Big change! Now app developers needed to check for permissions or catch exceptions.


# Best Practices for Mobile App Developers

- 1. Only ask for the permissions you need
- 2. Use "internal storage" for sensitive data
- 3. Validate input from external sources (incl. users)
- 4. Encrypt network communications
- 5. Don't hard-code secrets in source code
- 6. Use existing cryptography support (carefully)
- 7. Be careful with inter-process communications
- 8. Be careful about libraries you include


More: <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips">https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips</a>

### 1. Only ask for permissions you need

Apps are often "overprivileged". Early (2011) study:



- Overprivileged
- Possible false positives
- Not overprivileged



# 2. Use "internal storage" for sensitive data

### Internal storage is:

- Not accessible to other apps
- Deleted when the app is installed

External storage (like SD cards) are globally readable and writable.

Even better, encrypt data (EncryptedFile).

# 3. Validate input from external sources (including users)

### Check your assumptions about input!

- From users, from other apps, from web
- Length? Format?
- Can cause issues like buffer overflow attacks (in native code, not Java) or SQL injections (when sent to server)
- Be careful with WebViews

### 4. Encrypt network communications

**Use HTTPS!** This means user data will not be readable over the network.

```
URL url = new URL("https://www.yourserver.com");
HttpsURLConnection urlConnection =
   (HttpsURLConnection) url.openConnection();
urlConnection.connect();
InputStream in = urlConnection.getInputStream();
```

### 5. Don't hard-code secrets in source code

#### CryptoHelper.java

```
private static String SECRET_KEY = "8badcafef00ddead";
```



#### CryptoHelper.smali

const string v0, "8badcafef00ddead"
sput-object v0, Ledu/washington/cs/cse484/simplenotepad/
 CryptoHelper;->SECRET\_KEY:Ljava/lang/String;

### Instead, use Android Keystore

Allows you to create and store secret values.

### Prevents extraction of keys by:

- Making sure they never enter the application process
- 2. Use of secure hardware

# 6. Use existing cryptography libraries (carefully)

Do not write your own cryptography!

Unless you are a cryptographer ©

Follow recommended best practices for parameter selections:

https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/cryptography

# 7. Be careful with inter-process communications

- Primary mechanism in Android: Intents
  - Sent between application components
    - e.g., with startActivity(intent)
  - Explicit: specify component name
    - e.g., com.example.testApp.MainActivity
  - Implicit: specify action (e.g., ACTION\_VIEW) and/or data (URI and MIME type)
    - Apps specify Intent Filters for their components.


### **Eavesdropping and Spoofing**

- Buggy apps might accidentally:
  - Expose their component-to-component messages publicly avesdropping
  - Act on unauthorized messages they receive
     spoofing

### **Permission Re-Delegation**

 An application without a permission gains additional privileges through another application.

 Settings application is deputy: has permissions, and accidentally exposes APIs that use those permissions.



# 8. Be careful about libraries you include

Libraries run in the context of the application

-> they can use all the same permissions!

WIRED

# Thousands of Android apps have old security flaws lurking inside

Apps with millions of downloads are using code libraries with vulnerabilities in them, including some created by Facebook, Alibaba and Yahoo

# Best Practices for Mobile App Developers Questions?

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